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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the trade union movement in Turkey with particular reference to the Turkish 
confederation of trade unions (TURK-IS) and its members. Case studies were conducted in both TURK-
IS and its member unions, widely, based on open-ended interviews with union officials, but also 
involving the analysis of union's reports, documents and journals, the observation of workers education 
seminars and visits to the state's institutions and employers' organisations. The main purposes of the 
thesis have been to illustrate the changing nature, role and struggle of the Turkish unions in the context 
of the changing economic, political and social structure of Turkey. It also focuses on the dominant 
trends in trade unionism in a European context. 
The study argues that an explicit and theorised understanding of internal and external pressure on the 
trade union movements as they emerge in many countries, is of fundamental significance to the Turkish 
trade unions. It is argued that the trend in the Turkish labour relations in the 1960s and 70s seemed to 
be the co-operation of unions in the formulation of policies, related to national economic performance 
and social stability in politics. In other words, unions were tolerated to provide both economic and 
social stability at macro level and manageability and certainty at micro level in the light of the 
industrialisation process. 
In this context, Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) was the model of capital accumulation, which 
required trade unions to become integrated within the new economic and political policies in order to 
secure an economically and politically stable industrial relations framework. In this respect, the Turkish 
unions played a mediating role between the state, employers and workers. 
It is also argued that the changing system of capital accumulation (a move from lSI to "market 
liberalism") in the 1980s has endangered the traditional institutional arrangements. The traditional role 
of interest representation for unions, particularly as mediation between the ruling class and working 
class, has become problematic. The decline of union power, due to changes in their environments, has 
also weakened the value of central labour organisations as mediators between the state, employers and 
workers. The anti-labour policies seems to have been the outcome of strategic interventions of the 
governments and employers. In this context, particularly in the 1980s explicit reference to theoretical 
frameworks have tended to increase in favour of "strategic choices" and "union identities". 
The study argues that in the Turkish case, unions have not been faced with a complete policy of 
exclusion. In other words, the material conditions of "integrative" "collaborative" or "corporatist" 
policies have been reduced, however, they have not been completely eliminated. The reasons for this 
might be that although the economic power of TURK-IS and its members was no longer so important 
for the government, the political mediating role of unions became significant in the period of the 1980s, 
which included the transition to democracy, the process of integration of Europe, the implementation of 
austerity policies and the fear of the possible failure of the parliamentary regime. 
I argue in the thesis that under the painful and complex process of economic and political 
reconstruction and the development of democracy the Turkish trade unions have been faced with a 
number of tactical and political options in the rapidly evolving the issue of European Integration and of 
democracy and the increasing uniformity amongst member of TURK-IS. The Turkish case suggests that 
trade unions can achieve a position of influence in industrial relations systems as long as they pursue 
politically motivated strategies by setting a new agenda for members, articulating the broad long-term 
interests of the working class and finally displaying collective responses and collective responsibility. In 
this respect, it is argued that there is still a significant scope for a more active initiating and co-
ordinating role for central labour organisations and unions can pursue more comprehensive and tenable 
trade union strategies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
(i) The Thesis: The Conceptual and Analytical Perspectives for the 
Understanding of Turkish Trade Unions. 
This is a study about the trade union movement in Turkey with particular reference to 
the Turkish Confederation of trade unions (TURK-IS) and its members in the light of 
cross-national perspectives. The study examines the development, model, role and 
struggle of TURK-IS which is the country's leading labour organisation. 
Trade UnIons are expected to accommodate both their members and their external 
environments. Their role, policies and strategies are shaped in terms of the relations 
between the external and internal environments of the unions. The influence of trade 
unions can be also seen as a product of their successful interaction with their external 
and internal environments (Hartmann and Lau 1980). In this context, the nature of 
unions is based on their capacity for both mobilising or constraining their members and 
seeking the opportunities for the recognition and concessions from the state and 
employers. 
Some scholars have concentrated on organisational explanations of trade UnIon 
movements irrespective of the overlap and complex relations between unions' internal 
and external environment (Martin 1962, Windmuller 1975). Martin (1989: 110) argues 
that: 
9 
"it is trade union movements themselves, rather than the political and economic context 
in which they operate, which must be given priority in any attempt to establish a 
workable typology of such movements. In other words, the distinguishing criteria of the 
typology need to be derived directly from the trade unions and whatever aspects of 
their structure, behaviour, or experience is involved'. 
These studies lacked elaboration of the impact of external forces on the union's external 
influence. On the other hand, some analysts employed a more elaborate formulation or 
classification of different national trade union movements in terms of the nature of the 
politico-economic systems (Kerr at al 1964, Dahrendorf 1959). A number of authors 
also grouped trade union movements by considering the relations between trade unions 
and governments, political parties, or collective bargaining such as (Millen 1963, Davis 
1966 and Clegg 1976). However, these approaches mentioned above seem problematic 
in the Turkish case, since the relations between unions and other elements such as 
unions and working class party relations, workshop organisations etc. are either weak or 
absent. They also fall well short of providing satisfactory explanations for the analysis 
of changes in economic and political situations and of the struggle of the working class 
at crucial times. 
In fact, academics' interest in the role of unions in national labour relations increased 
with the emergence of studies on the capitalist state and the issue of corporatism 
(Schmitter 1977, Panitch 1977, Lehmbruch 1977). In this sense, there is no doubt that 
significant emphasis was given to the role and function of the trade unions. Therefore, 
the themes "mediating agency" or "intermediary organisation" were pursued in the 
discussion to describe the general character and posture of trade unions. For example, 
Muller-Jentsch's (1985) distinction between co-operative, militant and social contract 
10 
forms of intermediary trade unionism offered important comments on the elaboration of 
the role of national trade union movements, although he did not say much about how 
trade unions adopt or change co-operative, militant or social contract forms of their 
intermediary role within the continued crises of capitalist structural framework or how 
the relationships (among state, employers and workers) which trade unions maintain 
affect each other (1). 
Significant here is the understanding of trade unions and their role as institutions and 
processes of mediation. This point is important to make sense of the nature and the 
process of trade unions within the Turkish context. This discussion can become a 
theoretical starting point. It offers the crucial potential for looking at the establishment 
and development of trade unions; their relations with external and internal environments 
and their struggles from the perspective of the state, employers and workers relations. 
Hence, in interaction with the external and internal relations of trade uruons, the 
economic and political context and organisational strength play very important roles in 
understanding a country's union developments, roles and responses against the 
background of both external and internal developments. In this sense, a conceptual and 
analytical framework can be explored so as to illustrate the complex and potential 
impact of external and internal forces on the national union movements and labour 
organisations. 
Most academics in Europe have described the last decade as the crisis of trade unions. 
Among the important reasons given in explanation of the decline of union power are: 
considerable changes in the economic and political environments, the occupational and 
sectoral structures, the structure of potential membership and employers and 
management strategies. The profound changes in the environment of trade unions have 
11 
had a significant impact on the trade union movement including a decline in umon 
membership and strikes, an increasing diversity of interest within unions and workers, a 
decline in the authority of central confederation and the threat of their image. 
As in the case of most European countries, unions in Turkey have also been affected by 
the changing environment of the 1980s. While some of the developments seem to have 
been similar, factors which could be given for the deteriorating union situations may 
have been somewhat different in Turkey. The aim of this study is to attempt not only to 
discuss some parallel developments which are universal in character in many countries, 
but also to explore the key factors and outcomes unique to the Turkish case. In other 
words, in the light of changes in other countries' trade union movements, what are the 
distinctive and similar developments in the Turkish case. In order to draw a clear picture 
of Turkish unions the main purpose is also to analyse the undergoing external 
conditions, constraints, institutions, policies and strategies which have been likely to 
influence and reshape the role of unions under the changing circumstances of the 1980s 
and after. 
In this thesis, the basic approach to understanding the contemporary Turkish trade union 
movement is that Turkish unions are located in the particular economic, social and 
political context of Turkey. Therefore, trade unions should not be treated in isolation 
from the economic, political and social factors influencing them. It is simply in the 
dynamic, complex and contradictory interplay of economic, political and social relations 
that trade unions are established and developed. In other words, the formation, 
development and role of trade unions should be placed in their historical context and 
nationally specific political and economic settings and structural constraints. 
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In this study the Turkish unions' changing nature, role and struggle are analysed in the 
context of the changing economic, political and social structure of Turkey. It also 
focuses on the dominant trends in trade unionism in a European context and relates them 
to the empirical reality of Turkey. Within this framework, the understanding of Turkish 
unions might be dependent on continuing changes in the politico-economic system and 
the relations between state, employers, workers and other institutions. In short, they can 
be regarded as natural outcomes of their environments. 
During the period from World War II until the 1960s and partly the 1970s, due to the 
sustained capitalist expansion, reasonable concession between state, employers and 
unions was witnessed in many countries. This period is widely accepted as 
"institutionalisation of conflict" in industrial relations. This type of industrial relations 
system let unions enter into a specific set of mediating processes (Hyman 1989). 
While the capitalist expansion continued to provide the margin for compromise among 
opposing interests by setting up peaceful and orderly relations, mostly, in the name of 
"national interests", the notion of "pluralistic industrialism" gave rise to "industrial 
relations pluralism" in which workers' disruptive power was controlled. Therefore, the 
trend in labour relations in the 1960s and 70s seemed to be the co-operation of unions in 
the formulation of policies, related to national economic performance and social stability 
in politics. 
In a somewhat similar way, although the capital expansion or development and labour 
movement were weak compared with European countries, the economic and political 
strategies of governments in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s required the recognition of 
unions as intermediary organisations. This can also be seen as an attempt to establish a 
"pluralistic industrial relations system" in Turkey in the consideration of social stability 
13 
and econorrnc development policies through "integration" or "collaboration" and 
sometimes "social contract". This labour "inclusive" policy was also, most probably, due 
to the recognition of governments of the potential disruptive power of trade unions. 
From the beginning of the establishment of the industrial relations system in Turkey in 
the 1960s as bargainers with state and employers, unions tended to be considered as an 
indication of "business" unionism, albeit not often in the American sense because , , 
unions also pursued militant wage and social policies. As a result of ideological 
developments, the attempts for centralisation of union structure and militant wage 
claims, the effort for a "social contract" was witnessed in the late 1970. However, in the 
Turkish context, in comparison with most European countries corporatism did not 
become a significant notion as a part of social democratic ideologies of macro economic 
policies Rather, it appeared as a consequences of "the pragmatic needs of government 
to come to terms with the power of unions and their members to disrupt" (as Hyman 
(1989: 172-173) described it for English case). In other words, the economic and 
political crises and instability further required the co-operation of unions once more, this 
time through "social contract". On the unions' side, the slogan of "organisational needs" 
was a popular term, particularly in TURK-IS. In other words, the statement of Flanders 
(1969:238) "institutional interests of their organisation in survival and growth" for 
unions was also helpful to understand the point of Turkish unionists' views at the time. 
In short, the main concentration for Turkish unions was to preserve the integrity of the 
union and avoid a collapse of its strength. In this period, it might be over simple to 
define Turkish unions either as "Business" type or "social contract" type, but, they were 
likely to be identified between the two categories. However, the emergence of novel, 
changing and frequently difficult economic and political circumstances for trade unions 
in the 1980s and 90s, has opened the question of the relationship between unions and 
their environments and their changing role once more to discussion not only in the 
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industrial relations arena but also in society as a whole. The political and econorruc 
crises of capitalist development have again required new labour strategies, whether 
"inclusive" or "exclusive" for governments. It is a fact that in most countries in the 
1980s and after, the traditional role of interest representation for unions, particularly as 
mediators between the ruling class and working class, has become problematic. 
The profound changes in the environment of trade unions have had a significant impact 
on trade union movements in many countries. The fact is that the ability of unions to 
disrupt the priorities of the ruling class in the same period has been undermined. Thus, 
the political and economic consideration of collaborative or corporatist strategies for 
governments has been diminished. In these circumstances, the "exclusive" labour policies 
of governments seem to have become more crucial. This is important because the 
decline of union power, due to changes in their environments, has also reduced the value 
of central labour organisations as mediators between the state, employers and workers. 
In this sense, one of the changes of the 1980s, observable in all European countries, was 
"the very Widespread diminution of the role played by central organisations" (Baglioni 
1990: 10). This development seems to have "decomposed the intermediary character of 
unions" (Muller-Jentsch 1988: 176). It is also likely to weaken internal authority of 
unions and diminish their external recognition as a bargaining partner. 
On the other hand, there seem to be new professional associations, quasi-trade unions 
and unionisation of expanding sectors and other independent organisations being 
established outside the framework of the central confederations. According to Hyman 
(1994) these developments may also encourage a more active initiating and co-
ordinating role for central confederations. He also suggests various options (e.g. 
company union, social partner and social movement) available to trade unions in Europe 
in the 1990s. Taking Hyman's ideal models as a starting-point, the Turkish case shows 
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that room for manoeuvering still exists. Although the outcome can be somewhat 
different; depending on unions' distinctive objectives, tactics and strategies. 
At least for the Turkish case it would be wrong to argue that unions have been faced 
with a complete policy of exclusion. Although the material conditions of "integrative" 
"collaborative" or "corporatist" policies have been reduced, they have not been 
completely eliminated. For example, Ozal's government challenged the status of TURK-
IS as the main representative of Turkish workers, but it did not diminish its role. The 
reasons for this might be that although the economic power of TURK-IS and its 
members was not so important for the government, the political status of unions was still 
significant in a critical period which included the transition to democracy, the process of 
the integration of Europe, the implementation of austerity policies and the fear of the 
possible failure of the parliamentary regime. 
(ii) The Research Context: Problems and Methods. 
The study focuses not only on social institutions, but also the broad political and 
economic context, therefore, it should be considered in this light. This is necessary given 
a context where comprehensive labour studies are not yet well-developed. There is 
neither a tradition of debate on the working-class movement, nor complementary 
institutional histories of trade unions. In other words, Turkish literature on trade 
unionism is inadequate in two crucial respects. First, the institutional forms of trade 
unionism as a focus are absent. Second, it lacks anything approaching a serious 
explanatory theory of national trade union movements. 
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The debates on trade unionism have also never been of a sufficient level. There are 
several grounds for this yet by and large the following factors can be suggested: First, 
the almost hegemonic nature of positivism and pluralism in most Turkish social sciences. 
Secondly, the legalistic orientation of Turkish studies, which denies a wider conceptual 
and analytical approach. There have chiefly been a lack of study about the economic, 
political and ideological issues of workers-unions-state- employers relations. In fact, 
most of studies on trade unions were based on explaining Turkish labour legislation. 
Therefore, the major problem which appeared during the course of this study was the 
lack of any field work about trade union organisations in Turkey. Moreover, in the 
English language, secondary literature on Turkish unions was also absent. As a matter of 
fact, the field of industrial relations is a new discipline in Turkey where only a very 
limited study has been done so far. 
In a few studies the methodologies used were concerned with collecting data from 
institutions dependent on the state, including official Ministry of Labour statistics rather 
than focusing on more direct methods such as interviews with union officials, local 
labour representatives or observation, particularly on the conditions of employment and 
general attitudes of the states and employers. In addition to this, the absence of 
alternative critical views on trade unionism in Turkish literature is also crucial. More 
importantly, none of these studies such as Tuna (1964), Hale (1977), Dereli (1968), 
(1984) (most of them were short articles written before the 1980s) has a cross-national 
perspective which would allow readers to make comparison on various important issues. 
However, it can be mentioned that a more comprehensive historical account of the trade 
union movement in Turkey can be found in writers' works such as Rose (1962), Isikli 
(1967, 1979), Tuna (1964), although most of these studies dealt with trade unions 
developments during relatively short historical periods and none of them is up to date. 
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Even so, irrespective of their weakness, these studies contribute to our understanding of 
labour history and trade unionism in Turkey. 
Broadly speaking, considering the empirical side of study, two important points have to 
be made. The first is that as far as trade union organisations are concerned, the thesis 
focuses on the country's leading labour organisation, TURK-IS and its member unions 
which are national in scope. However, it does not neglect the activities, attitudes and 
aspirations of workers and organisational and collective means of struggles. Especially, 
the empirical research work has been carried out on two levels. The first is to be 
"external" relations of TURK-IS such as relations with the state and employers 
organisations. The second is to be "internal" relations of the confederation such as the 
relations between the confederation and industrial organisations. The study concentrates 
on the Turkish confederation of trade unions (TURK-IS) and its affiliates from the 
national level of confederation down to industrial organisational level so as to answer 
the questions raised during the interviews and more importantly develop my arguments 
on Turkish trade union movements. Then, the relation between the two levels will be 
also be examined, how the external and internal relations of TURK-IS shape the 
objectives, strategies and roles of the confederation, and with what problems. 
Thus, the external and internal approaches are preferred in the hope of offering 
interesting insights into the level of importance different trade unions attach to their 
national structures. Hopefully, the benefit of this is that it enables us to understand the 
external and internal relations of the confederation and to provide an analytical and 
comparative study. In this context the present study, which adopts a more analytical 
view of the trade union movement in Turkey, should be seen as an attempt to provide a 
more critical approach to Turkish unions. In short, the thesis seeks to illustrate what the 
contemporary experience of Turkey can tell us about trade unions in Turkey. It also 
18 
takes a cross-national analysis of trade union movements into account. Particularly it is 
concerned with the patterns, development, role and policies of Turkish unions under the 
changing economic, social and political climate of Turkey. 
(a) Why TURK-IS? 
As a case study, TURK-IS and its members are of interest for two reasons in particular. 
In the first place, it occupies an important position in the hierarchy of contemporary 
Turkish pressure groups considering its formal and informal links with government and 
its relations with employers and political parties (although it does not have a direct close 
link with any political party). Second, its capacity for attracting public attention is 
crucial and finally it has a long history in the Turkish labour movement especially under 
the changing economic, social and political structure of Turkey (TURK-IS, which has 
32 affiliates with total membership of 1,784,663 is the largest labour confederation in 
Turkey). 
My first exploratory visit to Turkey in April 1992 allowed me concentrate on all 
members (industrial unions) rather than select a number of industries or industrial 
unions. The key reasons for this is that firstly, as far as the level and development of the 
Turkish industrial relations system is concerned, there is a significant need to do 
research about national level actors (the state, employers and trade unions) before going 
into sectoral or workplace level. Even in Europe, academic interest has only recently 
shifted from national to workplace level. Considering that Turkish unions have only 30 
years of history (compared with over a century of European trade union history) and the 
absence of academic debate even at the national level, it can be clearly seen why the 
study focuses on this level. Second, the relations between unions and other elements, 
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such as unions and working class party relations and workplace representation have not 
emerged in Turkey. Therefore, these kinds of relations can not carry much weight for 
the investigation of the Turkish trade union movement. Finally, in Turkey particularly in 
the 1980s, the same model of struggle and responses among all unions in different 
sectors or industries was witnessed against external pressure. This might make the 
Turkish case more interesting. How can Turkish unions produce the same responses 
against the challenges of the 1980s? how do unions provide this unity and how does this 
happen? The main reason for this is, probably, because most of the members of TURK-
IS are organised in the public sector. All these facts also lead us to take all members of 
the confederation into consideration. 
(b) WHY 1960-1990s? 
The period of this study is from 1960, the year when the first steps were taken to 
establish an industrial relations system in Turkey, to the 1990s. In fact, the 1960s 
witnessed two significant developments in Turkish labour history. Firstly, the 
constitution of 1961 provided articles 46 and 47 on trade union freedom, the right of 
workers to bargain collectively with employers and the right to strike. Secondly, this 
coincided with a period of rapid economic development. Moreover, the 1980s was a 
crucial turning point in the history of the country's trade union movement as it marked 
the implementation of another round of more restrictive labour legislation in 1983. With 
reference to the role of TURK-IS in the industrial relations system, the 1980s were 
significant years since it remained as the only strong and effective leading labour 
organisation. What is more, the change in government leadership in October 1991 is said 
to have brought a "new" shift in the political and economic approach of the government, 
which in turn resulted in significant changes in labour relations. 
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It is for these various reasons that the study is confined to 1960-90s, a period which 
covers the formation, development and changing role of TURK-IS. This suggests that 
the periodization of the study is sufficient for a proper appraisal and understanding of 
patterns, development, role and struggle of Turkish unions. 
(c) Why European Context? 
Regarding the Turkish trade union movement, a number of reasons for the selection of a 
European context or of the European conceptual and analytical perspectives can be 
suggested. First, I reject comparing Turkey with the framework of developing or third 
world countries. This is because most studies on developing countries have taken as 
their prototype the colonial or post colonial state and its implications for trade union 
movement, which is the common political form in Afro-Asia. However, the 
inappropriateness of this approach for Turkey is quite obvious. As Hale (1977) argued: 
given the descendants of one of the major powers of renaissance Europe, Turkey's post-
renaissance history has more in common with that of Austria-Hungary than with that of 
Nigeria, India or Brazil. 
Therefore, Turkey's industrial progress is unique among developing nations due to the 
absence of a colonial overlay. Moreover, it is also not quite safe to relate Latin 
American experiences to the Turkish case simply by taking military interventions into 
consideration. Military take-overs seem to reflect a complex combination of factors 
unique to each country, with diverse consequences. How can one explain that after the 
military interventions of Turkey, unions always immediately restructured and re-emerged 
as an indispensable social partner of the Turkish industrial relations system, unlike most 
Latin American countries? 
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In terms of a systematic analysis of the development of each country's econOffilC, 
political, social and democracy process it is quite possible to say that there are important 
similarities between Turkey and particularly Southern European countries. In addition, 
through Turkey's various memberships of such international organisations as the council 
of Europe, and GECD, she seems more close to European countries in many respects. It 
is possible that Turkey can be part of the European Community (EC) in a future time. 
Turkey made an application on 14th April 1987 for full membership to the European 
Community (EC) in accordance with article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Various 
attempts have already been undertaken by Turkey in order to adapt its economic and 
social structure to EC standards. More importantly, all Turkish unions are linked to 
European trade unions at international level. 
(d) Method of Study. 
Although my intention is to restrict the investigation to the nature of and extent of 
Turkish unions, a study of trade unions in Turkey requires the analysis of existing 
knowledge and evidence in European literature in order to reach more general 
conclusion for the Turkish case. This approach is termed a II comparative review II 
(Hyman 1992b). There has been a tendency in Turkish literature to focus on the formal 
legal structures as a basis for comparison, rather than to address the more complex 
information practices and processes of trade union movements in other countries. A 
comparative approach to the study of Turkish trade unions would be a useful way of 
verifying hypotheses or of producing generalisations derived from research findings in a 
variety of natural contexts. Since the thesis is mostly about Turkish unions, the 
comparative dimension in the study is organised around a number of central topics 
rather than being in the form of a side by side treatment of a number of individual 
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countries. This method can be called "integrated approach" (Bean 1985). This is to 
avoid a concentration on the domestic minutiae and empirical details of union practices 
within the particular countries which may be available elsewhere in detail. The intention 
is to deal with material theme by theme rather than country by country. In short, the 
thesis has been informed by a wide reading of the secondary source material in European 
literature. 
Generally speaking, anyone attempting research into Turkish trade unions in industrial 
relations has to take the problem of methodology into consideration. Although it may 
need a tight focus, it is sometimes difficult to specify the scope of research due to the 
variety of circumstances and the complexity of every aspect of trade unionists' and 
workers' behaviour. In the study, the case study method is applied. The main reason to 
choose this method is that observation and interviews are most frequently used in case 
study and methods of collecting information can be selected, which are also appropriate 
for the task (Bulmer 1977, Bell 1987). It should be said that each organisation has its 
common and its unique features under the different economic and social structure. 
Therefore, in the hope of the case study, the aim is to identify such features and to show 
how they affect the implementation of systems and influence the wayan organisation 
functions. 
Three separate research visits to Turkey provided the bulk of original documentary, and 
interview material. Because, most of the empirical evidence was only available through 
interviews, these have been cited comprehensively throughout the study. Interviews 
were conducted through direct contact and mostly open-ended informal talk. The 
questions raised throughout the thesis are shaped not only by myself, but also by the 
trade unions. In other words, problems were of interest to both myself and the trade 
unions. 
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As far as the method IS concerned, the basic method used In this study can be 
summarised as follows: 
a) Documents including conference and Annual Reports of and Journal of 
TURK-IS and of its members have been used. 
b) Interviews with the Minister of Labour, Mehmet Mogultay, the president 
of TURK-IS, Bayram Meral and Executive committee, Salih Kilic and 
Enver Tocoglu and ex-president of the confederation, Halil Tunc and ex-
general secretary of TURK-IS, Kaya Ozdemir, the president of TISK 
(Employer organisation), Refik Baydur and vice president of KOC, 
Tugrul Kudatgobilik (the largest and the most important private company 
with 40.000 workers in Turkey) were conducted and also 28 national 
uruons and 22 local branches of some of these national unions were 
visited (most interviews were conducted with the leaders of and the 
members of the executive committee of these unions). In addition to this, 
3 union education seminars in different industries were attended and a 
great number of union officials, shop stewards and workers were 
interviewed. The interviews took place in Istanbul, Ankara and Kocaeli, 
three major industry cities in Turkey. 
c) Observational analyses based on the interviews and personal contacts 
have been made. 
d) Two popular journalists, Sukran Ketenci and Yildirim Koc (who is also a 
consultant for the president of TURK-IS) on labour Issues were 
interviewed and consulted by personal contact. At both Istanbul and 
Ankara universities the academics in industrial relations area were also 
consulted to share their knowledge and experience in Turkish unionism. 
e) A number of institutions visited to gather information are: the 
Association of Quality for companies in Istanbul, the Ministry of Labour 
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m Ankara, the State Statistics Institute in Ankara, the Bureau of 
International Labour Organisation in Ankara, the Archives of two 
Turkish news papers, Cumhuriyet and Milliyet in Istanbul, International 
Labour organisation (lLO) in Geneva in Switzerland and International 
Confederation of Free Trade unions (ICFTU) and European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) in Brussels in Belgium. 
( e) Outline of the Thesis. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. While the first part will cover the periods of 1960s 
and 70s, the second part will include the periods of 1980s and after. In part 1, the 
approach adopted was to understand the trade union movement in Turkey in the 1960s 
and 70s in terms of the incorporation of trade unions into the economic and political 
institutions of the newly emerged Turkish capitalism and of the transformation of their 
role as representative organisations of Turkish workers. In other words, it was argued 
that the project of the ruling class in those years was to include trade unions in the 
formulation and implementation of economic and political goals; notably stable 
economic growth and social peace. In this part, the terms such as "mediating agency" or 
"intermediary organisations" used by European academics as Muller-Jentsch (1985), 
Hyman (1975) were also employed to describe the general character and posture of 
Turkish trade unions. In other words, it is suggested that these themes in the Turkish 
context could be also discussed for the understanding of Turkish unions through, 
perhaps, different explanation or reasons. 
In this context, the task in Chapter 2 is to explain the development, patterns and major 
trends in other countries' trade union movements during the period under examination. 
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Chapter 3 focuses on an account of the origins and development of Turkish unions in the 
light of the economic, social and political structure of Turkey. In other words, the 
economic, social and political structure of Turkey will be examined to understand the 
conditions of the country in which Turkish unions are operating, mainly, it is to 
demonstrate the external factors which have a great deal of influence on the 
development of Turkish unions. The task here is to ask such questions as-
-What were the principal determining features of trade union development and 
how were these shaped in Turkey and by whom? 
-What role did trade unions themselves have in these process, how were they 
affected by the external and internal environments upon which they act and why? 
-How did these relations between the internal and external forces affect the 
development model of Turkish trade unions? 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the history and structure of TURK-IS by illustrating its 
functions, principles and activities. This is necessary to answer the questions like 
-Why, when and how did attempts occur in order to set up a labour 
confederation in Turkey? 
-What were the results and product of such efforts? 
-What are the ideology and objective of TURK-IS as far as industrial relations is 
concerned? 
-What is the representative function of TURK-IS both at national and 
international level? 
Chapter 5 gives particular attention to an analysis of the role of TURK-IS in Turkish 
industrial relations system particularly in relation to the relations with the state. political 
parties and collective bargaining. It also deals with the important issue of union 
democracy and leadership. 
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In part 2, the main purpose is to analyse the external conditions, constraints, institutions, 
policies and strategies which are likely to influence and reshape the role of unions under 
the changing circumstances of the 1980s and 90s. Basically, the question here is what 
happened particularly after 1980 and how far these changes represented a substantial 
difference from the past, mainly, since 1960. 
The task in part 2 is to find out what have been the main changes in the external and 
internal environments of trade unions and how these challenged their organisation and 
practice. In this part, it might be also argued that although the challenges of the 1980s 
and 90s have tended to decompose the intermediary character of unions, the Turkish 
case suggests that there is still a role for national unions and confederations. 
Chapter 6 explores the changes in trade union movements in other countries in the 
1980s. Chapter 7 discusses the political, economic and institutional changes and 
constraints and, more importantly, their impact on Turkish unions. It also deals with 
such major issues as privatization, anti-labour legislation, cultural and ideological 
offensive and the changing nature of collective bargaining. 
The purpose in Chapter 8 is to analyse how trade unions in Turkey affect the extent and 
nature of current difficulties. Can trade unions produce effective responses to new 
external pressures? Do they have such capacities? What sort of opportunities and 
policies are available to unions and can Turkish unions present an area of strategic 
choices in responding to the challenges and changes of the 1980s and 90s? In this 
chapter, it is argued that unions do have such capacities when they act collectively and 
pursue the economic interests of their members as well as political interests and explains 
how this happens. And also it argues that trade unions can produce "strategic choice" 
because they might seek to improve their current sets of contextual opportunities. 
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In the Turkish context, the key question might be also whether under the changing 
economic and political environment in the 1980s and 90s the role of trade unions as 
"intermediary organisations" "mediating agency" is still possible? If not, what can be the 
changing role of unions in Turkey? This lead us to Chapter 9. Chapter 9 concludes the 
study by analysing the findings in the light of general discussion and arguing whether 
alternative patterns of trade union actions in the 1990s for Turkish unions can be 
suggested through taking the recent conceptual or analytical perspectives on the subject 
in European literature into consideration. 
NOTES: 
1) The term, "intermediary organisation" is also used with reference to a unionism 
committed to reform within the capitalist structural framework. This is a 
unionism which sees its future and the future of the working class as being 
determined by close co-operation with capital and the government of the day, 
and that it is solely prepared to exert its role to the extent that this does not 
antagonise the power structure (Muller-Jentsch 1985). 
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PART I 
CHAPTER 2 
THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE UNIONISM IN 
VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN THE 1960s AND 70s. 
(i) The Post-war Settlement. 
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Some similar developments in various countries' trade union movements in the 1960s 
and 70s have been discussed by scholars. Broadly speaking, it would not be wrong to 
describe the post-war period as a Keynesian welfare state. At its base is a belief that the 
post-war boom had a significant effect on the economic role of the state and the political 
regime of accumulation. The state had to ensure the management of the national 
economy in order to secure the conditions for continued economic growth and mass 
consumption. This policy was combined with a political exchange, a compromise 
between the interests of capital and labour so as to maintain aggregate demand and full 
employment. Therefore, permanent income increases and a high level of employment 
were secured in exchange for the abandonment of the politicisation of the production 
process (Altvater et a11986, Offe 1984). 
It should be stressed that Keynesian economic policies in capitalist societies were all 
committed to a strategy of post-war reconstruction and economic expansion based on 
Fordism, "a pattern of capital accumulation". In other words, the success of Keynesian 
policies in the post-war period which secured a stable economic growth and full 
employment was primarily due to Fordism and the hegemony of the USA in the world 
economy. To the extent that as suggested by many commentators (Baglioni 1989, 
Jessop et a1 1986) in this period the political and economic climate gave rise to the 
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recognition of trade union rights and collective bargaining and the political acceptance 
of trade unions as an important social partners in economic and political management. 
Besides, trade unions did not use their market power by political bargaining, there was a 
significant link between an expanding welfare system and this pattern of class 
comproIll1se. 
In this sense, Hyman (1992a: 152) argues that "in phases of economic growth it is 
possible to reconcile competing interests through processes of positive-sum 
distributional bargaining". In short, the post-war realignment between capital and 
labour provided a development in the position of labour and labour unions on the basis 
of collective bargaining and political citizenship. 
However, it is well known that in the late 1960s and the 1970s the economic and 
political climate changed in many countries, basically, the post-war conditions started to 
decline in this period. This can also be called "the collapse of the post-war regime of 
accumulation". Most capitalist countries' economies faced several problems such as 
rising inflation, unemployment and growing recession. In addition to this, the late 1960s 
and early 1970s witnessed an increase of industrial conflict and rank and file militancy. 
This trend may be called the collective mobilisation of workers. Hyman points out that 
rank and file militancy did not only express itself through strikes but also through other 
manifestations of active dissatisfaction particularly in the workplace. Thus, one of the 
main issues was also the relations between workers and trade unions, particularly, their 
leadership (1) (Regini 1992). 
It is quite significant to note that the organisation of production combined with Fordist 
lines gave rise to intense work effort and the lack of real carer opportunities for 
workers. However, it also gave them a high disruptive ability. Moreover, Panitch (1986) 
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stresses that the industrial strength of workers' organisations increased in the post-war 
period with the help of a long period of full employment. This development also brought 
about wage increases. In this case there were two problems for many governments. One 
of them was the price increases which reduced the countries' foreign competitiveness 
and the other was, unless price increases were allowed, a profit squeeze, which is the 
source of capital accumulation. This is why the states pursued incomes policies in order 
to control money-wage demands in collective bargaining. Employers and governments in 
many countries wanted to see the participation of trade unions in the management of 
economic policies as a solution of the crisis. 
Therefore, the state developed a corporatist strategy which can also be regarded as neo 
corporatism or social concertation which enabled the organised socio-economic 
producer groups to integrate by means of a system of representation at the leadership 
level and mobilisation at the mass level. This also requires the non-conflicted integration 
of central trade union and business organisations into tripartite economic planning 
bodies by coinciding with incomes policies. 
(ii) The Experience of "Corporatism". 
After collective mobilisation declined in most countries during the 1970s, the late 1970s 
and early 1980s were regarded as the decade of neo-corporatism or social concertation. 
Hence, collective bargaining in many countries has been progressively replaced by a 
political bargaining or, as in the British case, a "social contract". In other words, the 
institutions and practices of concertation were widely applied in most countries. 
According to Regini (1992) the key issue was here the relationship between labour and 
the state rather than the relationship between trade unions and workers. In those years 
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concertation IS said to have been a highly politicised type of bargaining through 
involving governments, employers and trade unions in the deal. Concertation was also 
regarded as a highly centralised political exchange; this means that it was the centre of 
all system of industrial relations. 
Let us put it simply, concertation or political bargaining was an institutional framework 
within which organised economic interests were represented in order to shape the state 
policy through bypassing the parliamentary process. What was, then, significant for 
industrial relations was that first of all unions were said to play an important role in the 
industrial relations sphere and also in the political arena by getting involved in the 
decision-making and implementation process. This may also have had an influence on 
union recognition and collective bargaining. Second, union participation in 
policy-making was subject to an acceptance of capital accumulation and third, union 
representation had a more problematic relationship with the rank and file. That is to say 
that leadership collaboration was given an important degree of disciplinary actions in 
order to prevent rank and file actions during the corporate arrangements (Hyman 1986, 
Crouch 1978). 
It should be emphasised that the experience of corporatism has varied considerably 
between countries reflecting diversities in their own economic and political 
developments. It was either long term and stable in the countries like Austria, Sweden 
and Norway or unstable in Italy and the UK. It also occurred in Germany, although not 
always in a stable form. Now attention can be drawn briefly to the experience of 
corporatism which had a considerable effect on trade union movements in several 
countries. In the British case, much experience of corporatism failed compared with the 
other European countries. What is necessary to note is that in the 1960s there was a 
shift towards concertation in wage bargaining in order to secure full employment and 
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expand the welfare state. Unions participated in economic planning and they limited their 
pay claims. However, there were no attempts to set out statutory support for collective 
bargaining or union recognition. In the 1970s in Britain in fact although the TUC sought 
a co-operative relationship with government, this could not be institutionalised. There 
were two attempts in the 1970s to establish stronger corporatist arrangement. One of 
them was in 1972, it was unsuccessful, the other was known as the social contract 
(1974-1979). The aim of social contract was to make legal concessions and greater 
participation in economic decision-making for the TUC, but the social contract failed 
between 1974 and 1976. This was primarily because the labour government did not yield 
decision-making power to the unions and basically the unions could not provide the 
support of their members for pay restraint (2) (Hyman 1986, Crouch 1978). 
In the case of Italy, in the early post-war period, political exchange was impossible. 
Economic and social policy making was dominated by ideological consideration. 
Consequently, the involvement of trade unions was excluded. Also an export based 
industrialisation pursued by a Christian Democrat government brought about the 
subordination and political exclusion of labour. However, more significant changes took 
place in the 1960s. The Italian trade union movements developed substantial overall 
strength in collective bargaining; in industrial action and the like. Meanwhile, it began to 
act in a directly political role. The centre and centre-left governments and the strike 
waves in 1968 and 1969 caused several social reforms and employment support 
measures, including trade union and employment rights. It is crucial, though, to stress 
that like the British social contract, Italy had an experience of concertation called 
"solidarieta nazionale". Italian trade unions wanted to promote long term political 
exchange with the objectives, for example, a trade-off between wage moderation and 
influence over industrial and labour market policies in exchange for fostering growth and 
sustaining employment by taking economic recession and growing inflation in to 
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consideration. Yet, "solidarieta nazionale" came to an end due to the unions' 
unwillingness to continue their strategy of political exchange (Baglioni 1987, Cella and 
Treu 1986). Regini 1984 is quite right in saying that it was the unions' growing 
awareness of their miscalculation of the benefits which could in fact be obtained from 
concertation. Therefore, it was not the difficulty of enforcing wage restraint and of 
controlling workers' disagreements which can be seen in the British social contract case. 
However, in the 1980s there has been a tendency for corporatism in Italy (although 
disagreement among parties was witnessed over several issues). Crouch (1978) points 
out that in the context of Italy and France, the state did not use trade unions as 
instruments of national cohesion primarily due to the weakness and isolation of the 
unions from the experience of political exchange. 
In addition to this, it might be argued that in these two countries because of the 
unwillingness of the large communist movement, the experience of corporatism was also 
limited. In the case of France in the 1960s there was no significant participation between 
the unions and the French state, in fact, the state was usually suspicious of organised 
interest grouping. Moreover, French employers were strictly anti-union, particularly in 
the factories and at the workplace generally, France was similar to Italy in that a labour 
movement in the post-war period was shaped by the cold war. An important degree of 
nationalisation was carried out especially during the Gaullist period. Although there 
were some attempts in order to set up some form of dialogue and co-operation, this did 
not affect the established patterns of industrial relations in the 1970s. After the socialist 
government came to power, workplace representation was strengthened under the 
programme oflegislation introduced by Auroux (Pontusson 1983, Hyman 1989). 
During the dictatorships in Spain, Portugal and Greece the autarchic models paved the 
way for a more internationalised economy in consideration with both rapid 
industrialisation and the booming world market in the 1960s. This increased the pressure 
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for a modernisation of the regIme. For example, during the Franco term some 
concessions such as the factory juries (Jurados de empresa) were granted to workers. 
This meant that workers were provided with a representative organisation which 
allowed them to negotiate directly with management and the state. In Portugal in 
Salazar's period increased economic activity in the same years gave rise to the state to 
bring a degree of political liberalisation to the middle and working classes and it further 
resulted in some trade union reforms such as two decrees of the June 1969 reforms. In 
similar vein, the 1971 decree in Greece was initiated by the dictatorship to bring about 
an improvement on occupational societies and associations. On the other hand, during 
the transition period through democracy there were significant demands for 
"concertation" from the new democratic regimes. For example, while in Spain unions 
pursued restrictive and more moderate approaches to the state in return for promised 
economic and political reforms, unions in Portugal tried to maintain labour peace and 
restraint in the name of defending the revolution (Estivill and De la Hoz 1990, Pinto 
1990, Martinez Lucio 1992, Kritsantonis 1992, Barreto 1992). 
In the German case the SPD came to power in 1966 and then it encouraged a 
government-union commitment to inflation-free growth and full employment, 
furthermore, a programme of "concerted action" ("Konzertierte Aktion") was 
established in the mid 1960s, combining with the macro-economic goals of state policy 
and those of the major collective organisations. It is worth stressing that this "concerted 
action" produced a moderation in wage settlements by co-operation rather than conflict 
in industrial relations. Although the economic and political climate changed for the 
labour movement in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the institutional pattern of "social 
partnership" seems to have been relatively stable (Fuerstenberg 1987). 
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In the context of Sweden, the "Swedish model" from the mid 1930s to the early 1970s 
can be briefly summarised as 44 years of social democratic government sometimes 
within coalitions, Keynesian economic policy and extensive public welfare provision and 
tight central regulation of wage bargaining by the union and employers confederations. 
In the mid-1930s the new relation between capital and labour gave rise to the 
"saltsjobaden agreement" of 1938, which laid the foundation for labour-management co-
operation and consultation. After that, the spirit of co-operation continued to develop 
through the post-war period. Moreover, the government agreed to pursue the full 
employment policy in exchange for union support. In addition, economic growth was 
secured by union commitment to nationalisation and technical developments and during 
this period a solidaristic wage policy and an active manpower policy were pursued. 
Industrial conflict, then, was partly transferred to the political arena. Under the Swedish 
model Sweden experienced a period of high economic growth and continued industrial 
peace. It worked well until the early 1970s, but since then a significant change has been 
witnessed in Swedish labour movement. LO-SAF had usually set a standard bargaining 
for the remainder of the economy, yet, the growth of the public and private service 
sector and the decline of blue collar employment and important rise in the white collar 
federations made co-ordination much more difficult. Furthermore, the movement 
towards decentralisation in wage bargaining and pressures for tax reductions and curbs 
on public expenditure has intensified in recent years and finally LO-SAF centralisation 
broke down. For example, in 1983 the Engineering Employers' confederation reached 
agreement with its counterpart unions outside of the central round of negotiations. In 
addition to this wage earner funds introduced did not bring a main change for the labour 
movement. The 1980s witnessed more employer willingness to deregulate the Swedish 
model by fragmentation of the bargaining structure, flexible working time arrangements 
and so on (Hammarstrom 1987, Hyman 1989, Ahlen 1989). 
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(iii) Conclusion. 
The outcomes of Post-war settlements were that the state approaches to trade unions 
seemed to be consensual. The unprecedented and sustained economic growth combined 
with full employment enabled workers to receive regular improvements in their wages 
and work and employment conditions. The development of Keynesian economic policies 
in conjunction with the spread of Fordist mass production gave rise to an important 
dimension of the politics of class compromise. F ordism and the Keynesian welfare state 
encouraged the expansion of trade unions. These welfare reforms, further, strengthened 
union organisation and their role in industrial relations during the 1960s and the early 
70s. In short, European trade union movement experienced the emergence and 
reinforcement of corporatist patterns of interest mediation. In this context, trade unions 
significantly came to be included in corporatist arrangements. The trends in economic 
and political conjunctions were favourable to trade unions. Therefore, the unions made 
significant gains such as crucial improvements in union rights and democracy, a high 
degree of unionisation and an extension of the scope of collective bargaining in most 
European countries. 
However, the late 1960s and beginning of 70s witnessed working-class militancy and a 
marked radicalisation of union demands. This, later, caused unions to increase the 
political influence and contribute to the centralisation of collective bargaining, mainly 
through some forms of social contract. Although the Post-war institutionalised relations 
between the state and the union and employer organisation were affected by the changes 
in the structural condition of the 1970s (due to oil shock, crises and the recession of the 
same period and the resurgence of worker militancy), there was still a substantial degree 
of recognition of the legitimacy and positive role of the trade unions through the 
widespread use of the institutions and practices of concertation. 
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In fact, the interests and demands of the working class in relation to the state and 
employers were crucially mediated in the economic, political and institutional arena by 
the trade unions. The overall picture in these periods represents that the external and 
structural conditions reinforced the position of labour and the role of trade unions in the 
industrial relations systems. Not only the economic situation but also political factors (as 
in the case of Spain and Portugal with the return of democracy) made this realignment 
between capital and labour possible in European countries. In the same period, some 
similar factors which had an effect on the development and role of Turkish unions can be 
also discussed in the context of Turkey. 
NOTES: 
1) What was at stake in fact was their ability to accommodate workers demands by 
forcing them into the traditional channels of representation and intermediation. 
2) Panitch 1977 argues that a strategy of incorporation at the level of leadership 
was fractured by the militancy of the rank and file in the 1970s. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF 
TURKEY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS IN 
TURKEY IN THE 1960s AND 70s. 
The task in this chapter is basically to focus on an account of the ongms and 
development of Turkish trade unions in the light of the economic, social and political 
structure of Turkey. In this context, most of the discussion will be devoted to analysing 
developments in the economic, political and social structure of Turkey and their impact 
on Turkish trade union movement in the 1960s and 70s. In other words, it is the 
intention of this chapter to describe and analyse the factors which have influenced the 
main direction of organised labour activity in Turkey. However, the years following the 
second W orld War which witnessed the beginning of the establishment of the trade 
unions are also, briefly, discussed in order to convey the historical background of the 
periods in question. 
As a matter of fact, trade unions in Turkey are said to have become very significant 
agents of the country's economic and political life particularly in the last 30 years. Under 
the period of Turkey'S pluralistic democracy and mixed economic policies trade unions 
flourished especially after 1960. Although labour unions can be traced to the Ottoman 
period, they did not play any crucial role in the economic and political system of Turkey 
until the 1960s. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the structure of the 
economy and labour force had affected the development of trade unions. According to 
the State Institute of Statistics (1983), there were only 329,463 workers covered by 
Labour law in 1948, while unionised workers reached 52,000 and a distribution of the 
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active population by occupational status shows why the trade union moyement did not 
develop sufficiently: employers and self-employed, 29.5 percent; unpaid family workers. 
48 percent; wage earners, 19 percent; unknown, 3.5 percent. The ratio of the total 
wage-earning population-the agricultural sector included-to the total actiYe population 
was only 19 percent. In 1955 77,5 percent of Turkey's labour force was in agriculture 
and related activities, the rest engaged in activities such as mining, construction, 
manufacturing, commerce services, transportation and communication. The industrial 
labour force represented only about 250/0 percent of total employment, which was about 
2,720.000 (Rosen 1962). The industrial sector long remained subordinate. In this 
context, the key factor was the late commencement of industrialisation in Turkey. 
As in most developing countries in general and in Southern European countries such as 
Spain, Greece, and Portugal in particular, in Turkey industrialisation began among rural 
producers, petty commodity distributors and a number of small household 
manufacturing enterprises. The specificity of Turkish industrialisation processes raises 
significant issues and particular points of departure for trade union movements which are 
considerably different from those found in Western Europe. In this context, it may be 
crucial to explore the ways and means by which the specification of the industrialisation 
processes shaped the development of the trade union movement. 
In Turkey, in the 1950s, 60s and 70s industrial workers, mainly, ex-peasants recently 
arrived from the countryside, still retained ties with their family and land in rural areas. 
But, they did not suddenly become wage earners, since most of them still enjoyed 
considerable amounts of extra income coming from the land. There were loose ties 
between the workers and workplace. It is also crucial to stress that the larger part of the 
labour force was still employed in agriculture, mostly as unpaid family workers, or in 
handicraft, small shops and small industry, mostly as self-employed. With respect to 
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industrialisation processes, manufacturing activity was located primarily in consumer 
goods such as textiles, food, clothing and housing. 
Broadly speaking, when the industrialisation effort began to become more complex, its 
requirements in terms of labour force were met by the political and social incorporation 
of rural migrants. The policy of the state in the 1950s, 60s and 70s was to regulate the 
growth of national market. Combined with this economic policy, "populist disclosures" 
became important on the ideological and political level. In other words, the masses-
urban workers, farmers, small producers and shanty town marginals- were included in 
economic as well as political and cultural practices at national level. For example, high 
wages for organised workers, subsidised income for farmers and rural petty producers, 
and suitable conditions for immigrants to the cities were provided. The social, political 
and cultural consequences of this development for the Turkish working class was that it 
gained certain privileges, mostly, granted from above, without a struggle for them. On 
the basis of this background, the ideologies and politics of working class developed. As 
a result, class struggle specific to the capitalist mode of production was not as yet the 
mobilising component in political and social transformation of 1950s, 60s and 70s. 
There were also some problems within the working class itself such as the lack of class 
consciousness among the workers combined with lack of experience in the leadership of 
trade unions. In contrast to the situation in many other countries, where positions of 
leadership in trade unions were mostly occupied by white-collar intellectuals, Turkish 
union leaders had come from the rank and file of the manual workers, basically, due to 
the legal restrictions at that time. Therefore, unions were deprived of sophisticated 
leaders and intellectual guidance. 
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Second, the existence of a legislative framework had not been sufficient to ensure the 
rapid development of trade unions until 1960. For example, the laws allowed only wage 
and salary earners to join trade unions by excluding an important large portion of the 
total labour force including the self-employed and workers in family enterprises. In other 
words, the union movement had been suppressed by various governments through legal 
restrictions. 
Third, (and somewhat related to the second factor) there was a problem of the 
recognition of trade unions in the workplace due to the hostile attitudes of employers 
against unions. This is to say that, like employers in Spain, Greece and Portugal, most 
employers in Turkish industry came originally from agriculture and the commercial 
sector and developed under state protection. This may be why they often displayed an 
individualistic mentality, in particular authoritarian practices and paternalistic attitudes at 
work places. 
Finally, public opinion, associated with the media and the discriminating attitude of the 
ruling class against workers' organisations, also discouraged the development of trade 
unions. In the eyes of the general public the ruling class tried to give the image that trade 
unions were agents of leftist movements encouraging communism. Ironically, although 
there had been two socialist parties founded in 1946 (1), the role they played in the 
establishment and development of unions had been insignificant, particularly compared 
with many other European countries' experiences. But, this general opinion about the 
communist influence on trade unions, largely accepted particularly during the period of 
the early stages of social transformation, was an important obstacle to the development 
of trade unions (Tuna 1964, Isikli 1979). 
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(i) The Economic and Political Context Before 1960 and the Beginning of 
Trade Unionism. 
It can be safely argued that until the 1960s labour relations and working class activities 
were controlled by various governments. Until 1947 three separate items of legislation, 
enacted in 1925, 1936 and 1938, had banned the establishment of professional 
organisations and particularly trade unions. This was basically due to the official state 
ideology of the 1930s based on the national unity of a classless society. Therefore, these 
periods had witnessed a complete repression of the labour movement. 
In the 1930s the policy characterized by state-led industrialisation was etatism. It was 
influenced by Soviet economic planning. From this perspective, Turkey was, except for 
Soviet Russia, the first country which applied a central planning strategy for 
industrialisation. However, it is worth mentioning that the history of etatism in Turkey 
and the analysis of its roots can only be understood with regard to the complex external 
and internal forces and factors underlying the emergence of the concept. These include 
the inadequacy of the private sector at that time, the world depression and the crises of 
the capitalist system as well as the key theoretical-ideological approaches of public 
entrepreneurship and nationalist strategies. In fact, etatism was regarded as something 
that went on hand in hand with the state, bearing the responsibility for the national 
economy combined with the needs of a great nation. In other words, the state had begun 
the process of building Turkish industry (Herslag 1988). 
The state was closely involved in the process, undertaking infrastructure development, 
investing in strategic industries such as mining, public utilities, energy, petroleum-based 
products and textile and paper products through the State Economic Enterprises 
(SEEs). In addition, Etatism was incorporated into the program of the single party in 
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Turkey, the Republican People's party (RPP) created by Ataturk. It can be said that the 
identity of the party and state policy had determined economic developments in the 
1930s. The historical dimension of the policies of the 1930s was to create an industrial 
unity by providing a great deal of consensus between the employers and workers. 
It was also a period of important diminution in political mass participation in order to 
protect the authority of the new state. It is not wrong to say that etatist economic 
policies gave rise to a sort of state corporatism through political demobilisation of 
interest groups and subordinating associations to the state. Trade unions had not been 
allowed and the state had had control over a limited industrial workforce via 
paternalistic methods. 
After 1945 Turkey had considerable economic growth. This was a period in which 
economic policies led to important changes in the role of the state and private sectors 
and in the form of the division of labour. It would be more accurate to say that the 
development of domestic industry since 1950 was regarded as the most significant 
structural transformation in the Turkish economy. In that period, Turkey received 
American economic aid. Moreover, Turkey adopted a multi-party political system and 
when the Democrat Party came to power in 1950, it introduced "laissez-faire" 
capitalism, marking a turning point for Turkey, politically, economically and socially. 
Therefore, Turkey began to attract some foreign investment, imported capital goods and 
industrial raw materials. She resorted to external borrowing so as to finance costly infra-
structural investments. Also Turkey became a member of the organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation which helped to promote the ties with the west and to expose 
the country to more liberal ideas and domestic policies. 
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There can be little doubt that the economic policies which emerged in the 1950s helped 
to create the merchant class and gave rise to an investment climate which made it 
possible to channel their finance capital into industrial projects. In this sense, the 
accumulation of commercial capital was the genesis of capitalist development in Turkey 
and the engine for the transition to capitalism which greatly accelerated during the 1950s 
(Taylan, 1984). 
However, side by side with the economic and political developments, in 1947 the first 
law on the formation of trade unions was passed. The trade unions act of 1947 had 
allowed trade unions without giving the right to strike. After that workers had begun to 
join trade unions. However, in the event of the emergence of capitalism and of the 
multiparty system in Turkey, the state had attempted a paternalistic interest in labour 
relations through recognising trade unions. This was partly because the transition to 
multiparty democracy had given rise to a crucial confidence in governments' attitudes 
towards democracy. 
The government made efforts to present Turkey as a democratic nation in the regard of 
International bodies. In this context, the early membership of International Labour 
Organisation was part of these attempts. Yet, it would not be wrong to say that the 
trade unions had been subject to state control because the trade unions Act of 1947 had 
not enabled the adoption of several democratic principles. For example, trade unions had 
been encouraged to be national organisations, as the 1947 union legislation had clearly 
stressed that trade unions are national organisations and their objectives and activities 
cannot be against national interests (Sulker 1987). In this sense, trade unions were 
obviously required to subordinate their own economic and institutional interests to 
national aims. The act had also been limited in scope to manual workers and white collar 
workers had not been allowed to establish and join unions. In addition, this law had been 
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in sharp conflict with trade union freedom in terms of the external and internal relations 
of unions. For instance, trade unions could not join the international organisations 
without the consent of the government, nor could they engage in political activities 
including forming open political alliances with political parties. This legislation had also 
restricted unions' freedom even to control their financial situation. 
In parallel with these developments, there was a significant issue which was the great 
interventionism of the Democrat Party in economic and political life as well as labour 
relations in the mid-1950s, although the Democrat party advocated liberal economic 
policies as opposed to etatism and planing. When the Democrat party came to power in 
1950, it began to control trade union movements by repressing and arresting union 
leaders. Moreover, it used state paternalism by seeking workers' support through 
ignoring the channel of unions and directly distributing material benefits to the rank and 
file. For example, the ministry of labour assisted expensive programs to build low-cost 
housing and established minimum wage levels. Besides, it provided a great deal of fringe 
benefits such as health care, meals, clothing, bonuses for religious holidays, 
transportation and child allotments (Rosen 1962). 
In the meantime, the government provided unions with financial resources. In fact, there 
was a fund established by the fines levied in accordance with the labour law and it was 
distributed to the unions by the Ministry of Labour. A system of financial control by this 
fund, essentially, enabled the government to keep unions under its control and pressure. 
In this sense, It might be argued that there is some degree of shared experience between 
Turkey and Southern European countries, mainly, Spain, Portugal and Greece. In the 
case of Greece particularly in the formative years of trade unionism state paternalism 
became very significant. State regulation in labour relations was further reinforced 
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through a system of financial control. In 1931 the state set up a Workers' Housing Trust 
funded from compulsory contributions of both employees and employers. Some amount 
of this fund was also given to unions by the ministry of labour, particularly, during the 
course of the Metaxas regime in 1936; this system of financial control was used to 
subordinate trade unions to the government (Kritsantonis 1992 ). 
On the other hand, in the context of Spain and Portugal particularly in their final years of 
Dictatorships direct and rigid state control of workers was relaxed through a paternalist 
supervision of employee welfare. In the Spanish case the easing of the system brought 
about autonomous worker activity at the workplace combined with some individual 
rights in areas such as employment termination and job classification (Martinez Lucio 
1992). In Portugal the authoritarian regime tended to set up a system of industrial 
relations similar to Western countries via direct state regulations (Barreto 1992). In 
short, the national level trade union development can be also regarded as an outcome of 
state paternalism, particularly while different political parties, as in the case of Turkey 
and Greece, or dictatorial governments, as in the case of Spain and Portugal, sought 
organised popular support. 
It should be also mentioned that the most significant event of the early 1950s was the 
formation of TURK-IS, the Confederation of Turkish trade unions, as a national centre 
in 1952. However, the confederation did not play an important role in the labour 
relations. This was probably because, first, it lacked legal and political protection, 
second it concentrated on economic bread-and-butter functions more than any other , 
aspect of trade union activity (this will be discussed in more detail in the chapter 4). 
To sum up, the period until 1960 can be summarised by saying that during this time, 
although trade unions had gained their legal status, they had been subject to hea\y 
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government influence. Besides, trade union development had been limited due to the 
small size of the working class since Turkey had been largely an agrarian society with a 
large segment of the population engaged in self-employed subsistence farming. Also, the 
denial of the basic rights to collective bargaining and to strike had resulted in unions 
being unable to exert a more effective influence as a powerful pressure group in the 
country. 
Hence, the working class had been forced to accept whatever the government granted. 
In other words, the initial model of trade union development can be suggested as that of 
a state-sponsored movement and particularly the formation of a national structure of 
trade unionism can be described as a result of state paternalism. However, as far as the 
trade union movement in Turkey is concerned, the decades of the 1960s and 70s were 
said to represent a gradual tendency of the working class to move towards more 
organisational, political and ideological independence from the state. Thus, it may be 
suggested that the 1960s marked a turning point in the Turkish trade union movement. 
(ii) Political and Economic Developments from 1960s Until 1980: Import 
Substitution Industrialisation and Emerging Societal Corporatism. 
In the late 1950s the Turkish economy experienced serious problems due to the growing 
inflationary pressure, crises in the balance of payments and the like. At the same time, 
the authoritarian practices of the Democrat Party caused social and political unrest. The 
result was the 1960 military intervention. The 1960s witnessed two significant 
developments in Turkish history, firstly, the new constitution was established in 1961 
after the military coup of 1960. This constitution extended political and democratic 
rights. Such as collective bargaining and strikes. Secondly, this development combined 
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with rapid econorruc development. In the economic context, ill the 1960s import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) was chosen as an economic instrument in order to 
result in a smooth transition from a mercantile to an industrial economy (2). 
It is a fact that during the post-war periods, most countries were faced with more or less 
similar economic and political developments (of course there were variations due to the 
outcome of different historical and national specific processes of each countries). 
Broadly speaking, the increased importance of the state was witnessed in this period. 
Particularly, in the Southern European countries (despite weak labour movements) the 
state socio-economic intervention became very significant in influencing the nature of 
the industrialisation process. 
Combined with the state involvement in the political and econorruc life, a pluralist 
industrial relations system was also established. This enabled unions to gain some rights 
and status including the introduction of coalition rights for organised labour, the 
granting of collective action and strike rights, the recognition of trade umons by 
employers, finally and perhaps more importantly, the recognition of umons as 
"intermediary organisations" in ensuring a crucial framework for the development of 
economic and political policies. 
However, there was crucial scope for diversity in implementation and performance 
across different economies. This process associated with general set of institutions and 
policies were referred as the "post-war settlement". This period is widely described as 
"the Keynesian welfare state". Even in some countries where the state did not adopt an 
explicitly Keynesian approach, state intervention was to imply aspects of the Keynesian 
welfare state in order to ensure social stability and the development of private industrial 
capital, such was the case in Southern European countries and Turkey. 
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In short, no matter what the countries' regtmes (Dictatorship or Democracy) were, 
aspects of the Keynesian model came to dominate the OEeD countries. What can be 
emphasised is the similarity between a certain economic allocation model in most 
countries and the Import Substitution Industrialisation (lSI) model in Turkey. The main 
argument here is that features of the political economy of Turkey during the 1960-80 
were affected by the dominant model in the other countries, so was the development of 
Turkish trade unions. Like Keynesian economic policies, the Turkish model also 
involved management of the economy by the state, the ascendancy of state managers 
and the redistribution of income in order to constitute and reproduce a domestic market. 
The main concern of Turkish policy makers in the 1960s and partly also those of the 
1970s was to set up a wide industrial base through evolving "Etatism" into the "mixed 
economy", where the state's economic role was to supervise implementation of five year 
plans and assist the private sector's growth (3) (Toksoz 1988). Regarding the changes in 
the direction influenced by the constitution, economic and social planning was 
introduced by a new institution called the state planing organisation (SPO). The role of 
this organisation was to prepare five-year economic and social plans simply by initiating 
a new economic policy (lSI). 
The key target of the lSI policies in the 1960s was to avoid the economic difficulties of 
the 1950s (4). What can be argued is here that the state still played a significant role in 
managing the process of Turkish industrialisation through making the SPO the key body 
of lSI as co-ordinator of the economic resources. It should be stated that employers , 
were in favour of the planning period as opposed to the etatism of the 1930s. But, it 
does not mean that employers in Turkey rejected state intervention in the economy. In 
fact, representatives of employers organisation did seek state regulation of the economy. 
For example, the Istanbul chamber of industry supported import controls as quite 
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important for industrialisation (Eralp 1990). Given the introduction of central economic 
planning after 1960, there were noteworthy changes in the sectors. Unlike agriculture, 
industrial and service growth was regarded as the most rapidly expanding economic 
sector in the planning period. Annual average growth rates were as high as 6.7 percent 
between 1960 and 1976. Agriculture shrank from 38 percent of GNP in 1960 to 23 
percent by 1976, whereas industry'S share expanded from 16 to 25 percent and the 
contribution of services and construction to GNP was at 54 percent (Toksoz 1988, 
Herslag 1988). In other words, the high rates of growth of GNP were combined with a 
sectoral shift from agriculture to the industrial and service sector. 
On the political level, this period can be labelled as the populist period. In fact, there 
were elements of populism as far as the political regimes and mechanism particularly for 
income distribution in the political sphere were concerned. In spite of the fact that 
populism had been on the agenda since 1946 and continued between 1950-60, it became 
a crucial political debate in the 1960s and 70s (Boratav 1983). 
It is a fact that the constitution of 1961 let trade unions develop and expand their 
influence on Turkey'S economic and political arena and they became a very crucial factor 
in the determination of income distribution, especially in the urban sector. This liberal 
constitution also made it possible for the working class to have an impact on the political 
processes and mechanism thereby leading to the characterisation of this period as 
containing elements of populism. 
Most important of all, perhaps, various governments pursued increasingly ambitious 
economic goals which were confronted with growing demands from politically 
organised interest groups such as trade unions. Therefore, there were several attempts 
from governments to establish a public policy towards associations This policy was 
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seeking to encourage co-operation between workers and employers by combining rapid 
economic development with democracy and to avoid a return to overt authoritarian rule. 
It is immediately evident in the highly significant document below: 
"In order to establish an equilibrium among the social classes, it is necessary that the 
workers who have an important role to play in the realisation and continuation of 
development, should enjoy the same economic and social rights as other social 
categories. The rights of the worker must be recognised and he must be conscious of 
the important part he plays in the economy as a member of the community and just as 
an important factor in production. This is indispensable for obtaining the harmonious 
relations and close co-operation between capital and labour, on which planned 
development depends in a democracy ... The rights of labour to negotiate and bargain 
with employers on equal terms will be recognised, solidarity of interest based on 
principles of social justice will be created between workers and employers and the 
basic right of collective bargaining and strike and lock-out will be legally established 
in order to help the development of unions on the one hand and democratic practices 
on the other. /I (State Planing Organisation, First Five Year Development Plan 1963-
1967: 103-104). 
The point to be made here is indicated by the fact that since Turkish capitalism was not 
as advanced as western capitalism, it is not quite safe to regard this pluralist period as a 
means of emergence of societal corporatism. Simply, it emerged differently from 
European patterns. Because, most important of all, Turkish pluralism has never been 
accompanied by a highly institutionalised system of collective bargaining among a well 
organised interest groups such as trade unions and employers organisations or between 
those groups and state. 
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On this point, Schmitter's study (Schmitter 1974) on the issue of corporatism argues the 
position that there is a clear distinction between state corporatism and societal 
corporatism. For him state corporatism has been characterized by associations which are 
created and penetrated by the state. Basically, these associations are subordinated to the 
state under state corporatism, whereas societal corporatism has been described as 
characterised by associations which emerged spontaneously, retain considerable 
autonomy, and themselves penetrate the state. Schmitter (1974: 101-2) went on to 
argue that: 
"The abrupt demise of incipient pluralism and its forceful replacement by state 
corporatism have involved the enforcement of "social peace" by repressing and 
excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands in a situation 
where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent, and short 
of resources to respond effectively to these demands within the framework of the liberal 
democratic state. On the other hand, the gradual decay of advanced pluralism and its 
subtle displacement by societal corporatism have involved the need to strengthen and 
stabilise bourgeois-dominant regimes by co-opting and incorporating subordinate 
classes and groups more closely within the political process". 
Taking Schmitter's argument into consideration, it can be emphasised that Turkish 
experience in societal corporatism was dissimilar to those of European and Latin 
American countries. This is mainly due to the weakness of capitalist development and 
the absence of a pre-existing tradition of strong associational pluralism. 
Moreover, unlike many other countries III Europe and Latin America, the Turkish 
experiment with societal corporatism was state-initiated. In other words, the initiative 
for the corporatisation of interest representation in the 1960s came from the state's 
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attempt to incorporate the associations of subordinate classes, mainly, trade unions 
within the framework of liberal democracy to strengthen the problematic and unstable 
bourgeois-dominant regime. In this sense, it can be also said that the state exercised 
some causation about any potential mass political and economic demands from the 
working class. 
However, evaluation and comparison with the other countries in terms of corporatist 
models may be misleading in the Turkish case. The more important question centres on 
the conditions of developments that are emerging. In this respect, it might be said that 
the attempts for the emergence of corporatism in the 1960s, and partly in the 70s, 
cannot be simply an example of the emergence of societal corporatism but rather a 
highly complex, unusual and unstable mixture of both state and societal corporatist 
types. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the attempts to create a corporatist structure in 
the Turkish industrial relations system failed and conflict between classes reached the 
highest level in the 1970s. In short, the result of an ambiguous mix of state and societal 
corporatism in Turkey was to bring about mobilisation and politicisation in the mainly 
working class masses rather than to produce a social contract between social partners. 
(iii) The 1960 Legal Reforms and the Rise of Turkish Trade Unionism. 
What needs to be also considered is not only the impact of the transformation of 
economic and political structures but also the impact of legal reforms on the 
development of trade unions. There is no doubt that after the military intervention of 
May 1960 the Turkish trade union movement entered a new era. In this period labour 
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policy was shifted due to primarily two factors, first, the adoption of the liberal 1961 
constitution, which restored the principles of democratic rule and, second, the beginning 
of planned economic development. Thus, after long resistance of the state and 
employers the rights to strike and engage in collective bargaining were eventually 
recognised. The new constitution also included other progressive social provisions such 
as some provisions on work conditions, wage equity, paid holiday, and social security. 
Briefly, the 1961 constitution was not only designed to meet the need of private business 
but also prepared to create a relatively favourable attitude to the workers' unions. The 
constitution of 1961 produced Articles 46 and 47 on trade union freedoms, the right of 
workers to bargain collectively with employers, and the right to strike. However, the 
rights which the new constitution conceded had to be regulated by special legislation. 
Therefore, it was not until 1963 that the required enactments-trade unions Act (no 274) 
and collective agreements, strikes and lockouts Act (no 275) were approved by the 
Turkish parliament (Talas 1983). 
In fact, these two key pieces of legislation were passed in 1963 and regulated the 
Turkish industrial relation system and union organisation until the end of 1980. It can be 
pointed out that there were a number of internal and external factors for the introduction 
of this new industrial relations system. First, trade union leaders were included as 
delegates in the constituent assembly of 1961. Second, there were threats posed by the 
gradually growing left-wing ideologies in Turkish society and, finally, within the 
considerably favourable atmosphere, unions also began to raise their voice as pressure 
groups, making themselves felt in various activities, including mass open meetings and 
silent marches. For example, on 31 December 1961 TURK-IS members organised a 
massive demonstration at Sarachane in Istanbul, with attendance of more or less 
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100,000 workers, who demanded the implementation of the rights granted in the 1961 
constitution (Hale 1977). 
In addition to these internal influences, the impact of external forces should also be 
stressed. Basically, after 1960 several unions and particularly TURK-IS received the 
government's permission to affiliate with international trade union organisations. Hence, 
Turkish trade unions started to set up close relations with the federations and 
confederations of international unions. A number of union leaders visited union 
headquarters in other countries, attending conferences, conventions and seminars and 
thus benefiting from the experience of industrially advanced countries. Assistance was 
extended in the education of union officers and leaders for the Turkish unions by the 
bodies such as the OECD, the ICFTU and the ITS (Tuna 1964). Moreover, ILO 
conventions and recommendations had also a considerable impact on the establishment 
of the industrial relations system in Turkey by softening government attitudes toward 
organised labour. Therefore, for the government the emergent belief was that collective 
bargaining with the right to strike was a necessary component of pluralistic democracy. 
What is surely significant is the fact that these new rights, for which workers in the 
European countries had striven for almost a century, were given rather suddenly from 
above. In spite of vociferous demands of TURK-IS for the right to strike in the period 
of 1950s, the new legislation was, in fact, not a consequence of continued pressure by 
workers from below. What is meant by this is that unlike many other countries' trade 
union movements, the Turkish trade union movement achieved these rights without any 
real struggle. In reality, the state granted union rights as a result of the prevalent 
economic and political conditions in Turkey at the time. In this context it can be possibly 
argued that these rights could be taken away without any resistance from the working 
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class (5) particularly during econonuc and political cnses due to the lack of the 
necessary experience of the Turkish working class in labour struggle. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the unions were organised and developed by state 
influence. The government aim was to create a more centralised system of industrial 
relations which was a necessary component of the economic model of 1960s. In 
addition, employers were also in favour of the centralised system of industrial relations 
to establish a centralised industry wide collective bargaining. This means that moderate 
union representatives as social partners in the tripartite commissions were allowed to 
represent workers' organisations. 
As a result of all these developments, for the first time unions were given responsibility 
for selecting workers' representatives and shop stewards at the workplace. Union 
membership no longer consisted of manual workers only. By abolishing the distinction 
between manual and intellectual work, white-collar workers were at last allowed to form 
unions. Financial security was provided by adopting a checkoff system for dues 
collection. The minimum age for membership was reduced to sixteen. Geographic 
federations were disregarded and conditions for affiliation became much easier. Trade 
unions were permitted to affiliate with and withdraw from international organisations 
without the prior permission of the government and finally trade unions were entitled to 
budget 5 percent of their income to workers education programs and to make financial 
investments provided that they did not distribute profits (Dereli 1984, Oguzman 1984). 
However, taking principles of trade union freedom into account it is worth commenting 
that the law laid down detailed rules for the internal organisation of unions and specified 
their role in providing legal and other forms of assistance for their members. According 
to this union Act no 274, union's political functions remained severely limited. The act 
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banned any organisational and financial links between unions and political parties. This 
can be criticised on the grounds that it made it politically embarrassing to prohibit the 
unions to engage in politics. This act prevented unions from pressing industrial claims 
which could be defined as matters of "political" importance. Furthermore, some of the 
traditional state control mechanisms in labour relations can be seen from the Act as a 
long list of prohibitions on the right to strike. For example, it was unlawful to call a 
strike in time of war, general or partial mobilisation, state of emergency or national 
disaster, in health or educational institutions, in public utilities, or during the validity of a 
collective agreement. Again according to this Act strikes can also be suspended for up 
to 60 days by the government in the face of the safety of the nation and strikes cannot be 
organised so as to influence the decisions of the government or local authority 
(Oguzman 1984). 
Yet, broadly speaking it was widely accepted that the significant provisions of 1963 
were welcomed by the unions as the "Magna carta" of the Turkish labour movement. It 
needs to be also emphasised that major dimensions of the trade unions Act (no 274) 
enabled unions to strengthen their organisations and also encourage industry-wide 
bargaining agents within the frame of new industrial relations systems. This carne close 
to TURK-IS's target of setting up itself as the co-ordinating representative of a more 
centralised trade union movement. 
There is evidence to suggest that trade unionism developed very significantly in the 
1960s. Unions started to be more persuasive in collective bargaining with employers and 
strikes as an important weapon of unions began to be used. Under a relatively favourable 
economic, political and, more importantly, legislative climate, there was a remarkable 
growth in the number of unions in Turkey in the 1960s. It is immediately evident by the 
official statistics of the ministry of labour that particularly after the enactment of trade 
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union Act of 1963, there was an increase in the number of workers' unions as well as 
employers' organisations. It is important to keep in mind that the organisations of 
employers and federations were rather slow as compared to the development of labour 
UnIons. 
As can be seen from Table 1, in 1948 there had been only 73 trade unions with 52.000 
members. In 1963 this increased to 565 unions with 295,710 members. However, by the 
year of 1975 the number of labour unions reached 781 unions representing 3,328,633 
members. It is also interesting to note that the development of trade unions and 
employers organisations in Turkey took place in a relatively short period especially 
between 1963 and 1970. As has been discussed before, this was basically due to the 
legal provisions of Acts no 274 and 275 (6) and partly due to the rapid industrialisation 
of Turkish industry. 
Table 1: Number of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations and their Membership 
Unions E~lo"yers' Associations 
Year I Number II MembershiJ2 I Number Membership 
1948 I 73 II 52,000 II - I -
1963 I 565 II 295,710 II 78 I 1,605 
1970 I 737 II 2,088,219 II 120 I 10,760 
1975 781 3,328,633 107 8,943 
1978 912 3,900,079 119 10,112 
1980 735 5,695,285 106 9,183 
Source: Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1980. 
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(iv) Towards the Emergence of a New Trade Union Movement. 
As the world economy went into recession, basically due to the upsurge of oil prices, 
stagflation and unemployment, these developments had an impact on Turkish economy 
as well. Therefore, in the mid-70s Turkey faced several economic difficulties, such as 
rising inflation, unemployment and trade deficits. As a result, the Turkish economy was 
affected by debt and applied to the IMF for the extension of loans and some 
concessions. The decade of the 1970s witnessed an important tendency of the working 
class to move towards organisational, political and ideological struggle against the ruling 
class. As a result of industrialisation and ensuing urbanisation, industrial workers and 
union membership increased significantly. 
Despite the fact that TURK-IS leadership adopted a more intermediate attitude towards 
government and employers, they began to feel the pressure from the rank and file 
movement. This was primarily because the transformation of the young and 
inexperienced working class into a militant and highly industrialised sector took place. 
There is now a need to analyse the increased influence of trade unions in the Turkish 
industrial relation system and the emergence of the organised and militant labour 
movement during the course of the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. In this 
context, a significant development from the standpoint of the development of unions in 
Turkey was the birth of DISK, the confederation of reformist trade unions in 1967. 
Compared with TURK-IS, whose policy was usually criticised as "supra-party unionism" 
or "business-oriented" philosophy, the guiding principle of DISK was that the real 
solution of Turkish working class could be affected solely via political organisation and 
action of the workers themselves. The foundation of DISK by four major unions: the 
chemical industries workers' unions, the metal workers' union, the rubber workers' union 
and press workers' union was caused by their breaking away from TURK-IS as a 
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consequence of a disagreement between unions and the leadership of the confederation 
in major strikes such as the Kozlu miners' strike in 1965 and the strike at the Pasabahce 
glass factory in Istanbul in 1966 (Marqulies and Yildizoglu 1984). 
After its initial creation, the key development bringing about the emergence of DISK 
was the role played by the Turkish labour party (TLP), founded in 1961. The first 
General convention of the TLP in 1963 stressed as an important move the formation of a 
rival confederation as opposed to TURK-IS (7). TLP, like any other socialist party in 
Europe, sought to set up an organic links with workers through unions (Dereli 1984). It 
has often been claimed that throughout the late 1960s and 70s most of the DISK's 
activities concentrated on political propaganda. For instance, according to the 
declaration of DISK's foundation (1967:9): 
"It is not possible to attain the rights of the labour via economic struggle solely. In 
order to gain this trade union movement must also engage in political struggle through 
applying its democratic rights granted in the constitution". 
However, although DISK widely stressed the political phase of unionism, it also 
involved in "bread and butter" aspects of unionism through engaging in collective 
bargaining. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be argued that collective 
bargaining itself can be regarded as a significant political parameter. It should not be 
forgotten that unions focused on the political aspect of unionism have to operate in an 
economic environment. Therefore, due to the economic and political situation of the 
country at the time (particularly the continued increase in the rate of inflation) the 
collective bargaining activity of DISK was to contribute to the welfare of workers, since 
the impact of any wage increase was wiped out immediately by the ensuing price 
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Increases implemented by employers, who did not nuss any chance to compensate 
themselves for any profit loss (Dereli 1984). 
DISK members often pointed out the need to engage in politics by supporting parties 
that would respond to the needs of the working class. For this very reason, after its 
foundation, DISK gave its support to the TLP in the 1969 general election and later 
DISK supported the RPP, the Republican Peoples' party, which was ideologically the 
second closest political party to DISK. This was because, first, the military intervention 
of 1971 ( discussed below) closed the TLP, and second and perhaps more importantly, 
DISK entered the period of moderation by changing its radical strategies and adapting 
more social democratic manners (Isikli 1979). 
It can very plausibly be argued that the foundation of DISK as a separate confederation 
can be treated as a division among organised labour. Alternatively, the question raised 
by some of TURK-IS leaders and officials was whether it was possible to build a unified 
trade union movement by remaining within the TURK-IS and transforming and 
reforming it in the interest of the working class in the 1960s (This debate has been on 
the agenda up to today). But, DISK and TURK-IS began to compete with each other in 
this period. What also needs to be explored here is that the late 1960s was a time of 
increasing radicalisation among the masses as the class struggle in Turkey assumed 
greater visibility. This period also registered the beginning of the economic crisis. 
In the meantime, a considerable increase in unionisation continued significantly both 
within DISK and TURK-IS. Yet, DISK-affiliated unions differed from those of TURK-
IS in that they distinguished themselves by their successful leadership of long and bitter 
strikes. Thus, it is not so unsafe to suggest that the result of the formation of DISK and 
the competition between DISK and TURK-IS may have given rise to increased 
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unionisation as well as increasingly militant behaviour on the part of unionists. It is a fact 
that TURK-IS unions mostly organised in the public sector whereas DISK unions 
tended to concentrate on the private sector. In the public sector wages were generally 
higher than in the private sector. Higher wages in the public sector can be attributed to 
the government political consideration and the state enterprise managers in the 
workplace. Hence, any threat of militancy on the part of unions induced public sector 
managers to give concessions in order to forestall any actual militant action. 
In addition, since TURK-IS was the dominant confederation and it also tried to establish 
a good connection with the governments as a part of its policies (despite its "above-
party politics") in order to secure this conflict free relation. Until the mid-1970s there 
were relatively few industrial actions in the public sector (see Table 2 below). In other 
words, public sector unions remained outside the struggles. The reason for this should 
be sought in the logic oflabour-management relations in the public sector 
Table 2: Strikes by Sectors 1963-1980. 
Years Private Sector Pili ic.-.Sector 
1963 I 7 1 
1964 I 75 8 
1965 40 6 
1966 36 6 
1967 52 48 
1968 45 I 9 
1969 67 19 
1970 46 26 
1971 I 54 24 
1972* 0 0 
1973 15 7 
1974 23 22 
1975 77 13 
1976 83 22 
1977 138 29 
1978 148 27 
1979 144 46 
1980 197 30 
* Strikes were not allowed due to the military intervention of 1971 
Source: Guzel (1983) "Cumhuriyet Turkiyesin'de Isci Hareketleri" Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiyc 
Ansiklopedisi no 7 p 1870 Iletisim yayinlari Istanbul. 
64 
It should be mentioned that this period (particularly between 1967 and 1970) witnessed 
working class struggle through strikes, marches, demonstrations and even factory 
occupations mostly led by DISK affiliated unions in the private sector (Margulies and 
Yildizoglu 1984). It is crucial to stress that during the 1960s the number of strikes and 
of workers participating in strikes increased rapidly. In fact, the working class began to 
enjoy economic and political gains and made the ruling class seek an urgent need to 
curb trade union power. 
According to comparative data on work days lost per worker in manufacturing and 
work days lost per striking worker (see Table 3), the workdays lost per worker in 
manufacturing were as much as the other countries in comparative perspective. The 
workdays lost per worker also show that Turkish trade unions had longer strikes 
compared with various countries' unions. Moreover, the duration of strikes also 
appeared to increase during the course of 1963 and 1973. 
Table 3: Workdays Lost Due to Strike Action. 
Workdays Lost per Worker Workdays Lost per Striking 
in Manufacturing* Worker** 
Country 1969 1973 1975 1969 1973 1975 
Turkey 
U.S.A 
U.K. 
Italy 
Sj)ain 
- 0.5 0.4 20 57 50 
1.2 0.7 - 18 5 -
0.5 0.7 0.7 5 6 8 
4.5 2.8 1.6 6 4 1 
- 0.2 0.4 3 3 4 
* The ratio of workdays lost in manufacturing industry to total employment in that 
industry. 
* * The ratio of total workdays lost due to strikes in all sectors to the total number of 
workers involved in strikes. 
Source World Bank 1980: l..j. 3. 
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This is also to say that workers' activity seemed to be more "political" through 
demanding beyond economic gains. Therefore, what this picture shows us that Turkish 
unions became increasingly militant and politicised in this period. As the labour 
movement began to threaten the ability of the ruling class to manage the country, 
parliament proceeded to discuss altering the trade unions Act of 1963 at the beginning 
of 1970s. The main aim for this amendment was said to recreate and strength the role of 
TURK-IS within the labour movement as opposed to the increasing growth and 
influence of DISK. 
According to the proposed law 1317, which aimed to limit trade union rights in general, 
a trade union could organise only at the national level if it represented at least one-third 
of the workers in that particular branch of industry. The minister of labour also often 
spelled out that unions which became tools of ideological movements, mainly, DISK-
affiliated unions would automatically be abolished as soon as the law was passed. At the 
same time, the leadership of TURK-IS was trying to establish good relations with the 
political power (Justice party, the right-wing party) since the members of TURK-IS 
were mostly organised in the public sector. However, the response of the working class, 
particularly among the DISK members, turned out to be the first spontaneous, large-
scale political action of the working class in Turkey when DISK and its supporters 
(over 100,000 workers) marched to protest against the government's curbs on trade 
union rights. As a result, there was bloodshed on 15-16 June 1970 (Sulker 1987). 
Moreover, in 1970 and 1971 strikes reached their peak level and affected many sectors 
of the economy. When we look at the statistics of the ministry of labour for those years, 
it is quite clear that there was a considerable increase in strike activity; the work days 
lost due to strikes were 476,116 in 1971 with 10,916 participating workers and 659,369 
in 1972 with 14,879 participating workers (8) (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991). 
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Finally, the economic and political crises of the late 1960s gave rise to the military 
intervention of 1971. Yet, as opposed to the general views of most trade unionists in 
Turkey, it can be argued that the effect of this military period on the trade union 
movement was not so serious. Although the regime immediately imposed martial law in 
the provinces, mainly, in industrial cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Kocaeli, Adana 
and so on, the prohibition on collective bargaining rights and the right to strike was very 
short-lived. This is to say that the impact of the military intervention of 1971 on the 
working class was limited (9). 
This was, mainly, because, first, the military was unable to set up a coherent and stable 
regime without a mass support base. Masses in general were reluctant to admit the 
legitimacy of military intervention and to lose the rights granted by the 1961 
constitution, secondly perhaps more importantly, there were also further problems 
caused by the split in the ruling alliance due to competing interest within the groups like 
industrial/financial capital and landed/commercial. They simply did not agree on a 
national consensus which may have formulated the restructuring of the state to change 
the channel of access to the use of state power against the organised union movement. 
As a result, the military had to allow a general election in 1973 and social opposition 
including parties and trade unions re-emerged in Turkish economic and political life. 
In the analysis of Turkish unions, it is crucial to take some political developments of the 
1970s into consideration. After the election of 1973 the Republican Peoples Party 
(RPP), under its new social-democratic leader, Ecevit, formed a coalition government 
with the religious National Salvation Party (NSP) (Ugur 1976). What is significant here 
is that trade unions were attracted through RPP's populist and social democratic slogans. 
There is little doubt that the trade union movement gained momentum after the 1973 
general election. More public sector unions broke away from TURK-IS and joined 
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DISK. As TURK-IS began to lose its credibility within the labour movement the 
, 
division between social democrat and right-wing unions within this confederation 
became more pronounced (Koc 1986a). 
Hence, the failure of 1971 military regime and the masses' increased awareness of the 
contradictions of capitalist development led to the politicisation of the unions, including 
the public sector unions. When the mid-1970s came to a close, the crises of the Turkish 
economy combined with political unrest further increased the intensification of the 
struggle and the growing politicisation of daily life. It is well known that in the late 
1960s and the 1970s the economic and political climate changed in many countries as 
the post-war conditions started to decline. This can also be called "the collapse of the 
post-war regime of accumulation", during which most European countries' economies 
faced several problems including rising inflation, unemployment and growing recession. 
In addition to this, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an increase in industrial 
conflict and rank and file militancy. This trend might be characterized as the collective 
mobilisation of workers. Therefore, Turkey shared more or less the same experiences as 
the other countries in this period. 
Throughout the period, unionisation rose rapidly. While there were 737 trade unions 
with 2,088,219 members in 1970, it went up 912 unions with 3,900,079 in 1978 
(Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1980). Besides, a record number of workers were on strike 
in 1974, the workdays lost because of strikes were 1,109,401 with 25,546 strikers 
participating (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991). 
It is also important to bear in mind that workers began to join unions in terms of their 
political approaches. Political parties, particularly small religious fundamentalist and 
nationalist parties, started to seek workers' support through their allied confederation of 
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trade unions. The confederation of Nationalist workers' unions (MISK) was influenced 
by the extreme right-wing National Action Party and HAK-IS was sponsored by the 
religious National Salvation Party. While MISK rejected any "social-class" concept by 
advocating co-operation among all sectors of society, HAK-IS also denied the class 
conflict between employers and employees by stressing the solution within the 
framework of Islamic principles. 
As far as the trade umon movement In Turkey was concerned, the other political 
development was the first Nationalist Front government, which replaced the RPP-NSP 
coalition in 1975. It was a coalition of right-wing parties (JP, NSP, and NAP). This 
coalition government was often accused of being hostile to trade unions particularly 
during the major strikes by using the security forces. 
In 1976 the Nationalist Front government proposed to keep the state security courts set 
up by the military regime in 1971. However, DISK protested against this proposal by 
declaring a general strike and so approximately 300,000 workers responded. The 
politicisation of unions continued throughout the year. In 1976 and 1977 more than half 
a million workers and other social classes including teachers and students gathered in 
Istanbul for a May day demonstration organised by DISK. But a May day meeting in 
Istanbul in 1977 ended up with violence; nearly fifty people died (Berberoglu 1982). 
Broadly speaking, throughout the 1970s trade unions continued to be very active in 
collective bargaining negotiations and in strikes. The increasing unionisation combined 
with the militant labour movement during the 1970s made possible the signing of 
relatively favourable wage contracts. Therefore, real wages in almost all sectors rose by 
5 to 7 percent every year in these periods. But, a sharp decline by 10 percent in real 
wages was seen in the course of the years 1971-72 of the military regime during which 
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strikes were banned. Wages increased again after the fall of the military government. 
They went up rapidly by 21 percent in 1975, by 5 percent in 1976 and by 22 percent 
between 1976 and 1978. Yet, the biggest drop in real wages was registered by around 
23 percent between 1978 and 1980 (Boratav 1983). Meanwhile, massive lay-offs were 
widespread in all sectors, particularly by using the lock-out method. This also resulted 
in unemployment. While there were 2 million unemployed in Turkey in 1971, it 
increased 3.5 million by the end of 1978 (Berberoglu 1982). 
If it is quite true to treat industrial conflict as the significant reality of the working class 
movement, it can be suggested that, the case of Taris' strike in January 1980 was the 
most important event for the Turkish working class (10). When the Nationalist Front 
government began to lay-off many workers with a left-wing identity and replace them 
with its own supporters, workers went on strike. As a result the spontaneous strike 
brought about an occupation and later bloody clashes with the police and army forces. 
In fact, this main strike at the beginning of 1980 gathered wide support from the many 
other trade unions and social classes (Berberoglu 1982). The years of 1979 and 1980 
saw the escalation of political unrest in the country and registered as strike-prone years 
in the history of Turkish labour movement. The work days lost due to strikes were 
1,303,253 in 1980 with 84,832 participating in strikes (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 
1991). 
Having explored the increasing struggle of trade unions particularly in the late 1970s it is 
also necessary to raise the question of what the responses of employers and government 
were. Basically while the economic and political situations were getting gradually worse, 
the representatives of employers' organisations and of government began to blame 
unions for the growing economic and political crises. For this very reason, first, the 
ruling class can be accused of seeking to undermine the political and democratic 
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framework established by the 1961 constitution, (after failing in the 1971 military 
intervention) from which trade union organisations benefited, through using anti-labour 
strategies particularly during major strikes. Second, on the political level employers did 
try to bring two major parties, RPP, (social democrat), and JP, (right-wing) together to 
form a coalition government. Probably, by doing so, they would further seek a 
compromise from the labour confederations. Yet, all these attempts failed due to the 
political division between those parties. Finally, it can be argued that, for the ruling 
class, the Turkish economy - particularly under the increasing world economic recession 
and its impact on Turkish industry - required a new economic model based on a closer 
integration with international capital. This is to say that there was a need to open the 
economy to the world markets by applying export-orientated strategies rather than 
import-substitution policies. 
Therefore, the IMF's austerity measures in January 1980 were introduced. However, it is 
a fact that the restructuring of the Turkish economy further needed some political 
changes since unions were affecting capital accumulation and aggravating the economic 
difficulties. One of the conditions for the implementation of IMF austerity programs was 
to lower real wages and to secure political stability. Finally, in September 1980 the 
military intervened and ended long term political instability. It was obvious that this 
military intervention was dissimilar to previous ones in that the 1980 military regime 
wanted to create a desirable political and economic climate for the ruling class in which 
the IMF programme could be easily implemented through suppressing all opposition 
groups particularly trade unions. 
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(v) Conclusion. 
In summary, the discussion can be concluded by suggesting the determinants of union 
development in general. By doing so, the development model for Turkish unions can be 
argued through exemplifying some European countries' experiences, particularly Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. So, the few differences and similarities may be explored in terms 
of the issues and processes of trade union developments in order to employ more 
analytical understanding of Turkish trade unions. 
In this perspective, it can be argued that the development of autonomous umon 
movement in Turkey possess some of the characteristics of trade unions in its 
counterpart countries mentioned above. In other words, in Turkey and those countries in 
question, the development of the independent trade union movement was influenced by 
significant internal and external economic and political factors. For instance, there has 
always been a link between the development of more autonomous trade unionism and 
the process of democratisation and also the economic and political models of Northern 
European countries in particular has had an impact on contemporary trade unionism in 
these countries. 
As has been suggested several times in this chapter, the emergence of the autonomous 
trade union movement originally resulted from government-directed changes at the 
beginning of the 1960s. It is a fact that most trade union rights including the right to 
strike and collective bargaining were granted from above by the ruling class without any 
long and spontaneous class struggle from workers themselves, as was the case in most 
European countries. This also partly explains the question why the development of the 
Turkish trade union movement was largely affected by legislative enactments rather than 
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spontaneous pressures from below, which characterized most of the European labour 
movements, at least in their formative years. 
In this context, it can be argued that the integration of some part of the working class, 
particularly trade unions into the economic and political system shaped the attitudes of 
the working class. In other words, associated with the historical underdevelopment of 
the working class both as an economic and as a political force, the economic and 
political model of 1960s relegated the working class to a passive status without affecting 
the designation of economic and social policies. 
The ineffective political role of the Turkish working class during the emergence of the 
autonomous labour movement can also be related to the late and limited development of 
an industrial working class. This was basically due to the late industrialisation process. It 
also applies to some other countries' cases. In some countries where industrialisation 
developed later than Britain more paternalistic care was taken of workers and their 
organisations by the state from the outset, for example, in the case of Germany 
paternalism has always been an important factor in industrial relations and industrial 
development and in Greece the paternalistic attitude of the state became very significant 
in shaping both the development of the trade union movement and the industrialisation 
process. 
In addition, it is also safe to suggest that pressures from the working class played a 
limited and insignificant part in the transition to democracy in the 1960s. In fact, during 
the unions' formative years, trade unions in Turkey were not established and developed 
on a basis of class consciousness and neither were they influenced by communist or 
socialist ideologies of parties or French-style anarcho-syndicalism, as in the case of 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
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Moreover, due to the absence of ideological domination within trade unions urnons III , 
Turkey did not suffer from internal political splits as compared with their counterparts in 
other countries (if we omit DISK, which broke off from TURK-IS). The reason why 
ideologies of the left failed to take root in the Turkish labour movement is that socialist 
parties and unions linked with them were easily closed and suppressed. Even after the 
progressive trade union Act of 1963, the government prohibited unions from engaging in 
political activity including a direct link with any political party. 
It can be also argued that the external factors combined with internal elements in the 
shaping of more autonomous trade union movement in the 1960s. This is to say that the 
world economic and political tendencies, particularly of European countries, played an 
important role in the development of unions in Turkey. The emergence of social and 
economic regulation in the 1960s, especially, the post-war Keynesian experience and the 
rise of social democracy in the West, helped the Turkish working class to benefit from 
those developments. 
The model of accumulation called "Import Substitution Industrialisation" lSI 
(resembling the Keynesian policies in many ways) accorded with the demands of 
employers and, more significantly, those of the industrial working class. In other words, 
the project of the ruling class for the new accumulation model also conformed with the 
short and medium interests of the organised working class. The right to unionisation, 
collective bargaining and strikes as well as some social reforms were granted in 
accordance with the requirements of the new model of accumulation and Turkey's 
pluralistic multi party democracy. 
Therefore for trade urnons these institutional channels which had been set up III , 
European democracies after long struggles strengthened their position. There were 
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considerable efforts to implement several progressive reforms borrowed from the 
Western models in Turkish labour law such as instituting an adequate election procedure 
for the determination of the sole bargaining agent, strengthening the employment 
security of workers and establishing a quasi-European co-determination system. 
In this context it should be stressed that in the 1960s and part of 1970s, the development 
of the trade union movement can only be understood through the world political and 
economic conjunctures and the development of ideologies, particularly social democracy 
on the one hand and through government-directed bureaucratic reforms from above on 
the other. Briefly, it can be argued that until the end of the 1960s the unions were 
dependent and under control by the state. After that, provisions relating both to basic 
and social rights and, more crucially, to trade union rights allowed unions to become 
pressure groups in the Turkish industrial relations system. In other words, there was a 
shift from the state-controlled union movement to an autonomous and independent 
union movement. 
However, let us not forget that, like the Southern European countries, in Turkey the 
state played a central paternalistic role in shaping and regulating both the development 
and strategies of the trade union movement and the formation of a modem economy 
through expansion of private industrial capital. Again this was basically due to economic 
and political considerations of governments combined with the influence of the world 
economic and political conjuncture of the 1960s. Unlike their counterparts in Southern 
European countries, pressures from the working class played a limited role in the 
transition to a more independent and democratic union movement in the political sphere. 
The strategies of unions were said to be determined to stay out of politics by focusing 
their activity mostly on economic functions. And they were often accused of being 
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inactive in the designation of policies for labour-management relations. Furthermore, 
they were also regarded as being weak in organising workers' activities as a political 
force. However, it can be suggested that evaluation of trade unionism in Turkey only 
according to "economic" dimensions could be misleading. 
At the beginning of the 1970s Turkish unions engaged in a more radical and militant 
activities. Essentially, the crises in the model of economic regulation and political unrest 
resulted in the unions adopting new radical policies. In other words, Turkish unions 
began to aim at going beyond the narrow class interests of members by stressing more 
and more the need to create a union model in which they could respond to the larger 
goals of working class in the 1970s. In this sense, it resembled many of the 
characteristics of trade union movements in southern European countries which had 
regained their momentum after dictatorships or military interventions and contributed to 
the socio-political structure and the democratisation process of the country. 
Finally, it can be confidently argued that the analyses of trade unionism in Turkey can be 
considered as part of the development process of "internal" and "external" determinants. 
And also that the struggle for, and process of, democracy is related to the struggle for 
more autonomous and democratic trade union movements. Unfortunately, the question 
of democracy and the development of trade unionism were hit by the military 
intervention of 1980. This can also be regarded as a historical turning point for the 
Turkish trade union movement. Turkish history often shows that there has been a 
significant link between the developments of the Turkish democracy and of the unions. 
The periods of the 1980s and on further illustrate this link and will be discussed in more 
detail in the second part of this thesis. 
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NOTES: 
1) Two socialist parties, the Turkish socialist party and the Socialist workers and 
peasants' party of Turkey had been set up in 1946. However, they were closed 
by the Martial law command in the same year. For more detail see Sulker (1973), 
Turkiye'de isci hareketleri. 
2) lSI was dependent on foreign imports in the form of technology and intermediate 
goods. 
3) Industrialisation strategies from 1950 (liberalisation period) to 1960 was import 
substitution through strong protectionism, whereas since 1960, central economic 
planning was implemented to develop co-ordination between the state and 
private sectors. In that period much of the attention was also paid to encourage 
the consolidation of private sector production. 
4) Hershlag 1988 also argued that the planning strategies of the 1960s and 70s 
were widely the pragmatic results of the impact of modem econometric models, 
of growing urban pressure and of the need to integrate Turkey in the world 
economy and the European economy. 
5) The case of 1980 military intervention is the most important example here. There 
was not any real resistance from the working class during the 1980 coup. 
6) The legal provisions of Act No 274 regulated the constitution and conduct of 
trade unions, while Act No 275 defined forms of the collective agreements, 
strikes and lockout see (Oguzman 1984). 
7) It is very important to look at the relations between TURK-IS and the TLP so as 
to understand the creation of DISK particularly since the main unionist members 
of the TLP's were also members of Executive committee of TURK-IS (Isikli 
1979). 
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8) Strikes covered larger numbers of workers and were more prolonged in the 
1960s and throughout the 1970s 
9) Of course if we ignore the temporary arrest of some DISK bureaucrats and the 
close of The Turkish labour party (TLP) which DISK was in alliance with. 
10) Taris is a public sector agricultural processing complex near the city of Izmir, 
which employed more than 10,000 workers. 
CHAPTER 4 
TURK-IS: HISTORY, PRINCIPLES AND ORGANISATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
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Although there had been serious attempts to set up a labour confederation prior to 1950, 
in Turkey the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TURK-IS) was formed on 31 
July 1952 (at a time when the right to strike and collective bargaining in line with the 
ILO standards were not yet exercised in the country). Attempts to achieve such an 
organisation had derived from both internal and external influences. As far as internal 
influences are concerned, until 1952 the need for such a top level central organisation 
had long been discussed between the federations, birliks (regional organisations) and 
industry-based unions. 
The nucleus of TURK-IS was founded by the efforts of the Turkish Textile Workers' 
Federation (1). Various meetings took place in Istanbul, Bursa and Izmir early in 1950, 
involving the representatives of large unions, of the federations and of birliks. A steering 
committee was appointed to draft a constitution, and the first convention of the 
confederation was held on 6 September 1952 in Izmir. 
The second organisational stimulus for the emergence of a confederation came from 
external forces. The most important of these was American influence. The impact of 
American labour policy on the developing countries was very clear. It tended to affect 
trade union movements, particularly in developing countries, through its labour agencies 
(mainly AFL, AID and partly ICFTU ). In the case of Turkey these attempts had started 
in the confederation's formative years. A labour official from AFL, Boris Shiskin, had 
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come to Turkey to talk to union leaders to encourage the establishment of a labour 
confederation. He had also promised Marshall aid in the event of a confederation. In the 
same year, January 1951, on behalf of ICFTU Irving Brown had also come to Turkey 
(2). He had also mentioned the sizeable direct budgetary support as well as free 
membership of ICFTU (Koc 1986b). 
It can be said that the American aid program succeeded not only in setting up a central 
confederation but also in influencing the philosophy and policies of TURK-IS, whose 
leaders experienced their first taste of unionism in "Business type" or "wage conscious" 
unions rather than "political unionism". Therefore, as a result of the deliberate policies 
of American labour agencies Turkish unions had not been able to benefit from the 
tradition and experience of the European working class, at least in the confederation's 
formative years. In the first TURK-IS convention in 1952 there had been 69 delegates 
representing several unions as well as the federations and birliks (TURK-IS 1962). In 
the early years of the confederation, there were 55 affiliates of TURK-IS, including the 
federations, Industry-based trade unions and directly affiliated unions representing 
294,697 members (Tuna 1964). 
According to a survey carried out by TURK-IS the number of its members was to be 
around 1,350,000 in 1975, representing 85% percent of all unionised workers in the 
country. However, the 15th congress of the confederation was attended by 458 
delegates representing some 1,600,000 members in 32 affiliated unions. As of the 
beginning of 1993 TURK-IS had a membership of 1,784,663 organised within its 32 
affiliated unions. Most affiliated unions are members of their relevant international 
bodies. The Confederation has eight regional offices in Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Adana, 
Sivas, Diyarbakir, Samsun and Eskisehir and 58 "city" representative functions 
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throughout Turkey. Also the TURK-IS organisation comprises 823 local unions in 32 
affiliated national unions. 
According to the constitution of TURK-IS, the confederation may not accept any new 
application for affiliation from a union which has organised workers in a branch of 
activity which is being represented by one of the existing affiliates of the confederation. 
Therefore, the application can only be carried through mergers. 
TURK-IS admits into membership merely those organisations which have been 
organised at the national level. It is a fact that particularly after the trade union Act of 
1963, TURK-IS decided to organise the union structure on the basis of national 
industrial unions. According to the 5th TURK-IS convention's decisions (TURK-IS 
1962), it was suggested that unions in Turkey should be organised within the national 
level and the national unions to be affiliated to TURK-IS could be organised within 28 
industrial categories. 
Reviewing several TURK-IS congress reports (particularly since 1960) and responses 
given during the interviews, two key reasons can be suggested for the centralised 
industrial unionism. First, whereas craft unionism was well established in most European 
labour movements from the very beginning, the Turkish legal system always encouraged 
the principle of industrial unionism. Second, according to TURK-IS sources (1963:12) 
"Industrial unionism should be based on a nation-wide centralised structure, it was 
clear that rival unionism would cause internal struggles and strife within the labour 
movement ". 
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Therefore, the fear of TURK-IS at the time was the concept of rival unionism which was 
aimed at weakening the trade union movement. In December 1961, a committee was 
established by TURK-IS's executive committee in order to prepare a report based on the 
structures of various European labour union movements. This report suggested that 
Turkish trade unions were identified by a large number of unions representing only a 
small membership percentage of total workforce. And also according to the report, the 
affiliated organisations to TURK-IS were grouped as four categories: regional 
organisations, federations, industry-based unions and directly affiliated locals. The report 
also stressed the need for a centralised structure for Turkish trade unions. As a result, 
TURK-IS begun to co-ordinate the reorganisation campaign and TURK-IS, with the 
financial and technical assistance ofICFTU, set up six regional offices (TURK-IS 1963). 
The aim of these regional offices was to stimulate the amalgamation and reorganisation 
of the small unions and the other type of unions, federations and birliks, within each 
industry so as to establish strong and effective national unions which were to be 
affiliated with TURK-IS. It should be mentioned that from the speeches of TURK-IS 
leaders in the fifth General congress reports of TURK-IS (1962), it is obvious that the 
leaders of TURK-IS advocated the German model, which was based on a centralised 
network of sixteen national unions. However, the congress decision was to set up 
twenty-eight national unions. 
However, broadly speaking, the efforts of TURK-IS in centralising the structure of its 
affiliates did fail. In the reports of the Executive and Administrative Committees 
presented to the Sixth convention of TURK-IS (1966) TURK-IS itself admitted the 
failure of its attempts for a centralised structure and the reason given for this failure was 
the differences in opinion, personal disagreements and political rivalries among leaders 
(3). 
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The new trade unions Act No. 2821 was enacted in May 1983. This new system of trade 
unions should be treated as an important legal regulation for both the understanding of 
the present organisational framework of unions and the centralisation demand of TURK-
IS. 
Some of the main principles of new trade union Act of 1983 can be summarised as 
follows. It is clearly stated in the new Act, Article 3, that trade unions can not be 
organised according to any profession or workplace. Therefore, the principle of 
"industry-based national union" was accepted. It was the end of the most important 
debate since its establishment within the TURK-IS. Basically considering the wishes of 
TURK-IS, in the 1983 trade union Act, federations were cancelled and confederations 
were kept as higher organisations. According to the Act, at least five trade unions from 
different work fields can organise a confederation. 
The work fields or industrial categories were determined by the Ministry of Labour. The 
work fields of workers' unions were stated and their number was decreased from 34 to 
28. Although birliks (regional unions) and federations were abolished to centralise the 
trade union structure, in the Act it is made possible for the union to be organised by 
intervention of" elected worker representatives" for conveying the private problems of 
workplace, finding solutions, and more importantly for the purpose of being a bridge 
between the members and the unions themselves. 
Broadly speaking, the trade union Act of 1983 resulted in TURK-IS having a highly 
centralised union structure. Without any doubt, the unification of organisation at many 
levels reinforced the power of unions. This structure seems to be in line with the 
requirement for centralism which has been inherent in the political and administrative 
organisation of TURK-IS. However, the important question here is how much of the 
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power is used by TURK-IS as the confederation and how much authority is delegated to 
the confederation from national industrial unions. The relationship is not clear enough 
for any definite judgement to be made about the highly centralised structure of unions in 
Turkish context (we return this issue when the role of TURK-IS in Turkish industrial 
relations is discussed). 
(i) The Internal Structure of TURK-IS. 
According to the constitution of TURK-IS, mandatory and voluntary organs III 
accordance with the trade unions Act of 1983 Act. No.2821 are described as follows: 
Mandatory organs: 
(a) Congress; the supreme authority in the determination of the policies and programmes 
of the organisation is the general congress. It convenes once every three years and is 
composed of delegates elected by the congresses of the affiliated unions, on the basis of 
their membership. The general congress elects the five members of executive board. 
(b) Executive Board; it is composed of five members: President, General Secretary, 
Financial Secretary, Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Organising, elected by 
secret ballot by the Congress. The executive Board is the supreme organ of the 
confederation in between congresses. Basically, it is charged with the responsibility of 
implementing all the decisions taken by the congress. In other words, it has the authority 
to act on behalf of the confederation and is responsible for directing the activities of the 
organisation and giving effect to the decisions and recommendations of the Congress. 
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(c) Board of Auditors; the Congress elects from among its delegates a board of auditors 
composed of three members. The board is responsible to hold audit of the accounts of 
the organisation at six months intervals. 
(d) Disciplinary Committee; the Congress also elects from among its delegates a 
disciplinary committee composed of five members. The Committee has the authority to 
hear and investigate the charges made against officers of the confederation and affiliated 
organisation for action deemed to be in contravention of TURK-IS Constitution. 
Voluntary organ: 
Council of Union Presidents; presidents of the TURK-IS affiliated unions automatically 
become the members of the Council of union presidents. The Council has the authority 
to discuss and make recommendations on all matters particularly concerning the labour 
movement and on matters related with the administration and activities of the 
Confederation. This Council meets every three months or more frequently if necessary. 
Affiliated organisations to TURK-IS and membership represent as at 1993: 
National Unions Leadership Members Membership 
of ITS' 
TARIM-IS S.Ozdes 43,948 IFPAAW 
(Agricultural, Irrigation and Forestry) 
TURKIYE MADEN-IS H.Kayabasi 63,725 MIFIICEF 
(Mining) 
GENEL MADEN-IS) S.Denizer 48,857 MIF/ICEF 
(Mining 
PETROL-IS M.Ceylan 77,380 ICEF 
(Oil and Chemical) 
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TEKGIDA-IS O.Balta 175,492 IUF 
(Food, Tobacco, Drink:) 
SEKER-IS H.Alcan 38,542 IUF 
(Sugar Industry) 
TEKSIF S.Yilmaz 235,154 ITGLWF 
(Textile, Knitting, Clothing) 
DERI-IS Y.Kaya 14,249 ITGLWF 
(Leather and Shoe) 
AGAC-IS G.Ercakir 14,655 IFBWW 
(Wood and Lumber) 
SELULOZ-IS M.Sari 15,910 ICEF 
(Paper and Pulp) 
BASIN-IS A.Guvenc 5,488 IGF 
(Press Technicians) 
BASISEN M. Tiryakioglu 35,536 FIET 
(Banking and Insurance) 
BASS T.Yilmaz 10,692 FIET 
(Banking and Insurance) 
CIMSE-IS T.Eralan 54,008 ICEF 
(Cement, Ceramic, Glass) 
KRISTAL-IS I. Eren 16,455 ICEF 
(Glass Workers) 
TURK METAL M.Ozbek 183,948 ITF 
(Metal Industry) 
DOKGEMI-IS N.Tur 7,168 ITF 
(Port, Dock, Shipbuilding) 
VOL-IS M.Bayram 192,149 PSI,IFBWW 
(Construction and Building) 
TES-IS F.Barut 120,784 ICEF 
(Energy, Water and Gas) 
TEZKOOP-IS T.Tamer 41,271 FIET 
(Commercial Clerical Employees) 
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KOOP-IS A.Balaman 37,664 
(Office Employees) 
TUMTIS S.Topcu 6,479 
(Motor Transport Industry) 
DEMIRYOL-IS E.Tocoglu 31,079 ITF 
(Railway Workers) 
DENIZCILER SENDIKASI T.Uzun l3,688 ITF 
(Seafarers) 
HAVA-IS) A.Aycin1 2,840 ITF 
(Airways) 
LIKAT-IS H.Biber 8,268 ITF 
(Longshoremen) 
HABER-IS C.Teke 29,958 PTTI 
(Postal, Telegraph, Telephone) 
SAGLIK-IS M.Basoglu 15,002 PSI 
(Health Employees) 
TOLEY-IS C.Bakindi 25,402 
(Hotel and Restaurant) 
HARP-IS I.Cetin 39,064 PSI 
(Defence Industry) 
TGS O.Erinc 4,438 FIJ 
(Journalists) 
BELEDIYE-IS F.Alan 165,429 ICEF 
(Municipal and General Workers) 
Number affiliated 32 
Total membership 1,784,663 
* ITS= International Trade Unions. 
* Dual representation in four industry branch exists upon a decisions of TURK-IS congress with the 
understanding that these unions shall merge in the future. 
Source: TURK-IS (1993) dergisi sayi 273 Ocak. 
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(ii) The Principles and Ideology of TURK-IS. 
TURK-IS, of course, has its own principles and ideology, like the workers' 
confederations in other countries. It is quite significant to stress the principles and the 
ideology of the confederation so as to understand this organisation as a whole. The main 
constitution of the confederation clearly declares its basic ideology. Particularly, Article 
3 stresses the conception of a national, democratic and secular regime. While claiming to 
fight against fascism and communism, it adheres to the protection of democratic rules. 
In addition, some of the fundamental principles of TURK-IS can be summarised as 
follows (4); 
- TURK-IS considers the social and economic problems of Turkey as a whole. It 
believes that the peace, security and welfare for all Turkish workers depends largely 
on the solution of all such problems and a rapid and well balanced social and economic 
development of the society. 
- TURK-IS demands that specific provisions of the National Constitution relevant to 
"social and economic rights and obligations" are fully realised in the shortest possible 
time. TURK-IS is determined to exert all possible pressure on governing and 
opposition parties to see to it that the provisions of the National Constitution are fully 
observed. 
- TURK-IS is determined to pursue a policy which will eliminate all grounds for clashes 
among various classes of the society and thus create a balance, as well as unity and 
integration among these classes. 
- TURK-IS will do its utmost to see to it that extreme centralisation and political 
interventions that affect most state sector enterprises will be discontinued, and the 
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workers will participate in management so as to increase productivity and get a filir 
share from the increased profits. 
- TURK-IS will engage in all the necessary measures to ensure that foreign capital will 
not be allowed to do business in Turkey in all cases when a business can be operated 
by native capital, nor be allowed to transfer large sums of profits outside of the 
country. It will strive, at the same time for ways under which foreign investment will 
be subject to a production tax in amounts which meet international standards and 
demand from the government the initiation of all necessary measures to make up for 
the amount of revenue lost due to Government's failure of not having collected such 
as a tax from foreign investment. 
- TURK-IS demands that all measures should be taken to have the private sector operate 
in a manner and serving the interests of the Turkish community and facilitate the 
achievement of the plan targets and discipline. 
- TURK-IS is determined to conduct an extensive education campaign to ensure that 
great masses of workers as well as the Turkish general public will use freely and 
properly their social, economic and political rights (TURK-IS 1968, 1970, 1976, 
1979). 
What is important in our present context is that the provisions of the confederations' 
constitution and its principles demonstrate a general picture about TURK-IS. First. 
TURK-IS recognises and even defends the institutions and rules of the existing socio-
political order. Second, it rejects class struggle rather concentrating on promoting 
national consciousness. And finally it seems that the principles of the confederation 
mentioned above indicated its objectives in the economic, social, and political field~. 
and even they can also be considered as some reformist demands from and within 
TURK-IS. 
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What is, then, the general policy framework of TURK-IS in terms of the political means 
and ways? According to a resolution adopted in the fifth general congress of the 
confederation in 1964, TURK-IS remains entirely independent vis-a.-vis political parties 
and pursues an above-party policy. Since then, TURK-IS leaders have often stressed the 
policy of "supra-party unionism," a philosophy which is aimed at having the union 
movement act as a non-party pressure group. As a matter of fact, this policy has been in 
accordance with the prohibition imposed by the trade union law on the establishment of 
organic links with political parties. However, let us not forget that legislation has not 
outlawed individual union members from joining parties or from running for parliament 
under diverse party affiliations. 
(iii) Activities of TURK-IS. 
TURK-IS is not involved as a bargaining agent. This is simply due to legal obligation. 
According to the collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs Act No 2822, labour 
confederations are not able to engage in collective bargaining (Oguzman 1984). 
However, TURK-IS exercises a "consultancy" and "co-ordinator" role in collective 
agreements to be carried out between labour unions and employers organisations. 
TURK-IS is also determined to co-ordinate almost all union activities, not only with 
respect to bargaining issues, but also in terms of other industrial relations problems and 
social and political activities. While individual unions handle dispute settlements matters 
(particularly in the case of strikes and lock-out), TURK-IS assists their affiliated unions 
by establishing a central solidarity fund. Yet, TURK-IS has frequently been criticised by 
their members for playing a limited role in representing the internal unity of Turkish 
trade unions. 
90 
It is very significant, though, to comment that TURK-IS pays a great deal of attention to 
preparing the views of labour in the preparation and amendment of laws and regulations 
related to labour and industry and defends these views at all levels. In fact, particularly 
after gaining new rights in 1963, such as collective bargaining and the use of the strike 
weapon, the main activities of TURK-IS have centred around economic tasks. As a 
result, TURK-IS has been expected to be more effective in raising the income level and 
in standardising the working conditions of larger numbers of wage-earners. To do so, 
TURK-IS has chosen the way in which it has been able to develop good relations on a 
permanent basis with the government. Therefore, TURK-IS as a pressure group has 
been involved in such lobbying activities. This approach can be clearly seen from the 
fifth general Congress' report (1963 :21): 
"in order to have better legislation for its members, the confederation closely follows 
discussions in the parliament. The results of these discussions are recorded on tables 
indicating the attitudes of parliament members on labour issues. These records are 
published regularly. " 
Basically, member unions are encouraged to put pressure on political parties by the 
voting procedure in general elections. Although establishing any ties with political 
parties has been forbidden, unions have been able to play an indirect role in political 
activities mainly by supporting prolabour parties or their candidates. As part of its 
activities TURK-IS has also initiated several labour education activities. These are , 
conducted at different levels and cover a wide variety of topics. The technical assistance 
and co-operation extended by such international agencies as OECD, AID, ICFTU and 
International trade secretariats have helped to sponsor part of these programs. 
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Koc (1986b) argues that there is one significant factor that must be discussed in the 
analysis of the educational activities of TURK-IS. This may be simply termed the 
"American influence". Especially after 1963, the assistance of the agency for 
international development (AID) did give financial support to TURK-IS in the form of 
payment of salaries and travel expenses of regional directors and educational officers as 
, 
well as of headquarters staff. What is more, for four years the AID labour division 
supplied lecturers to assist the confederation's educational programs, and some 200 
Turkish union leaders were said to have visited America during the beginning of 1960s. 
Some unionists during the interviews have also stated that the American support 
program was intended to set up the tactics, techniques and philosophy of America 
unions in Turkey. 
Therefore, the adaptation of "wage conscious" unionism within the TURK-IS was not 
so difficult as a part of this direct relation. In addition, these important American 
influences and the direct budgetary support may have delayed TURK-IS in setting up 
direct ties with its European partners. A top leader of union affiliated to TURK-IS told 
the author that due to American influence on the development of TURK-IS, TURK-IS 
leaders often emphasised the non-political nature of the labour movement. In other 
words, the American type of unionism prevented trade unions from becoming a political 
force in favour of the working class and its democratic rights, rather putting them into a 
position of collaborating with the forces of state and capital. 
Various reports of the confederation also indicate that in collaboration with university 
industrial relations academics, TURK-IS and its members have regular educational 
programs, particularly to train shop-stewards and rank and file members. 
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Higher level trade union officials attend the training programs of the TURK-IS labour 
college in Ankara on a more permanent and regular basis. However, the author, who 
attended some union seminars within the leather and petroleum and chemical unions had 
, 
the impression that there are a number of criticisms against the quality of the trainers and 
seminars and the contents of courses for workers. There is also a significant complaint 
about the lack of substantial programs in vocational training. In fact, my findings on the 
educational programs of the confederation support this discontent. For example, in 
terms of the trade union Act of 1983, trade unions have to spend 5% percent of all their 
income on education of members. Yet, when we look at the reports of unions, it is clear 
that most unions use this money for organising a number of conferences at very 
expensive hotels, particularly in the big cities, rather than concentrating on labour 
educational programs. 
As far as economic activities of TURK-IS are concerned, its activities also remained 
limited in this area. In spite of the fact that the Trade Unions acts have encouraged 
unions to establish co-operatives, there has been little development in this field. 
Moreover, TURK-IS has often tried to co-ordinate with private and public authorities to 
support what is called "social housing projects". But, all these efforts have failed. Some 
large unions such as TEKGIDA-IS in Food industries, TEKSIF in Textile, YOL-IS in 
construction and building and MADEN-IS in mining have holiday places for members. 
Some workers and shop stewards to whom I spoke are, however, in doubt about 
whether these facilities are used by members or top level unionists. 
During the course of this study many reports and publications of TURK-IS and of its 
members have been reviewed. Therefore, the most striking activity for the trade unions, 
and particularly for TURK-IS, is the time and effort spent in legislative matters. In a 
number of legislative proposals, such as the social security Act, unemployment insurance 
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and the amendment of 44 articles of the 1980 constitution, TURK-IS is preparing its 
own drafts and submitting them to the government and opposition parties as well as 
media. It also undertakes the printing of journals, some periodicals and books in order to 
shed some light to its members and inform the media as a whole. 
(iv) Representative Functions of TURK-IS. 
TURK-IS acts as the spokesman and co-ordinator of the majority of trade unions in 
Turkey, representing its members on both national and international bodies. The 
representation of TURK-IS at both national and international level derives from not only 
some legal obligations, such as the main constitution of Turkey and various labour 
legislations, but also voluntary agreements between TURK-IS and the employers' peak 
confederations (TISK) and its own constitutions. 
This representative function of TURK-IS at national level can be briefly outlined as 
follows (most of the following functions are based on tripartite bodies) (5). 
- Minimum wage board, which fixes the minimum wage at national scale. 
- National productivity centre, which is to increase productivity at national level. 
- State planning organisation expert committees, which makes recommendations and 
suggestions in relation to development planning. 
- Labour council, the supreme tripartite assembly which is set up to solve problems in 
the field of industrial relations. 
- Board of the social security institution, which is simply established to safeguard the 
security of workers. 
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- High board of health of the social security institution, which resolves conflicts in 
relation to the health problems of workers conflicts arising from collective agreements 
involving work under strike prohibition. 
- Foreign economic relations board, which involves the development of economic, 
financial commercial and industrial relations between Turkey and other countries, 
mainly European countries. 
- The advisory committee to the Ee, which has become a very significant committee 
after Turkey's application to the Ee, deals with co-ordination and collaboration 
between employers and workers' representatives and the government on matters 
concerning the Ee. 
What can be very plausibly suggested, therefore, is that TURK-IS plays a significant role 
in a wide range of standing consultative machinery on labour issues. In fact, the 
activities outlined above are considered as a means of encouraging labour and 
employers' leading confederations to discuss their mutual problems with a view to 
coming to some understanding or taking voluntary action. Some of this tripartite 
machinery seems to be reasonably well developed in Turkey. In addition to these 
tripartite bodies which deal with labour matters in general, TURK-IS also joins a number 
of official committees which are competent to consider specific technical subjects such 
as apprenticeships and vocational training, social security and industrial safety. 
It is worth mentioning that representation on other bodies, particularly those dealing 
with macro economic and social issues, has become crucial in more recent years. An 
example is the advisory committee to the Ee and the foreign economic relations board. 
From the point of view of some officials of TURK-IS and its members who were 
interviewed, it is generally accepted that on balance they benefit by involvement in these 
tripartite bodies. This is because these formal contacts strengthen the status of the 
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confederation, its executive committee and its officials, particularly in the eyes of the 
member trade unions of TURK-IS the workers belonging to them. In addition, formal 
contacts they offer a potential means of influencing the government's industrial relations 
policies. However, the criticism on tripartite bodies raised during the interviews was 
about the unequal representation between employers and workers organisations in the 
wide range of standing consultative machinery. 
The second vital representative function of TURK-IS is at international level. As far as 
industrial relations issues are concerned, TURK-IS is the only confederation playing an 
important role in the international arena. It has a close relation with the International 
labour organisation (ILO). Thus, It also nominates workers' delegates to the annual 
conference of the ILO. In other words, all international labour conferences are closely 
followed by representatives of Turkish workers' unions. They are mostly nominated by 
TURK-IS and attend the specialist and regional meeting of the ILO. They also 
participate in the work of the relevant commissions, such as ILO tripartite industrial 
committees, ILO expert committees and ILO advisory committees (TURK-IS, 40. 
yilinda). 
Furthermore, TURK-IS became a full member of the ICFTU in the year 1960 following 
eight years' bitter struggle. Relations with international organisations were strengthened 
when ICFTU, together with International Trade Secretariats, appointed a joint 
representative to TURK-IS. The national member unions of TURK-IS are affiliated to 
the International Trade Secretariats which are also associated with the ICFTU. TURK-
IS was also a member of ICFTUIERO until this organisation expired. The confederation 
joined ICFTU/ARRO in 1973 TUAC in 1975. 
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Moreover, TURK-IS became a member of ETUC in 1988. In various interviews with 
trade union officials the author has been told that TURK-IS executive committee's 
decision to join ECTU was largely influenced by Turkey's application for full 
membership to the EC and the recent increasing relations between European trade 
unions and Turkish trade unions. 
It is a fact that in the eyes of trade unionist interviewed the membership of ETUC is very 
important in terms of both the democratic principles of European trade unions and 
Turkish workers interests within the European community. In addition to the trade 
unions officials' opinion, It would be also argued that the recent close economic and 
political relations between Turkey and other European countries (due to the economic 
and social policies of Turkish governments in the 1980s) and the significant increases in 
the multinational companies in Turkey have forced Turkish unions to increase their 
contacts with their European partners. 
(v) Conclusion: Some Comparison and General View. 
The overall picture so far tells us that like DGB in Germany, LO in Sweden, UGT -P in 
Portugal, UGT in Spain and GSEE in Greece, TURK-IS is the largest and most 
important confederation in Turkey. In addition to its lobbying activities as a pressure 
group, TURK-IS, as the main confederation engages in co-ordinating and representative 
functions for trade unions. It also nominates union representatives to several quasi-
governmental agencies and tripartite bodies. As GSEE in Greece, DGB in Germany and 
TUC in UK, TURK-IS, is to all intents and purposes the single union centre in Turkey 
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The organising stimulus for the emergence of the confederation stemmed from both 
internal and external forces. The former was the attempts of the existing federations and 
the latter was the American influence. In this sense TURK-IS's case displays some 
similarities to GSEE, the Greek General Confederation of Labour in Greece that foreign 
involvement, particularly American influence, in the emergence and development of the 
labour confederation was significant. It has been often claimed that United States' agents 
were sent to Greece to promote "free" trade unions against communism (Coldrick and 
Jones 1979). 
As UGT -P in Portugal, TURK-IS opted for a model of national unions on the basis of 
branch activity. This model is, basically, inspired from the Austrian and German 
examples. It should be stressed that there is a considerable variation in the characteristic 
of unions in different countries. Compared with the other countries' union structure as in 
Spain and Greece, in Turkey TURK-IS does not include the district or regional unions 
and national federations. Thus, it has a highly centralised union structure. 
In fact, although in some respect they have some common essential elements, trade 
unions in various countries display a substantial diversity in terms of structure, functions 
and formal relations with political parties and the state. For example, in their declaration 
of principles, the UGT -P in Portugal, the UGT in Spain, the GSEE in Greece and 
TURK-IS in Turkey claim to be autonomous workers' organisation which are 
independent of political parties, the state and employers' associations. In other words, 
with regard to the relations between unions and the state or political parties, they do not 
involve the domination of one side by other. 
Although they seem to be neutral in party politics, their political presence is usually the 
socialist or the social democrat parties. However, in relation to political parties, unlike 
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its Southern European partners in the case of Turkey, TURK-IS in principle maintains a 
basic political neutrality. Yet, despite the policy of "supra-party unionism", TURK-IS 
also rewards its friends and punishes its enemies whatever their party persuasion 
particularly during the election time. 
In considering the policy of the confederation, TURK-IS does not pursue a 
revolutionary policy of class struggle. In this context, unlike the UGT in Spain, it is 
similar to the GSEE in Greece and the UGT -P in Portugal. Therefore, it is quite possible 
to describe TURK-IS as an intermediary organisation (the term is used by Walther 
Muller Jentsch, 1985). This term is used with reference to a unionism committed to 
reform within capitalist structural framework. Basically, this is a unionism which sees its 
future and the future of the working class as being determined by close co-operation 
with capital and the government of the day, and that it is solely prepared to exert its role 
to the extent that this does not antagonise the power structure. 
In this sense, at least two important reasons can be suggested for the pressures "internal" 
and "external" on TURK-IS's policy and principles. For internal pressure there are a 
number of determining factors such as the different political tendencies of leaders of 
member unions the lack of a well-entrenched class-consciousness, conservatism of the , 
working class and the reluctance of workers to identify themselves with any leftist group 
and organisation. On the other hand, in the context of the external pressure, legal 
restrictions on trade unionism in Turkey and the legal and institutional requirements of 
the system of collective bargaining are so crucial that social partners are willing to 
compromise and work together. Here the pressure drives from the economic and 
political implications of union's action. It is to say that unions are forced to join 
responsibility for the state of the economy and for stable growth. 
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As a matter offact, in the principles of TURK-IS the economic growth of the country as 
well as a policy of social reforms have been stressed. In addition, in more recent years 
TURK-IS leaders have often claimed the defence of values and principles of democratic 
trade unionism. 
As the case with the GSEE in Greece, the UGT in Spain and the UGT -P in Portugal, 
TURK-IS has strong relations with international bodies, including ICFTU, ETUC and 
TUAC to the DECD. That is why, combined with the consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey and Turkey's full application for the European communities, TURK-IS' policy 
and principles are likely to be redefined in accordance with the needs of a modem trade 
union movement which is more compatible with the structures, functions and formal 
relations (concerning the political parties, the state and employers organisations) of the 
European trade union movement. This not only further requires the principles of 
solidarity in general but also encourages a mass democratic movement in Turkey. 
NOTES: 
1) In Turkey, federations had begun to set themselves up before the emergence of 
TURK-IS. 
2) Irving Brown worked as the chairmen of foreign relation of AFL-CIO. He was 
also said to have some relations with CIA see Koc 1986 "TURK-IS neden boyle 
nasil degisecek" Alan Yayincilik. 
3) F or a detailed analysis of the structure of Turkish trade unionism see Dereli 1966 
"Turk sendikaciliginda merkezilesme temayulu ve muhtemel neticeleri" sosyal 
siyaset konferanslari, vol. 7, Istanbul. 
4) TURK-IS has twenty-four principles in the constitution of the confederation of 
the Turkish trade unions. The first twenty-three of these was approved by the 
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seventh general congress in 1968. The twenty-fourth was accepted by the eight 
congress in 1970. These principles were amended and adopted at the 11 th 
general congress of TURK-IS (1979). 
5) During the case studies in April 1993 in Ankara, it was difficult to gather some 
information about representative functions of TURK-IS from the confederation's 
own sources and the information given officially was not good enough. 
Therefore, most information is based on the authors' personal contacts, or 
gathered from the ministry of labour's periodicals and TISK (the main employers 
confederation's officials in Ankara). 
CHAPTERS 
THE ROLE OF TURK-IS IN TURKISH INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS (1960-1980) 
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A famous phrase used by Seyfi Demirsoy (one of the ex-presidents of TURK-IS) to 
describe the role of TURK-IS in the labour movement is that "there is a government in 
Ankara, there is a parliament in Ankara and there is the TURK-IS in Ankara". In fact, 
the task here is simply to find out how true this view is. In other words, the role of 
TURK-IS in the Turkish industrial relations system becomes very important in 
understanding of role of unions in the Turkish economic and political system. Individual 
workers do not become members of TURK-IS, but join one of its affiliated trade unions. 
In essence, TURK-IS is a union of unions. Thus, the role of confederation may be 
broadly described as involving in everything concerned with the labour movement. It co-
ordinates the labour views and in general, performs various necessary functions and 
provides assistance to its members. 
In this context, it is necessary to raise some questions. Was the role of TURK-IS in 
Turkish industrial relations explicitly defined in terms of the characteristics of the 
confederation and its organisational elements (leadership, union democracy, policies and 
strategies etc.), or of external structural influences? What were the necessary purposes 
of TURK-IS in its relations with state, collective bargaining, organisational 
developments, strikes and politics? How far were the strategies, policies and objectives 
of unions in Turkey shaped by their organisational peculiarities? What were the 
significant features of interaction between the internal environment and the broader 
social context? 
102 
Also, an important question to ask is whether the theoretical debate on the role of trade 
unions in a European context can inform us about the role of the unions in Turkey. For 
some academics the role of trade unions in various countries did not extend far beyond 
the limits of collective bargaining. In this respect, the effect of the bargaining role of 
unions was also explained as what was described by the Webbs' "market relations" 
(Hyman 1971). Hyman argues (1975) that trade unions in many countries were formed 
as agencies for collective bargaining in order to improve their wages and employment 
conditions. A number of commentators also argued that some union demands seem to be 
beyond the securing of economic gains. For Flanders, job regulation was an important 
term to analyse the function of unions; collective bargaining was not only an economic 
function, but also a form of political expression. The latter, basically, required the 
participation of unions or their representatives in the regulation of "managerial relations" 
(Hyman 1971). 
Some authors explained the function and role of trade urnons m terms of the 
transformation of "external" and "internal" determinants of unions. Muller-Jentsch 
(1985:5) argues that; 
"the role and function of trade unions in West European society are to be seen in the 
wider context of the transformation from "laissez-faire" to an "organised welfare-state 
capitalism ", 
This development had a significant influence on trade union organisation and policy. As 
a result, unions changed from "classical" to "intermediary". Development was 
characterised by changes in union structure: there was an internal restructuring and a 
tendency for the centralisation of the decision making process, (mainly, the 
bureaucratisation of trade unions); changes in union policies occurred (wages and 
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working hours, organisational objectives and external representation became more 
important); differentiation between workplace and industry-wide representation took 
place (new types of workplace institutions emerged and workplace representation 
became more important); there was an institutionalising of class conflict and an 
increasing trade union role in economic policy (Muller-Jentsch 1985). 
What is required here is an explicit attempt to identify the similarity or difference 
between the type of unionism in Turkey and what is called the "intermediary" unionism 
in which the coexistence of union structures and developments may assume alternative 
forms and may involve different consequences for the role and function of Turkish trade 
unions. In order to respond to this question four crucial themes namely: relations with 
the state, collective bargaining, strikes and internal developments are to be discussed 
below. 
(i) Relations with the State and Politics. 
One of the significant roles of TURK-IS in the Turkish industrial system is to lobby on 
general labour and social matters on behalf of its members. In other words, TURK-IS 
seeks to influence government decision-making on labour and social questions of 
concern to its members. It will be shown that, since its formation, TURK-IS has had a 
considerable influence on Turkish governments. However, the patterns of relationships 
between the governments and TURK-IS have taken different forms in different 
historical periods of Turkish labour movement. 
Since the establishment of TURK-IS in 1952, the confederation adopted the policy of 
what is called "supra-party unionism". According to the main constitution of the 
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confederation, Article 3 also forbade any links with political parties. However, it stated 
that 
"unless the executive committee of TURK-IS and the representatives of its members 
reached an agreement, the aim of TURK-IS was to stay independent and pursue 
"above-party" policy (TURK-IS 1970, Ana Tuzuk Madde 3 :6). 
In fact, the general idea among union leaders who defended the confederation's "supra 
party policy" was that the policy of union independence should be supported because if 
TURK-IS sided with any political party then most of its members would split into the 
different political lines, particularly, since they lacked common party loyalties (1) 
(TURK-IS 1973). Unlike the situation in most European countries, political parties in 
Turkey have not had any political objectives in which they radically differ from each 
other, either in their conception of trade unionism or their approach to party-union 
relationships. In this context, TURK-IS's non-commitment policy to any political party 
should be also understood. 
The purpose of TURK-IS in general has been to develop good relations on a permanent 
basis with the governments and to secure the unity of the unions behind it as their 
spokesmen and co-ordinator. Yet, the successful achievement of this aim has sometimes 
turned out to be problematic. 
During the years preceding 1960, the hopes of the confederation to establish good 
relations with the Democrat party (DP) had been disappointed. The Democrat Party in 
the 1950 election had come to power by promising the right to free collective bargaining 
and the freedom to strike. This friendly relationship between the DP and TURK-IS was. 
however, short-lived, because the DP had refused to implement its promises on the right 
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to strike and adopted restrictive labour policies. Union leaders, who often criticised the 
government for inaction and inadequacy on some legislative issues, such as the right to 
strike and permission to affiliate to the ICFTU, had been subject to repression and 
persecution (Rosen 1962). 
Particularly after 1953 the government exerted constant pressure on unions which did 
not support the Democrat party. In 1957, courts of law were exhorted by the Democrat 
party government to shut down regional union organisations. Shortly after this the 
government's policy towards unions became more repressive (Koc 1986a). During the 
formative years of the confederation a favourable government policy was significant. 
However, the removal of this support, especially after 1953, demoralised union 
leadership and the confederation's direct confrontation with the Democrat party gave 
rise to the division among the already fragmented union leadership into partisan factions 
(2). 
On 19-21 June 1957 the third convention of TURK-IS took place under heavy 
government pressures. Although some delegates at the congress were accusing the 
government supporters within the confederation of becoming the tools of the DP 
government, the Democrat party loyalists in the confederation replaced Ismail Inan, the 
supporter of the people's party faction, with Nuri Beser, leader of the Democrat party 
faction within the confederation (Koc 1986a). The change in leadership led TURK-IS to 
playa passive role in relations with the government. In short, during the 1950s as the 
national labour centre TURK-IS was unable to establish itself as the recognised , 
spokesman for the labour movement. Its leaders were frequently told by the government 
officials that the government had no need for" intermediate channels" particularly since 
the labour movement was controlled by the government (TURK-IS 1960). 
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However, the relationship between the state and labour unions in Turkey began to 
change in the 1960s and 70s. As has been mentioned earlier, after 1960 the principal 
goals of economic and development policies were the adaptation of the idea of a "social 
welfare state". The 1961 constitution also set up liberal pluralist freedoms and social and 
economic rights and duties and encouraged the progressive labour legislation enacted in 
1963. Hence, the state policy toward labour was to seek a broad corporatisation of 
unions, as well as the other associational interest representatives. For this reason 
periodic meetings were held between the government officials and TURK-IS leaders. 
The first meeting was held in August 1962 in Ankara. After this several meetings were 
also organised between government, employer organisations and TURK-IS (Kutal 
1977). 
The labour policy of the government became one of the key elements in the attempt to 
reconcile rapid economic development with democracy. Therefore, in order to avoid a 
return to overt authoritarian rule, some moderate demands for political participation and 
economic redistribution were tolerated by the government. This approach toward unions 
was particularly promoted by the conservative Justice Party. It can be argued that, the 
state was in the need of an "intermediate channel" between unions/workers and 
employers and the state. The Justice party attempted to develop collaborative class 
relationships particularly through nation-wide collective bargaining between the leading 
associations in the key economic sectors, especially, in the public sector. Since TURK-
IS was mostly organised in the public sector, the leaders of some large public sector 
unions were keen on establishing good relations with the Justice Party government 
(particularly after the Justice Party victory in the 1965 election) (Isikli 1979). 
During this period, TURK-IS was helped by the State to set up a representational 
monopoly at national level. The efforts of TURK-IS for "centralisation" and 
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consolidation of its power should also be understood by regarding the state's policy 
toward labour. Thus, the role of the state was said to be crucial in not only affecting the 
demands of TURK-IS and its internal governance and even leadership selection but also 
undermining its rivals' power. 
The election of the sixth congress of TURK-IS in November, 1960 resulted in important 
changes in the leading cadres of the confederation. Seyfi Demirsoy who was known as a 
conservative unionist was elected for the presidency and Halil Tunc, a moderate 
unionist, was elected secretary general. A well known journalist on labour relations, 
Refik Sonmezsoy (1991), describes these two leaders as the best team in the 
confederation's history. They held their position during the period of 1960-1974. This 
was important for several reasons. Firstly, the relation between the Justice Party and the 
leadership of confederation was strengthened; and second, this change in leadership 
further brought about some political tendencies within the confederation despite its 
"non-partisan politics". First, some unionists within TURK-IS founded the Turkish 
Workers Party in 1961 and they later split from TURK-IS and established the DISK (a 
rival left-wing confederation) in 1967. The second political tendency within the 
confederation was the emergence of the social democratic unions supporting left of 
centre policies of the Republican People's party (lsikli 1979, Cecen 1973, TURK-IS 
1968). 
Although it is possible to charge TURK-IS with political passivity, it does not mean that 
the confederation was totally out of politics. In fact, claims that TURK-IS displayed a 
lack of political objectives are not accurate. Although any formal relationship with 
political parties was forbidden by the trade union Act of 1963, as in the case of 
American unionism, informal support was always possible. In this respect, the first tactic 
of the confederation was the promotion of the election of unionists to parliament 
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without considering their party affiliations. The second strategy of TURK-IS was to 
punish its parliamentary enemies by launching significant propaganda to prevent the 
reelection of some MPs from several parties whose attitudes seemed to be anti-labour. 
This was evident especially during the general elections of 1961 and 1965 (Koc 1993, 
TURK-IS 1969). 
The confederation intended to produce a number of tactics concerning a wide range of 
political matters. For example, the so-called "Twenty-four principles document" adopted 
by the seventh general congress in 15 April 1968 covered a great number of political 
issues, including the nationalisation of an important part of the mining and petroleum 
industries, tax reforms, the limitation of the influence of foreign capital, the extension of 
public housing and education, and the promotion of land holding (TURK-IS 1968). 
Taking these principles into consideration, it can be suggested that although TURK-IS 
tended to remain independent vis-a-vis political parties, the role of the confederation 
seemed to be as a pressure group in politics. This can be seen from the above-mentioned 
principles which also demonstrate the dimension and capacities of a political pressure 
group. 
What should be noted is that the social democratic union movement began to develop 
within TURK-IS in the beginning of the 1970s. These social democratic unions opted 
for more politically autonomous unionism. This can be clearly seen from their 
publications called "report of 4" and "report of 12" (TURK-IS 1971). Some of these 
unions, including the Municipal Workers' Union (Genel-Is) and the Hotel, Restaurant 
and Tourism Workers' Union (Oley-Is) broke away from TURK-IS and joined DISK. 
The rest such as the Road Construction Workers' Union (Yol-Is), the Petroleum , 
Workers' Union (Petrol-Is) and the Office, Commercial and Clerical Workers' Union 
(Tez Buro-Is) remained within TURK-IS. 
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Broadly speaking, because of the significant development in the power of DISK in the 
labour movement and the changes in the policy and leadership of the Republican 
Peoples' Party (RPP), there was much pressure on TURK-IS to abandon its "above 
politics" policy in favour of declaring itself to be social democrat in orientation. After 
1965, and particularly in the 1969 election, the RPP adopted what was called a "left of 
centre" programme. This new ideology of the party affected the leaders of some unions 
associated with TURK-IS as the RPP began to offer attractive proposals to unions. 
These structural and ideological changes in the RPP gave rise to some crucial influences 
on some unions associated with TURK-IS. One striking example is that on 14 January 
1971, at a meeting of the TURK-IS management committee, a report was presented by 
four main TURK-IS union presidents "the report of the four". This report criticised the 
confederation's policy in general and, particularly, the "above-party" policy. The report 
also stated that TURK-IS did not efficiently pursue the 24 principles of the 
confederation (TURK-IS 1971). 
In the statement, various proposal were also suggested to consider new strategies for 
the general line of the confederation's policy. Some of these proposals can be 
summarised as follows: (a) TURK-IS should be linked to a definite political ideology 
and unite around a more valid political ideology; (b) Turkish unionism, due to its 
specific circumstances, should adopt an ideological approach excluding capitalism and 
Marxism; a social democratic ideology for Turkish unions should be discussed; (c) the 
struggle of trade unions in the labour movement requires co-operation with a political 
party of social democratic character. Hence, since the RPP is the only such political 
party in Turkey, possibilities of co-operation with it should be elaborated (3) (TURK-IS 
1971, Isikli 1979). 
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For these unionists, the RPP, due to its policy, ideology and attitude to labour relations 
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was the only party which appeared to be suitable for TURK-IS to be together in joint 
action. Eight national unions and some federations decided to back them. This move was 
followed later in 1971 by a call from twelve TURK-IS unions for the adaptation of 
social democracy as their main ideology. This became a more crucial development since 
the "twelve" had among eight members of the twenty-nine member executive committee 
of TURK-IS. 
The "twelve" also stated their political strategy that the Turkish labour movement should 
take a share in political power mainly through co-operating with other working people 
in society. TURK-IS, as a peak confederation, should have an influence on different 
political matters (TURK-IS 1971). However, despite all these social democracy 
approaches proposed by the "twelve", TURK-IS did not change its policy. The reason 
for failure of this development given by the ex-president of the confederation, Halil 
Tunc, (4) is that 
"One broad contrast that may be drawn between the situation in most European 
countries and the one in Turkey is that trade unionists do not normally hold a right 
wing ideology. However, conditions are different in Turkey. There are both workers 
and trade union leaders on the right. Hence, it was not easy for TURK-IS, which had a 
great number of executives with a "business-unionism" background, to adopt the 
aspects of political unionism" 
In fact, most unions associated with TURK-IS always sought to establish good relation 
with political power, mainly, governments, as they were organised in the public sector. 
Therefore, it is hardly a paradox to say that since the right wing parties in Turkey were 
in office for a long time, it was difficult for TURK-IS to change its policy in favour of 
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social democracy. It should be stressed that certain factors, such as the absence of a 
political struggle tradition in Turkish unionism, resulted in the failure of any alternative 
ideological development within TURK-IS. Broadly speaking, in the 1960s and 70s in 
spite of the emergence of different political tendencies in Turkish trade unionism the 
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leadership of TURK-IS was still concerned with safeguarding the unity of the 
confederation by pursuing its traditional policy. In short, although the executive 
committee of TURK-IS was constrained and dependent on the state, some unions, 
mainly the social democratic unions within the confederation, struggled to adopt the 
tactics and strategies of the autonomous union movement. 
On the other hand, as the rivalry between two confederations, TURK-IS and DISK 
intensified, the Justice Party and TURK-IS improved their relations substantially. The 
government was also willing to grant official recognition to the confederation's claims as 
the sole representative of labour. For example, Turkish leaders were given a place as 
labours exclusive representative in joint consultative boards and regulatory commissions, 
such as the minimum wage commission, the social insurance organisation, the supreme 
arbitration board and the state economic enterprises. 
The 1970s were the beginning of a period of polarisation and radicalisation of political 
forces including unions. The response of the government was to move away from the 
model of pluralist interest group politics influenced by the 1963 legislation and to adopt 
a more unitary labour policy through granting TURK-IS an effective representational 
monopoly at the national level. In doing so, the first important intervention of the 
government was the amendment of the union law in 1970. It simply aimed at 
undermining TURK-IS's rivals, particularly DISK. The amendment law forbade the 
existence of unions unless they represented at least one-third of the insured workers in 
its trade. It was obvious that this amendment would allow TURK-IS to become the only 
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labour organisation authorised to use the title "Confederation" and enable it to represent 
the whole labour force at national and intemationallevel. 
However, massive workers' riots in Istanbul and Izmit on 15-16 June 1970 were an 
important response to the proposed amendment of the union law. In the parliament, the 
RPP and the Turkish labour workers' party also opposed the law. Therefore, this trade 
unions Act was overturned by the constitutional court two years later (Sulker 1976). 
The reaction of TURK-IS' leaders to the large-scale workers' protest was interesting. 
While the leader of TURK-IS, Seyfi Demirsoy, and the other members of the executive 
committee were defending the changes in the proposed law, they also put the blame for 
the 15-16 June events on the rival confederation, DISK (TURK-IS 1973). 
The military coup of 12 March 1971 came in the aftermath of the 15-16 June events, at 
a time when unions were gaining some autonomy from the State and moving away from 
the "non-political "philosophy of TURK-IS. In the years following the 1971 coup, 
TURK-IS changed its tactics against its main rival, DISK. This can be clearly seen from 
a letter written to the prime minister, Nihat Erim, in May 1971. The general secretary of 
TURK-IS, Halil Tunc, wrote to him that 
"TURK-IS had heard rumours the DISK would be closed down in the near future. As 
you are well aware, TURK-IS has had a continual battle with DISK, since DISK and 
TURK-IS have conflicting ideas and conflicting objectives. Despite this fact we must 
cite our observation that if efforts are to be made to close down DISK, the impression 
would be given of an overall attempt which aims at doing away with union rights and 
ul1ionfreedom" (citedfrom Hale, 1977: 68). 
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It can be argued that having written this letter, TURK-IS, first, demonstrated its lovalt\' 
~ . 
to the military government by expressing its good will particularly staying out of high 
politics and, second, tried to convince unionists and workers in general that TURK-IS 
was a real representative of union rights and union freedoms. What is more the 
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confederation may also have felt the fear of some external pressures from national and 
international democratic organisations. 
After the 1971 coup, Turkey returned to civilian rule. However, the election results 
brought about a series of unstable coalition governments. In this context, the relations 
between the governments and TURK-IS were also unstable. During the course of 
nationalist front coalitions of 1975-77 there were continuous conflicts between the trade 
unions and the government. It is important to point out that the ministry of labour used 
its power to protect some unions and to repress others (Isikli 1979). The conflict 
between unions and the government had a considerable impact on the relations between 
TURK-IS and its member unions. Even when the masses, not only the workers but also 
the civil servants, students, farmers and small artisans became politically active, TURK-
IS was not able to bring them together for common goals. Therefore, the discontent of 
the rank and file and of local leaders of the affiliated unions substantially increased. In 
spite of the fact that social democratic unions within the confederation began to raise 
their voice particularly against the confederation's "non-partisan politics" and its policy 
toward government, they were unable to gain sufficient power for the executive 
committees at the 9th and 10th general congress of the confederations (TURK-IS 1976). 
It can be argued that the policy of TURK-IS not to set up any link with a political party 
but to exert pressure on the current government, was not very successful in practice. In 
fact, TURK-IS was compelled to act this way since antagonising the government might 
jeopardise the successful passage of labour legislation and collective bargaining 
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negotiations III public sectors. For this reason there were occasions when the 
confederation, by condemning several strikes and ignoring workers' demands in 
collective bargaining, sided fully with the government view. 
By analysing the several congress reports it can, thus, be argued that the confederation 
was never able to rid itself of the accusation by the delegates of turning its back on 
working class interests and serving the benefits of the conservative parties or, as a shop 
steward in the leather industry told the author; "It was nothing but a mere satellite oj 
the party in power". However, when faced with such unexpected and occasionally 
severe criticism from its own member unions and rank and file, they directed some 
criticism against the government for their inaction and carelessness in the issues like 
labour legislation and wages. On the other hand, for the government, TURK-IS was 
desirable for its own purpose, since dealing with a strong central confederation which 
was seemingly apolitical and which always claimed to be the main representative of 
Turkish working class would be much easier than trying to cope with various 
organisations split politically. The nationalist front government was willing to encourage 
the strengthening of TURK-IS by undermining, at least through indirect methods, the 
development of alternative labour confederations such as DISK. 
Thus, until the late 1970s, although the confederation frequently agreed with the 
government's views on major policy issues, the relations of TURK-IS with the 
nationalist front coalition governments can be characterized by uncertainties rather than 
stability. Firstly, in terms of its policy implementation TURK-IS was not able to rid itself 
of political considerations in general and particularly the pressures of the party in power, 
despite its "above-the parties" policy. Secondly, due to some considerable pressure 
from the different tendencies within the confederation TURK-IS' leadership was unable 
to exert its central power in practice. 
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What needs to be also emphasised is that the failure of the government to set up a 
collaborative type of unionism since 1960 gave rise to the emergence of union pluralism 
by the end of the 1970s. Consequently, the labour movement seemed to be divided into 
different factions such as the DISK (the left-wing confederation), the MISK (the 
confederation of Nationalist trade union) and the HAK-IS (the religiously oriented 
confederation) . 
In the meanwhile, in the 1970s the rank and file became more radicalised and the union 
leadership became more politically active. Faced with continuous pressure from within, 
the general congress of TURK-IS held on 12-18 April 1976 could not abandon its 
defence of party neutrality. Thus, at the end of the 10th general congress of the 
confederation there was not a clear-cut commitment to any political party. Nevertheless, 
the convention authorised the administrative board of TURK-IS to decide, by a two-
thirds vote, whether or not to support a political party in the general election of 1977 
(TURK-IS 1976). It would come as a surprise that TURK-IS took a stand favourable to 
the RPP, the centre left populist party, in the 1977 general election. This meant that 
TURK-IS changed its approach on the vital question of "above-party" politics at least 
for a while. 
It should be also emphasised that in the third five-year economic plan of the government 
there was a significant proposal to establish an industrial relations unit to co-ordinate 
collective bargaining activities, particularly within the public sector, as well as to 
establish a wages and incomes council for the whole economy. However, this initiative 
failed, partly for the following reasons. Firstly, public sector managers were not willing 
to cooperate with the private employers' associations, second, collective bargaining was 
taking place at local level, and finally, there were disagreements about the wages and 
income council within the employers' organisations (Dereli 1984). 
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However, Ecevit's RPP government in 1978 attempted to restrict wage increases by cost 
of living indices via applying the policy of "the social contract". After long negotiations 
with TURK-IS, the prime minister, Bulent Ecevit was able to win the support of the 
president of TURK-IS, Halil Tunc (TURK-IS 1979). As has been mentioned before the 
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affiliates of TURK-IS were better organised in the public sector. Therefore, various 
collective agreements were concluded consistent with the terms of the "social contract" 
in the public sector. The government also seemed willing to adopt the "social contract" 
as a guideline for collective bargains in the private sector. But, DISK, whose affiliates 
were better organised in the private sector responded to the "social contract" with 
suspicion and resentment, despite the attempts of Ecevit's government. DISK leaders 
told the prime minister that they would agree with the government's proposal provided 
government undertook some reforms, including repealing the right of lock -out and 
nationalisation of a considerable portion of the Turkish economy (Dereli 1984, Koc 
1986). 
As a result, the social contract was abolished when political power shifted to the right-
wing Justice party in 1979. At the same time, the social democratic faction within 
TURK-IS failed once again to come to power in the confederation's convention held on 
16-22 April 1979 (TURK-IS 1979). 
To sum up, it can be argued that by seeking the collaboration of unions, the aim of the 
governments, particularly the conservative Justice party and nationalist front 
governments, was to avoid an independent, politically active union movement which 
would promote class struggle and present new challenges to the authority of the ruling 
class. During the course of the 1960s and 70s, although the state attempted to adopt the 
pluralist model for Turkey's political life, its labour policy seemed to restrict interest 
representation so as to promote collaborative class relations. In doing so, it preferred 
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clientelistic relations with favoured unions, mainly, TURK-IS. True enough, TURK-IS 
had official recognition and a monopoly of representation particularly compared with the 
rival confederation, DISK. Yet, this crucial exclusive right of representation and the 
guaranteed access to policy making were exchanged for co-operation in reducing 
working class demands and promoting social peace. 
It should be stressed that the leaders of TURK-IS welcomed the introduction of this 
mode of organisational representation as a significant opportunity to overcome their 
traditional isolation during the 1950s. Basically, the main objective of TURK-IS in these 
periods was to establish good relations with the parties in power. But it was, of course, 
at the expense of its losing credibility in the eyes of member unions and the working 
class, because the state interfered in the confederation's internal relations, such as its 
demand-making, leadership selection and internal governance. 
From the beginning of 1960s state control of labour umons was transformed into 
pluralism. Yet this model of incorporation of labour unions into the economic and 
political system did not give rise to what is termed "neo-corporatism", including "wage 
restraint" and "social contract", if we ignore the short-lived experience of the 1978 
"social contract" (5). 
Among other reasons for the failure of the "social contract" in Turkey was the fact that 
relations between employers' organisations, labour unions and the state were not highly 
institutionalised. The industrial relation system was established within neither an 
authoritarian political system nor a pluralistic democratic system. In this sense, the 
relations between social partners were expected to produce uncertainty in labour 
relations. Under these conditions, the role of TURK-IS was shaped to maintain the 
existing order and social peace. Therefore, TURK-IS, which carefully tried to avoid 
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political unionism and gave priority to securing wage increases and welfare benefits, was 
"loyal" to the state. 
(ii) Organisational Developments. 
The issues of internal environments such as union democracy, leadership, attitudes and 
factions, are important in understanding the whole union movement because most of the 
strategies, policies and issues were undertaken by organisations themselves. Union 
leadership in Turkey differs in many significant ways from union leadership in other 
European countries. As Dereli (1984) stressed, union leadership in Turkey was held by 
the leadership of blue collar origin. This was because, firstly, until the 1963 union Act, 
union membership was limited only to manual workers. Second, Turkish unions had 
always provided leaders from within their own ranks since the legislations had excluded 
non workers from union membership ,and finally, the intellectuals were not willing to 
occupy the leadership positions in unions. Although white collar workers were allowed 
to form and join unions, intellectuals were still reluctant to hold the leadership positions 
of unions. Before the pre-1963 period most union officials were not professional leaders 
paid by their unions (Dereli 1975). Leadership was a new experience for most unionists 
in the 1950s. 
One of the ex-general secretaries of TURK-IS, Orhan Balta, (6) told me that in this 
period membership participation and interest in union administration and elections was 
high. Rosen (1962) argued that there had been reasonable democracy in union affairs 
and the rank and file participated actively. He went on to observe the fact that 
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"the evidence of abundant devotion to democratic principles is doubly striking in a 
society where political democracy is new, and authoritarian traditions deep-rooted " 
Rosen (1962:289). 
The main reason for this is that the trade unions were not very large and bureaucratic 
domination was almost absent. Only few unions were able to maintain even one full-time 
officer. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, however, an increased tendency for trade union 
leaders to consolidate their power positions and resist democratic principles in union 
administration was witnessed. In other words, Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" began to 
operate particularly in industrial unions and some of the bigger federations. Broadly 
speaking, leadership positions were stable, and frequent turnover, particularly among the 
top posts was rare. Leadership turnover was also very low at confederation levels. For 
instance, the executive committee of TURK-IS, Seyfi Demirsoy, Halil Tunc and Orner 
Ergun held the same position from the 4th General congress to the 10th General 
congress. At both national and local level the picture seemed to be the same (TURK-IS 
40 nci yilda). 
It should be stressed that the oligarchical tendencies within both TURK-IS and its 
member unions also resulted in some local unions and branches losing their capacity for 
independent action, particularly in terms of collective bargaining and financial autonomy. 
More importantly, this trend lessened potential young leaders' chances of rising to power 
from local levels (7). 
At this time white collar employees did not join unions together with blue collar workers 
and therefore did not compete for the leadership positions. This was probably because of 
status considerations and a lack of identification with working class values. As a result, 
white collar employees preferred to set up white collar unions like Bank-is and Tez-
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Buro-is. However, after the 1960s most of the large industrial unions and federations 
began to employ white collar experts in their research, education, media and collective 
bargaining departments. Unions employed some technical union staff experts rather than 
union intellectuals who might have brought new ideologies into the unions. 
As indicated earlier, at the beginning of 1960s the state with its emphasis on both social 
justice and planned economic development was in need of institutional channels for 
willingly moderating demands and the support of reliable labour leaders. In this respect, 
although unions were not strong enough to assist the political and economic policies, 
their co-operation, intermediary role and significant organisational resources would be 
considerable elements in any long-term compromise. On the other hand, the attempts of 
the government to set up a centralised industrial relation system was an acceptable 
proposition for TURK-IS leadership, whose purpose was to establish an exclusive 
representational cartel in labour relations. The new industrial relations system with its 
corporatist measures was a welcome opportunity to overcome their traditional isolation 
and impotence. Although the new freedoms granted to the Turkish trade union 
movement after the 1960 legislation significantly strengthened the confederation's 
economic and political bargaining power, its new leaders were rather cautious in 
exercising this power. The new leadership began to pursue a policy in which they sought 
the significant exclusive right of representation (being granted by official status as labour 
spokesman in the country) and the guaranteed access to the policy making process. 
In the reformist atmosphere of the early 1960s many of the union leadership'S decisions 
can be explained only through paternalistic and opportunistic manners. This is widely 
evident during the periods of the Seyfi Demirsoy and Halil Tunc administration. In the 
course of the 1960s and 70s, Seyfi Demirsoy, ex-president of TURK-IS and Halil Tunc, 
ex-president of and ex-general secretaire of TURK-IS, directed the confederation's 
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transformation from an isolated and symbolic structure into a centralised and relatively 
powerful peak labour organisation. In their words, the attempt was to creat lithe largest 
and most effective pressure group" (Halil Tunc 1969:2). 
During this transformation period TURK-IS leadership exercised two main policies or 
tactics. Firstly, it reaffirmed its "above party" policy which was to maintain good 
relations with political power, mainly the government of the day, to secure their 
recognition and deal with political split within the confederation and also to gain 
material benefits. The other main policy of the confederation's leadership was to focus 
its efforts on organisational purposes, including replacing heterogeneous regional 
affiliates with vertically structured occupational federations and co-ordinating union 
bargaining according to centrally determined policies and providing a political consensus 
among the different factions which were divided into conservative, socialist and social 
democrat. 
The strategy included an effort to achieve the virtually exclusive right of representation 
and the guaranteed access to decision making process at macro level that TURK-IS 
leaders were unlikely to achieve independently. In exchange for such rights they pledged 
continued moderation in exercising trade unions' new rights to strike and collective 
bargaining. Therefore, official recognition of the confederation as a central labour 
representative was to be returned for co-operation in reducing working-class demands 
and promoting social peace. 
This premature and artificial attempt to create a centralised representational cartel for 
organised labour further required internal authority and discipline. In fact, the leaders of 
the largest unions within the confederation, mainly the conservative faction of TURK-
IS, were to concentrate too much power in their hands. On the other hand, small 
122 
factions of the confederation, such as social democrats and socialists, were too weak to 
play a crucial role in its strategies and policies. That is why, although TURK-IS 
leadership often pointed out the pluralist strategies of organisation, in practice a 
continued inter union authority and discipline was considered as necessary to protect 
union leadership's policies from the potentially disruptive impact of the other factions. 
It can be argued that pluralism in union democracy in Turkey often aided the attempts of 
ruling class to preserve the disorganisation and passivity of the working class by letting a 
group of powerful union leaders to repress rival factions within unions. In this context 
the most striking example was that a debate about a strike decision in Pasabahce glass 
factory in 1966 brought about a serious conflict between six affiliates of TURK-IS and 
the executive committee of the confederation which sided with the government decisions 
against the strike. As a result, the supporters of Justice Party government within the 
executive committee of TURK-IS let president Demirsoy suspended socialist unionists 
from the confederation leadership and asserted greater authority in disciplining members 
in the name of the unity of the confederation (Sulker 1976, Fisek 1969 ). There is no 
doubt that all these developments worked for the interests of the state and employers so 
as to anticipate or delay the overt political expression of growing working class 
demands. 
However, this happy compromise between TURK-IS leadership and the ruling class did 
not last long. In the late 1960s and 70s there was a considerable increase in working 
class militancy, mainly because of the deteriorating economic and political conditions. At 
the confederation level two key leaders had different solutions and policies for the new 
situation. Although Demirsoy (president) and Tunc (General Secretariat) shared the 
same opinions about maintaining the formal above-party policy and the primacy of 
123 
organisational consolidation, they disagreed on the way of translating the groWIng 
strength of TURK-IS into a more influential role in the labour movement. 
For Demirsoy, the political activity of TURK-IS was to be limited to lobbying in 
parliament and putting some pressure on government, particularly through small 
numbers of l\1Ps (ex-trade unionists). His effort was to convince the Justice Party 
government that without the continued co-operation of moderate TURK-IS leadership, 
the implementation of government's economic policies would not be successful. In 
addition, Demirsoy also warned government about the increasing effect of socialist 
unionists promoting class struggles in the labour movement. On the other hand, for Tunc 
the policies of TURK-IS were to be designed to affect public policy independently of the 
government by expanding the confederation's bargaining power. The conservative 
factions of the confederation, who had attained a two-thirds majority in the 
confederation's central committee by the beginning of 1970s, were not a great comfort 
to Tunc's liberal views (Sonmezsoy 1991, Isikli 1979). 
However, during the 1970s due to demands for greater political unionism, the rival 
confederation's (DISK) growing popularity among the rank and file, and the emergence 
of social democracy within member unions, Tunc became an important leader 
particularly in balancing different factions in the confederation. As a matter of fact, at 
work place level a great deal of independent action from unions was witnessed; the 
strike rate increased dramatically and a number of TURK-IS's own affiliates began to 
argue that greater political activism was needed to protect labour's legal and political 
and economic gains. Thus, TURK-IS leadership with Tunc in the leading role, took 
some crucial steps in terms of its strategies and policies. 
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Under an increasingly hostile economic and political external enVIronment combined 
with internal problems such as the intensifying factional conflicts within the 
confederation, there were crucial demands from the rank and file for basic reforms in the 
confederation's structure, policies and political role. TURK-IS leadership faced two 
alternative strategies to reconsider the policy of the confederation. These depended on 
whether the confederation would continue its role as a seeker of corporatist privilege 
from the state and employers to establish a representational cartel in trade union 
movement, or, whether it sought to become a leading defender of the common interests 
of the Turkish working class. The former was to maintain the traditional line of the 
confederation's policy to protect economic gains and strengthen its status in labour 
relations. The latter would involve more innovative policies in which greater 
organisational efforts and political integration of the working class would be channelled 
towards more orderly and effective demonstrations of mass political power. By calling 
for working class mobilisation rather than resisting and containing worker militancy, the 
confederation could resist the new threats to union freedoms and to the democratic 
regime itself. 
In fact, in analysing the developments within the confederation in the 1970s it is rather 
difficult to find a clear answer to the question whether TURK-IS leadership chose one 
of the strategies mentioned above. A modest explanation might be that during 
Demirsoys' leadership in the 1960s, in order to achieve the confederations' demand for 
representational exclusiveness the policy of the confederation'S leadership was to 
collaborate with the Justice Party government corporatist strategy for reasserting state 
control over workers. However, in the 1970s as economic and political conditions were 
getting worse, employers and managers of state owned companies became hostile to 
workers' demands at the workplace. The result was a considerable increase in workers' 
militancy. This was also associated with the rapid resurgence and expansion of DISK in 
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the same years and demands for greater political unionism within the confederation. As a 
result, all these dramatic changes in the external environment of TURK-IS forced 
TURK-IS leadership to adopt a more pluralist strategy for the general policy of TURK-
IS. 
This new approach did not mean a substantial change both in the traditional "above 
party" policy of the confederation and in the general policy of becoming the leading 
representatives of all Turkish working class. Rather, it was an important change in the 
attitudes of TURK-IS for co-ordinating the growing workers' demands as opposed to 
external developments and balancing the intensifying factional conflict within the 
confederation. It should be mentioned that during the 1970s Halil Tunc gradually 
became the most important leader of TURK-IS. Tunc tried to set up a balance of power 
between TURK-IS' factions which would stop social democrats from leaving the 
confederation and reduce his own isolation within the conservative faction. Tunc's fear 
was that the confederation was likely to face a major split while increasing ideological 
and industrial conflict aggravated TURK-IS's internal cleavages. In this context, TURK-
IS's 1976 general congress was crucial in that considerable changes in the 
confederation's leadership and decision-making process helped to enhance the influence 
of the social democratic faction. This resulted from the expansion of TURK-IS' central 
committee from twenty-four to thirty-six members to accommodate representation for 
every affiliated member regardless of size (TURK-IS 1976). 
Although the conservative factions won a majority, their power within the confederation 
was reduced through decentralising reforms which benefited the growing social 
democratic members. After the mid-1970s, as working class militancy increased, the 
leadership of the labour movement had to adopt a more militant and politically active 
position. For instance, in order to compete with the more militant rival confederation 
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DISK and the growing discontent of its own workers, Tunc acquired a more influential 
role for TURK-IS in national politics. As a result, TURK-IS directed a "partial general 
strike" against the National Front Government involving 80,000 workers in Izmir. In 
addition, TURK-IS ordered member unions to set up new local committees to 
strengthen communication with workers and to prepare union political activity at 
regional and national level for a campaign against government (Koc 1986a). The main 
concern of TURK-IS leadership might have been to revise the confederation's lost 
reputation for militancy, to precluded the slide of its membership toward the rival 
confederations. In addition, TURK-IS leadership wanted to prove that TURK-IS could 
lead a politically active labour movement and also it could do so more powerfully than 
its rivals, mainly, DISK due to its greater ability to mobilise mass protest in a legal and 
orderly manner. 
All these development led Tunc to support Ecevit's proposals that the existing 
democratic regime and the freedom of trade unions would survive with the help of 
workers and their social democratic party. However, the main question was that while 
the conservative faction was still holding a majority of members, it would be difficult to 
persuade his union colleagues either to extend organisational contacts or to support 
common platforms with Ecevit's party RPP. In fact, as Ecevit's leadership in RPP 
pursued a new strategy toward the left of centre policies, the party gradually made 
serious attempts to set up alliances with organised labour. Therefore, the key tactic of 
Ecevit was to promote significant changes in the attitudes of leadership and strategies of 
both TURK-IS and DISK to integrate organised labour into his party's social democratic 
principles. 
After the mid-1970s Ecevit intensified his efforts to formulate such a strategy by 
boosting crucial militancy in TURK-IS and moderation in DISK. Basically, the policy 
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was involved in providing greater support to the social democratic groups in power 
struggles in both confederations. It is true that this attempt to create moderate leftist 
leadership was somewhat successful. For instance, while this pressure caused Tunc to 
reconsider the confederation' relations with the social democratic faction within TURK-
IS, the new social democrat leaders replaced the older socialist leaders in DISK. 
To sum up, in Turkey the complexity of the trade union movement is such that one can 
not generalise on the question of organisational developments. And also the theoretical 
debate on these issues are not quite adequate to explain Turkish unions. As Von Beyme 
(1980) stressed, the potential influence of union size and pluralistic divisions within the 
unions playa significant role in the understanding of internal union democracy. In fact, 
in the case of Turkey when most unions had been small and fragmented in the 1950s, 
unions did leave greater room for local and plant initiatives by the membership. in other 
words, while unions had been small (as in the case of "Birliks" and local federations in 
the 1950s), close membership involvement by direct participation had been more 
feasible. This had further limited the influence of leadership in union democracy. 
However, combined with the attempt of the state to encourage the centralisation of 
union organisations and the institutionalisation of collective bargaining, throughout the 
1960s, however, oligarchical tendencies began to be more prevalent, particularly in 
industry-based national unions and, to a lesser extent, in some of the bigger federations. 
Furthermore, an increased tendency of union leaders to consolidate their power 
positions was witnessed in most Turkish unions. An important term to describe the role 
of union leaders is used by C. Wright Mills (1948) who pointed out that they act 
principally as "managers of discontent". In this sense, Turkish unionists were said to act 
as a buffer between their members and the state. 
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In the national unions, all authority was vested in the centre, and branches were deprived 
of independent action usually through curbing the freedom of branch units, both in terms 
of collective bargaining and financial autonomy. This type of centralised union structure 
also brought about increases in size and in the diversity of members' occupations and 
employment situations which presented inherent problems in the organisation of 
democratic processes. In this context, the theoretical perspectives on union democracy 
provide no easy answer to the problem of trade union democracy in Turkev. For 
example, Edelstein and Warner (1975) and Child, Loveridge and Warner (1973) adopted 
what can be called a "structural" approach which widely focused on organisational 
factors and formal arrangements including size, membership pressure, and frequency of 
union conventions or conferences. 
These studies argued that organisational elements are quite important in influencing 
internal union democracy. For instance, for Child, Loveridge and Warner (1973), the 
larger unions are likely to maintain a fully effective representative system. Yet, in 
Turkish case in so far as structural forms are concerned, the question of union 
democracy can be debated. This is to say that compared with small local unions and 
federations, national industrial unions did not seem to have a more flexible and 
democratic structure, which permitted the affiliated locals a greater degree of autonomy 
as opposed to the rather dependent position of the branches of the national-industrial 
umon. 
Rather they posed certain built-in oligarchical tendencies. The other perspective, which 
gives great scope for the effects of collective bargaining arrangements, is the study of 
Clegg (1976). He argues that power within unions is based on the level of bargaining. 
While, for instance, industry bargaining concentrates power at the centre and promotes 
integrated, bureaucratic union government, bargaining at plant or local levels brings it to 
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the regions or branches. However, in the case of Turkey, this argument was not without 
its contradiction that in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s although collective bargaining took 
place mostly at plant level and was stable, union government was not decentralised and 
the branches did not have substantial independence. 
Therefore, by discussing theoretical debates on organisational developments It can be 
suggested that in the context of Turkey, the external environmental factors such as the 
economic and political conditions, the country's democracy tradition, ideological 
developments, industrial relations system and the existence of competing union 
confederations were more significant than organisational or internal factors in promoting 
internal democracy. 
It can be argued that, historically, Turkish political culture (with its limited democratic 
traditions) and the significant role of the state in labour relations tended to preclude the 
development of strong democracy within unions. For example, at the state- owned 
companies the exclusive status and representational monopoly were given to trade 
unions by conservative governments and paternalistic managers. The leaders of these 
unions were often supported by the state. It is a fact that within TURK-IS these unions, 
which were the largest, best-financed and most influential organisations, had dominating 
positions in TURK-IS executive committee. Moreover, these state-sponsored unions in 
the public sector intended to influence the structure and leadership of most smaller and 
less developed organisations in other industries as well. 
Unions leaders in Turkey usually saw their post as a means of promoting their interests 
in the existing political and economic system of the country. Nevertheless, particularly in 
the late 1960s and 70s, a more aggressive and combative set of union leaders 
confronting paternalistic and authoritarian employers and state managers emerged in the 
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Turkish trade union movement. This was most probably because the rank and file 
militancy encouraged trade union leaders to maintain a responsiveness to their members' 
needs if they were to remain in power. This was also notable within TURK-IS. 
Associated with economic deterioration and political unrest in the country, the 
ideological developments, especially the rise of social democracy and the emergence of 
rival confederations, gave rise to a growing commitment to pluralistic values including 
maintaining decentralised decision making processes, giving the chance of alternative 
sets of leaders and providing flexibility and autonomy to the branches for collective 
bargaining disputes. On the other hand, heterogeneity in membership contributed 
towards a relatively active democratic process. It seems clear that in the 1970s, the 
representation of different factions within the confederation and the fear of competing 
rival unions resulted in reasonable improvement in the organisational strength of TURK-
IS. Thus, changes in the union's external environment had a profound effect on the 
internal organisational development. 
(iii) Collective Bargaining Activity. 
After the legislation regulating collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs of 1963, 
collective bargaining became the most significant aspects of labour union activities. As in 
Germany, the state seemed to intend to bring labour and management together to 
regulate employment conditions by pursuing the policies of protection and providing a 
legal framework for the development of collective bargaining. This indeed affected the 
nature and extent of labour unions and gave rise to the recognition of unions as partners 
in collective agreements. 
131 
In this period, trade unions in Turkey in 1960s and 70s employed two strategies in order 
to obtain their demands. The first and more widely utilised method was collective 
bargaining. The second was the lobbying activities of unions, mainly, of their leading 
confederation, TURK-IS. In the 1960s, in combination with the new industrial relations 
system, collective bargaining was institutionalised in Turkey. Therefore, during the 
periods of 1963-1980 emphasis shifted to collective bargaining, while lobbying for 
improved labour legislation and regulations on social issues was given less emphasis. 
The collective agreement legislation of 1963 (Act No: 275) stated that the only 
organisation entitled to make a collective agreement with the employer(s) or employers' 
association was the trade union (local union, industry based national union or federation, 
depending on the level of bargaining). According to this Act, Confederations, however, 
were not granted the authority to enter into binding collective agreements (Celik 1988). 
After the first collective agreement legislation in 1963, the nucleus of collective 
bargaining developed at the local level in Turkey. Industry-wide bargaining which was 
so prevalent in European countries did not become so crucial in Turkey for several 
reasons; for example, the undeveloped state of employers' association, and the tendency 
of public economic enterprises to engage in bargaining separately (Tuna 1964). 
In the 1960s and 70s collective bargaining took place either at multi employer-level or 
on a plant-level. However, although the collective agreements, strikes and lock outs Act 
no 275 of 1963 stressed industry-based agreements, until the 1980s a great majority of 
the agreements concluded were at plant level. According to a union's publication 
(Petrol-is 1986), while in 1963 96 collective agreements covering 9,462 workers (3,394 
workers in public sector and 5,968 in private sector) were made in Turkey, this figure 
reached 2,247 collective agreements covering 279,327 workers in 1977 (215,443 
workers in public sector and 63,884 workers in private sector). 
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The data available indicates that the public sector seemed to be more active than the 
private sector in the collective bargaining arena during these years. The relatively larger 
size of state enterprises coupled with their more subtle paternalism and their more 
receptive attitude toward collective bargaining most probably accounted for this 
phenomenon. Collective bargaining in Turkey was legally carried out at either plant or 
enterprise level. Yet, multi-employers' bargaining so, called "group bargaining" in 
Turkey, also took place, particularly in the sectors where competition among the 
companies was high and working conditions were similar. However, in the case of 
Turkey, since collective bargaining has been mostly decentralised to the plant or 
enterprise level, neither a corporatist model of collective bargaining nor a "dual 
structure" system has usually been evident in Turkey. The development of mUlti-
employer "group agreements" was not stable. It only covered some of the industries 
(metal, textile and chemicals) in the private sector and did not prevail in the other 
sectors. Although the state only once in 1978 initiated a "social contract", the social 
compromise between the government and TURK-IS was short-lived mostly due to 
political events. 
The problematic and fragmented relations between the social partners trade unions, 
employers and state in the Turkish industrial relations did not produce a centralised, 
stable and institutionalised set of relations in collective bargaining. While elsewhere 
collective bargaining has been regarded as "the great social invention that has 
institutionalised industrial conflict and as an important institution in all industrialised 
countries where freedom of association is a reality" (Flanders 1969: 7). 
It does not seem that this view offers much relevance to the experience of Turkey. The 
political development, alternating between parliamentary democracy and periods of 
military interventions, did not help the strengthening of democratic trade union 
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movement or create the conditions for free collective bargaining. In the case of Turkey, 
the collective bargaining function of trade unions developed via the interrelated 
processes of certain economic and political factors. Government intervention in 
collective bargaining was usually more evident than direct negotiations, particularly in 
the public sector. Intervention came through the individual labour laws covering a wide 
variety of subjects such as minimum wages, paid holidays, paid vacations, social 
security, working conditions, dismissals, retirement, termination of employment and 
health insurance. This, basically, led most employment conditions to be determined from 
above, mainly, through statutory government regulation rather than from below, through 
union-management negotiations. 
The system of collective bargaining was regarded as an established institution of western 
countries by the Turkish government and as a model to be emulated, particularly in line 
with its industrialisation policies in the 1960s and 70s. In fact, the repeated efforts of the 
state, particularly at the beginning of 1960s, to introduce collective bargaining as the 
principal means of establishing wages and conditions of employment was seen as part of 
the institutionalisation of the industrial relations system in Turkey. In their attempts to 
control the labour movement from above, the mainly right-wing governments in the 
1960s and 70s tended to create an elaborate system of bureaucratic trade union 
organisations. In this sense, the collective bargaining became the most important 
function of trade unions in the Turkish industrial relation system. 
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(iv) Strikes and TURK-IS. 
According to the Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lockouts Act of 1963 (Act no 
275), only strikes called for the aim of maintaining or improving the economic and social 
conditions of workers, and strikes carried out in accordance with the provisions of law, 
were regarded as "legal". However, any action ordered for any other reasons was 
considered as " unlawful" (Oguzman 1984). As can be clearly seen from above 
statement, the act protected strikes only conditionally. This was due to the tradition of 
state control in industrial relations. The authoritarian tradition appeared more forcefully 
in the other statement in the Act No.275. In spite of the restrictive structure of legal 
framework as the passage of the 1963 legislation strike activity intensified. the number 
of industrial strikes increased from 54 in 1968 to 81 in 1969 and 112 in 1970 
(International Labour Organisation ILO 1977). 
However, most strikes were said to tend to be ineffective due to the central control 
exercised over industrial action. In other words, the individual workplace union or 
branches had to get the permission of the national union, which controlled the strike 
funds. On the other hand, the national unions were also dependent on the main 
confederation, TURK-IS. Basically, the national unions had to have the backing of 
TURK-IS before they could undertake a strike (Sulker 1976). 
In this context the role of TURK-IS in Industrial actions becomes significant. There has , 
always been considerable debate between TURK-IS and its member national unions on 
the strike decisions. Tending to favour the governments' and employers' opinions within 
a collaborative framework, TURK-IS seemed to display significant restraint on strike 
action. Particularly in the emergence of increasing worker militancy and radicalisation, 
TURK-IS leadership tried to play their role as "responsible unionists" in order to 
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maintain good relations with governments. However, having felt the pressure from 
below, groups of some national union leaders and workers' representatives often found 
themselves at odds with TURK-IS leadership during their struggles. 
The attitude of TURK-IS on strike action was that TURK-IS opposed the major strikes. 
This can be openly seen from two main strikes in 1965 and in 1966. During the course 
of an historic miners' strike in Zonguldak in 1965 and 1966, workers staged a riot and 
marched against a new method of remuneration which the management had put into 
practice. After a while, over 5,000 workers were involved in an "illegal strike" and the 
battle between workers and the management increased. By claiming the strike as 
communist provocation the government used military forces against workers to control 
the situation. The result was two shot dead and several wounded. The reaction of 
TURK-IS was to side with the government. The general secretary of TURK-IS, Halil 
Tunc, condemned the strike as an illegal act caused by communist forces. As a result, 
this led workers to confront not only the government and TURK-IS, but also their own 
union leaders in Zonguldak. As the name of the confederation was usually identified 
with the whole Turkish trade union movement the second incident of great significance 
occurred in a strike at the Pasabahce glass factory in 1966. A local union, Kristal-is, 
rejected the existing industry-wide agreement on the grounds that it represented a 
majority of workers at the plant level. While employers did not accept this argument, 
TURK-IS also agreed with employers' rejection. However, various TURK-IS member 
unions supported the Pasabahce workers and gave them financial help. This strike also 
further culminated in a conflict between TURK-IS and six unions which sided with the 
continuation of the strike and the opportunities of a plant level agreement against all 
industry agreements negotiated by TURK-IS (Fisek 1969, Isikli 1979). 
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The response of TURK-IS was that in October 1966 the confederation suspended its six 
member unions who supported the strike for varying periods. These unions were Basin-
Is (the printing workers' union of Istanbul), Kimya-Is (the chemical workers' union), 
Kristal-Is (the Glass workers' union), Maden-Is (the metal workers' union), Lastik-Is 
(the rubber workers' union) and Petrol-Is (the petroleum workers' union). Two other 
TURK-IS members, Yapi-Is (the construction workers' union) and Bank-Is (the Bank 
employees' union) which were not among the suspended unions however resigned from 
the confederation due to its policies on the major strikes (Isikli 1967). It is worth 
stressing that before the suspension these unions mentioned above also set up an "inter-
union resistance council" within TURK-IS. This council played a significant role in 
shaping the establishment of a new rival confederation of reformist labour unions 
(DISK) (Kutal 1969). 
Shortly after its formation, DISK became the second major labour confederation in the 
Turkish labour movement. The late 1960s and 70s were also a time of increasing 
radicalisation of the masses, as the class struggle in Turkey increased. On 15-16 June 
1970, over 100,000 workers in nearly 150 factories throughout Istanbul and Kocaeli 
went on a strike and protested against an effort to weaken the labour movement through 
amending the legislation governing trade unions. There were bloody clashes between the 
workers and the government forces (Sulker 1987). As the economic and political crises 
deepened, the workers' response to the deteriorating economic situation was to stage 
mass strikes and demonstrations, occupy factories and openly confront the government 
forces. Between 1970 and 1976 there were 658 industrial strikes, covering over a 
hundred thousands workers (ILO 1978). 
By the mid-1970s, in contrast to the development of TURK-IS, the size and strength of 
DISK and its member unions significantly increased and the labour movement became 
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more politically active and militant. For instance, in September 1976 a general strike was 
called with the demand that the state security courts be abolished. In May 1977 over 
40,000 metal workers went on an historic strike against the 11ESS, the Turkish 
Employers' Metal Association of Metal Industries, lasting eight months and ending in 
victory for the metal workers. On 20 March 1978 more than two million workers were 
involved in a two hours general strike organised by DISK, which also brought together 
masses, students, farmers and progressives not only big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and 
Izmir, but also in the other cities as Bursa, Mersin, Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana and 
Zonguldak (Berberoglu 1982). None of these important strikes were backed by TURK-
IS. 
In some of the main strikes, rallies and demonstrations throughout Turkey, the demands 
of the Turkish working class seemed to be not only simply economic but also political. 
However, unlike most developing and Latin American countries, this action did not turn 
into a strong protest against the government's policies all over Turkey. The main reason 
for this was that TURK-lSI leaders were not willing to become involved in "illegal" or 
militant activities. Their concern was still to maintain good relations with the 
government. 
On the other hand, in the face of these events, the attitude of TURK-IS was 
disappointing for the working class. Its leaders criticised most of these actions as 
communist-led riots organised by the rival confederation, DISK. It can be argued that 
for the ruling class to search for communist infiltration in any industrial action is a 
regular habit, but, it is surprising to see the leaders of the leading labour confederation 
manifest the same behaviour. In the cases of varied and interrelated reasons for social 
unrest, asking the workers to obey the law and respect the existing order, as did TURK-
IS, seemed to be very meaningless. Therefore, in these years Turkish workers found it 
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difficult to accept TURK-IS as an organisation which adequately represented their 
interests. 
(iv) Conclusion. 
At the beginning of this part of the thesis a number of questions were raised. The task 
now is to try to respond to these questions. Two significant questions are to be 
analysed. Firstly, the role of Turkish unions in the field of industrial relations particularly 
in relations to collective bargaining, state, strikes, organisational and developments and 
politics. Second, the extent to which the strategies, policies and objectives of Turkish 
unions were influenced by their own characteristics and external environment. 
The system of industrial relations in Turkey was established in 1960 and became part of 
the liberal pluralist institutions. The Turkish model of industrial relations (and within that 
model, the process and structures of collective regulation of labour relations) did not 
display much difference from the general model of pluralist democracies in Europe. 
During the transition periods to democracy, the regime of labour relations and industrial 
relations reflected the general model of labour law and industrial relations of the 
pluralistic democracies of European countries (8). Of course, some features of the 
historical and national specific processes of the economic and political development of 
Turkey tended to particularise the role of unions in Turkish industrial relation system 
from that of the Anglo-Saxon model. The function and role of unions usually did not 
possess an overt political dimension in dealing with either the policies of the state and 
employers or the exercise of managerial authority in regulation of conditions of 
employment. The reason for this is that most of the union functions were heavily 
regulated by the state. 
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In fact, this can be attributed not only to the interventionist policies of governments in 
industrial relations, but also to the narrowness of labour organisation in a country where 
the trade union movement was weak compared with other countries in Europe. One 
reason for the complexity of any adequate explanatory model for Turkish unions might 
be the difficulty of considering unions' role as universal. Therefore, a different 
explanation is necessary to understand the functions of Turkish unions, and their 
extension and consolidation. 
The increased importance of the state was witnessed in this period. As in other Southern 
European countries with weak labour movements, the state's . . sOClo-econoffilC 
intervention became very significant in influencing the nature of the industrialisation 
process. The role of unions in Turkey was, thus, marked by a strong emphasis on 
legalism and government intervention. Turkish unions under this system operated within 
a detailed legal regulation and the structuring of these legal rules reflected a procedural 
emphasis in collective bargaining. The system of protective law encouraged the attitude 
in unions that the solution of labour problems should come from above. As in Germany, 
the policies and strategies of Turkish trade unions can be understood by "etatism", a 
willingness to rely on the state to produce the solution of general problems in industrial 
relations. In this case, etatist attitudes can play a crucial role in trade union policies. 
These factors may have also accounted for the absence of pure "market relations" or 
"managerial relations" in the role of unions in the Turkish industrial relations system. 
Alongside the state involvement in the political and economic life in the 1960s and 70s, a 
pluralist industrial relations system was established. This allowed unions to gain some 
rights and status as intermediary organisation in ensuring a framework for the 
development of economic and political policies. Unlike the situation in many other 
countries, while the labour movement in Turkey was weak and did not posses any threat 
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to the ruling class, the state was still willing to collaborate with unions, most probably 
because it considered them as a potential assistance in resolving labour problems during 
industrialisation. 
There is no doubt that the attempt by the state to create an institutionalised industrial 
relations system also gave rise to significant emphasis on the role and function of 
TURK-IS. The themes "responsible unionism" "mediating agency" or "intermediary 
organisations" were pursued in the discussion to describe the general character and 
posture of trade unions in many countries (Muller-Jentsch 1985, Harmann and Lau 
1980). On the other hand, in Turkey the academics like Isikli (1979), Dereli (1984) 
usually concentrated on the term of "business unionism" to describe TURK-IS ' 
character. This view may be true for the formative periods of TURK-IS, but was not 
enough to explain all the confederations' history. 
A crucial finding often stressed is the fact that TURK-IS and its unions became better 
established, and more "mediating agency". However, Muller-Jentsch's description of 
"intermediary organisation" is somewhat problematic in the Turkish case. Firstly, in the 
1960s and 1970s in the absence of any strong craft union tradition, it is difficult to 
suggest the same transformation towards "intermediary" trade unionism in Turkey. 
Although changes in union structure and policies such as the bureaucratisation of trade 
union administration, and the professionalization of union officers and an increased 
demand in wage issues were evident, this can not be attributed to any transformation 
processes in the trade union movement. Moreover, conflict resolution through the 
collective bargaining system was established in Turkey again in the absence of any 
intensified class struggle. Workplace representation in Turkey did not develop any 
consultative and participative process of representation at the workplace. What is more, 
although most initiatives in labour relations did come from above, the governments did 
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not usually lead to union leaders being co-opted onto bodies where economic policies 
are discussed or decided. 
Therefore, so long as these considerations are born in mind, it can be argued that most 
of the necessary conditions suggested by Muller-Jentsch for the "intermediary" type of 
unionism did not exit in Turkish labour movement. Secondly, Muller-Jentsch also made 
a distinction between co-operative, militant and social contract of forms of 
"intermediary" trade unionism. But, he did not say much about how trade unions 
adopted or changed co-operative, militant or social contract form of their "intermediary" 
role within the continued crises of the capitalist structural framework. Neither does he 
explain how the relationship (among state, employers and workers) which trade unions 
maintain strongly affected each other. In the case of Turkey, and especially TURK-IS 
and its members, Muller-Jentch's distinction is not quite clear. TURK-IS and its unions 
sought to maintain co-operative and orderly relations with the state and employers. In 
this sense, it is possible to categorise TURK-IS and its members in this co-operative 
trade unionism group. However, there were attempts for social contract bargaining and 
a considerable increase in working class militancy, but no stable trend in labour relations 
can be identified. An increase in working class militancy and strikes were usually due to 
unresolved debates in the collective bargaining processes, rather than any significant 
socio and political dimension. 
Therefore, the intensity and broader implication of Muller-Jentsch's description of the 
"intermediary" unionism does not provide an adequate model for the role and function of 
Turkish unions. It is still possible to suggest that TURK-IS and its members in the 
periods in question appeared to display "responsible unionism" and their leaders acted as 
"responsible leaders" but for different reasons. 
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One thing is quite universal for the trade union movement, that, as noted by Hyman 
(1975:64), "a trade union is, first and foremost, an agency and medium oj power". He 
also stressed two-way relationships which unions develop with external and internal 
relationships of control. In other words, for him "a trade union exemplifies the 
interaction between the two types of power distinguished: "power for" and "power 
over". Hartman and Lau (1980) also point out in their definition of the functions of 
confederations that confederations established themselves by co-ordinating the external 
environment and their own constituents (or the internal environment). Here, they tried to 
explain the influence of trade union confederations as a product of their successful 
interaction with their external and internal environments. 
In this context, the inadequate explanation of any model for the Turkish case possibly 
derives from national differences in the development of unions depending on the degree 
and nature of linkages and relations between state, employers and workers. It can be 
argued that although sometimes workers' independent actions had a considerable impact 
on the policies of the leaders of unions, the role of Turkish unions in general in the 
1960s and 1970s were largely shaped by their leaders in terms of the external structure 
rather than internal organisational strength. The external environment includes 
legislation, the economic and political situation, the policies of governments and 
strategies of employers organisations. In the framework of my analysis based on Turkish 
experiences, one notable factor of external environments is the political and economic 
developments of the country largely influenced by the role of state, of employers and of 
international bodies or developments. 
In other words, my analysis is drawn from the unique experiences of Turkey. On the 
basis of my case studies within TURK-IS and its unions, it can be suggested that 
although the role and function of TURK-IS and its members were shaped to co-ordinate 
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the external and internal environments (these relations of the unions within the internal 
and external environments are usually interactive), the role, strategies and policies of 
unions should be widely understood in terms of the pressures from their external 
structures, mainly, the social context including the political, economic and social 
developments of the country. Particularly, in the Turkish case, the state intended to 
maintain the co-ordinating contribution from the major labour organisations due to the 
economic and political considerations of governments. Traditionally, mainly due to their 
"etatist" attitude, Turkish unions were usually willing to agree with the expectations of 
major actors in the external environment. However, because of the internal pressures 
from the rank and file unions, did not also purse a merely collaborative role. 
In this context, TURK-IS and its leadership, mainly two important men, Seyfi Demirsoy 
and Halil Tunc attempted on behalf of their members to adopt some strategies or 
policies to develop their current sets of contextual opportunities. In conjunction with 
their original goal, which was to seek the external opportunities for the recognition and 
concessions from the state and employers, they produced two significant strategies: (a) 
maintaining co-operative and orderly relations with the state and employers simply to 
establish a representative cartel in Turkish trade union movement: (b) preserving the 
integrity of the union and avoiding a collapse of its strength particularly through 
concentrating on its "above-party" policies. There is evidence that the scope for new 
innovative policies and industrial actions was diminished by the consideration of these 
two main policies. In fact, TURK-IS usually used its capacity for constraining its 
members rather than mobilising them to achieve its main objectives. 
As a matter of fact, in shaping the organisation's strategies, policies and objectives, 
organisational needs and survival became very important. For this reason, the leadership 
of TURK-IS was reluctant to implement a militant industrial policy or develop the 
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aspects of political umomsm. The social and political objectives mentioned in its 
constitution were usually abandoned in the name of organisational unity. In TURK-IS 
case, the rigid conservatism was evident and conservative leaders such as Demirsoy and 
moderate leaders as Tunc and their domination within TURK-IS' members (largely 
conservative unions) played a crucial role in the policy developments in the organisation 
as a whole. However, their decisions were heavily affected by external developments 
rather than the internal environment. This is to say that these leaders tended to render 
their behaviour more predictable and manageable for their external environment, mainly, 
the state and employers. They, thus, tried to rely on collective agreement as a main 
function of all unions for the regulation of working conditions and were particularly 
dependent on the goodwill of governments to maintain co-operative and orderly 
relations. 
On the other hand, TURK -IS was accused of committing itself explicitly to the 
philosophy of business unionism. In practice, from time to time this philosophy was also 
dismissed in the consideration of organisational needs. However, let us not forget that in 
the context of Turkey the consideration of organisational needs for union leaders was 
something in which the confederation might seek to improve its external opportunities 
with the state and employers. Otherwise, organisational unity was not asked for 
solidarity or democracy, in other words, internal opportunities. It would not be naive to 
point out that the scope for internal influence, mainly from rank and file on union 
strategies and policies was limited. The lack of membership involvement in unions can 
plausibly be attributed to not only the poor records of Turkish democracy in General but 
also to the rapid growth of a central bureaucracy. 
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In addition to this internal organisational problem, the social and, more importantly, the 
ideological isolation of union leaders from the rank and file was also evident in Turkey. 
Therefore, the role and function of unions may also be understood by the process of 
collaboration of their leadership. Most of the union function was controlled by national 
leadership and concentrated on narrow range of employment issues, mainly, wages 
rather than the socio and political interests of working class. 
It can be argued that since the role and function of unions was heavily influenced by the 
state intervention, the unions became more modest in their strategies and policies and 
bureaucratic in their internal organisation. In short, Turkish unions, their role, strategies, 
policies and objectives did not seem to be a product of their successful interaction with 
the external and environments. Rather, the external structures, the country's context of 
political and economic developments and conditions may have been more conducive to 
the rise of a collaborative trade union movement. On the other hand, the organisational 
environment did not play an adequate role in the transformation of existing union 
structure into a more democratic and effective union process which could also 
contribute to educate workers in their understanding of the union movement. Thus, the 
role, strategies, policies and objectives of Turkish unions in the 1960s and 70s should be 
placed in their historical context and nationally specific political and economic settings 
and structural constraints. 
NOTES: 
1) A personal interview with Kaya Ozdemir, the former education secretary of 
TURK-IS (01.03.1972-28.12.1986) and currently adviser to the executive 
committee of TURK-IS (14 October 1993). 
146 
2) The leaders of member unions in TURK-IS were divided as the loyalist of either 
the Democrat Party or the Republican Populist Party in the 1950s. 
3) The "report of the four" was prepared and advocated by four TURK-IS union 
leaders, Abdullah Basturk (president of the Petroleum Workers' union Petrol-, 
Is), Feridun Sakir Ogunc (President of the Seaman's Federation, DENIZ ULAS-
IS), Halit Misiroglu (President of the State Highway Workers' Federation, YOL-
IS) and Osman Sogukpinar (president of the Energy, Water and Gas Workers' 
union, GES-IS) (Isikli 1979). 
4) A personal interview with Halil Tunc, the then Secretary-General of TURK-IS 
(21.11.1960-31.01.1974), and latter the president of TURK-IS (31.01.1974-
22.04.1979). 
5) Relatively strong trade umon movement and substantial increase in the 
radicalisation of labour were obviously an important obstacles for the 
government since they were facing rising inflation and political unrest. Therefore, 
in the absence of a better alternative, Ecevit's government wanted to implement 
the "social contract". 
6) A personal interview with Orhan Balta, the leader ofTEKGIDA-IS (The largest 
Union in Food and Tobacco industry) and former general secretary of TURK-IS 
(17.12.1989-14.12.1992)(9 October 1993). 
7) A personal interview with Munzur Pekgulec, who was a shop steward in leather 
industry for a long time and is currently the secretary-general of DERI-IS (13 
April 1992). 
8) The 1963 labour legislation in Turkey was heavily influenced by the German and 
Scandinavian legislation. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 6 
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AND EUROPEAN 
UNIONS IN THE 1980s 
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There is not much disagreement that the trend towards a model based on concertation 
and centralisation which was the dominant trend in the second half of the 1970s has now 
been weakened in many countries (Although it has not disappeared). A number of 
commentators argue a general crisis in corporatist arrangements, and the types of 
political bargaining combined with them. This trend has not only been observed in those 
countries where political conditions were unfavourable such as U.K. (where the strongly 
right-wing conservatives have been in office) but also where political conditions were 
relatively favourable such as France, Spain, Greece (where socialist governments came 
to power). Therefore, it can be argued that the favourable conditions for political 
exchange seemed to make little difference. 
It is quite important to stress that in the 1980s all countries faced more or less the same 
problems. They had to challenge the hostile external environment. Industrial 
restructuring and the technological innovation became crucial particularly under the 
pressure of the international competitiveness of the economy. Therefore, it is a fact that 
trade unions in most countries have certainly been facing serious problems of adjustment 
to changed economic, social and political conditions which have an effect on the 
structure and behaviour of national trade union movements. 
Unions have been influenced by prolonged recession, high inflation, the growing public 
deficit, unemployment, profound modification in productive and economic structures, 
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organisational and technological innovations, changes in the structures of labour force 
and government policies of neo-Iaissez faire implying extensive deregulation and a drive 
towards maximum flexibility of the labour market. The possible influence of these 
elements on the dimensions of trade unionism can now be discussed in more detail. 
(i) Effects of the Challenges of the 1980s on Trade Unions. 
Hyman (1992a) argues that many of difficulties faced by trade unions in the 1980s have 
been attributed to a growing diversification of interests within each national working 
class. In this sense, the disaggregation of the working class becomes an important issue 
in the trade union movement. For Hyman, disaggregation covers a variety of process 
rather than being a concept. Those processes can be summarised as follows (1) a shift 
from collectivism towards individualism which basically reflects a decline in the level of 
trade union membership and reductions in opportunities for organised collective action 
due to the lack of collectively determined policies and disciplines (2) a polarisation 
within the working class in terms of core/periphery or insider/outsider relations (3) a 
growing particularism of collective identities and projects in terms of employer 
occupation or economic industry (4) fragmentation within the "organised working class" 
reflected in intra and inter union conflict and a weakening of the authority of national 
leadership and central confederations (Hyman 1992a: 151). 
There are a number of reasons suggested in order to explain disaggregation and 
divisions of trade unionism including the issues of economic stagnation and recession, 
long term occupational and sectoral shifts, changes in management policy and the 
organisation of production and cultural, institutional ideological and political 
fragmentation (Hyman 1992a). It is true that recession has had a considerable influence 
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on structures of employment and unemployment. It has also resulted in inter-group 
conflict within the working class. In addition, labour market segmentation has become 
so crucial by the growth of part-time, temporary and other "non standard" forms of 
employment. There has been a shift from manufacturing to the service sector in terms of 
employment. Moreover, women's employment has increased in the labour market and 
also the non-traditional forms of employment like precarious jobs in small manufacturing 
companies, in the services and the diffusion of small firms and of the "hidden" economy 
have developed as a part of the decentralisation of production. It must be stressed that 
changes in the product market and production system have affected the structure of 
employment. Therefore, the labour market situation has also changed due to the growth 
of new occupational groups. Yet, due to changing employment conditions, unions face 
considerable problems in recruiting members. Furthermore, certainly it should be 
mentioned that peripheral groups are increasing. For instance, there has been an 
important increase in part-time work in all DEeD countries. 
According to Delsen (1990) in most countries, particularly in Europe, part-time 
employment has continued to grow whereas full time employment has declined. 
Approximately 75% of the part-time work is concentrated in the service sector. In 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.K. part-time employment has become the more 
dominant source of overall job growth. Between 1983 and 1986 three out of four 
additional jobs in the European community were part-time, 80% of all net additional 
employment was female. Besides, during the course of 1980s there has also been an 
increase in the number of temporary jobs. The significance of temporary work varies 
between countries. For example, the share of temporary employment is about 5% in 
France and Italy whereas it is more than 9% in the Netherlands. Also in Belgium, France 
and Ireland permanent employment decreased, while temporary employment increased 
(Delsen 1990). As a result, it can be argued that the impact of the structural change of 
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employment on labour organisations can not be ignored. It is worth pointing out that the 
growth of new sectors of employment may create new problems for trade unions. For 
instance, employees in professional, managerial or administrative positions or those with 
technologically advanced skills can give rise to a distinctive interest within the workina 
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class. Their unionisation can also be regarded as a source of inter and intra-union 
conflicts. Moreover, an increase in public and service sector (particularly the rise of 
white collar trade unions) has shifted the balance of power (Muller-Jentsch 1988, 
Kassalow 1987). 
Broadly speaking, what should be argued is that in the last decade one of the main issues 
has been trade union fragmentation or a relative weakening of centralised authority. 
There is also some evidence to suggest that there has been a reduction in the number of 
trade unions affiliated to national labour confederations. This is primarily due to the 
growth of independent unions particularly in service industries such as TCO or 
SACO/SR in Sweden, CGC in France and of associations representing some categories 
of professional employees of cadres with quasi union status and objectives (Cella and 
Treu 1987, Hyman 1994c). 
Another point to make on the issue of the weakening of central labour organisations is 
that, as has been mentioned before, the 1970s and early 1980s can be described as the 
decade of neo-corporatism, or social concertation. In those years the instrument chosen 
was usually some form of incomes policy which diminished the independence of the 
industrial relations system and helped to spread institutionalised relations between the 
state, the union and employer organisations. It can possibly be argued that in the 1980s 
the economic and political climate began to change and, generally speaking, the main 
tendency in the last decade was the expansion of market relations combined with 
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international competition, industrial restructuring, management initiative and the form of 
micro-concertation at the plant level. 
In line with these developments, the governments in many countries have also opted for 
two paths of structural reform in public sectors including economic deregulation and 
labour market reforms. This has been mostly done through both budgetary restrictions 
and privatisation. Another tendency for companies has also been to contract out some of 
their activities to outsiders. These strategies in public sector have been used as part of 
the privatisation process in consideration of a reduction in the numbers of public 
agencies and institutions. 
In general, institutional mediation therefore became less important at the national level 
(Regini 1992). In other words, the trends towards an increase in the authority of central 
confederations of trade unions and also employers' associations seem to have weakened 
as a result of the growing difficulties in central bilateral or tripartite neo-corporatist 
bargaining, even in countries with the longest tradition of this practice, such as 
Scandinavia, Austria and Germany. What this tendency suggests is that there is a 
significant change in the behaviour of trade unions and their central organisations 
compared with the past. It may be due to the growth of division, contrast and 
divergence among different central labour organisations or even within the same 
organisation. The most crucial of these changes is the very widespread diminution of the 
role played by central organisations in favour of individual associations. This also further 
weakens confederations' political strength. Thus, it can be stressed that corporatist 
institutional constraints and collective self-restraint are more likely to exist in neo-
corporatist systems where the central confederations are established as effective labour 
organisations commanding sufficient authority to protect the institutional integrity and 
their political influence. 
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It is quite significant to point out that the role of employers has also been a significant 
effect on trade unions in the 1980s. According to Baglioni (1990: 11) there are three 
typical employer tendencies of recent years. They can be simply summarised as follows; 
( a) the demand for flexibility, (b) the preference for decentralisation in the management 
of employer contracts and, (c) the renewed employer political presence. Although 
employers may vary in practice in their determination to pursue their objectives, some of 
them seem to have displayed a clear preference for bargaining at the company level. 
Thus, this trend has led to some pressures to decentralise collective bargaining. 
Decentralisation in collective bargaining is associated with new employment system such 
as the expansion of the tertiary sector and non-standard types of employment. A number 
of observers now believe that instead of "Fordist organisation of production" what is 
called "flexible specialisation" is now a trend in the production process (Sabel 1989, 
Sorge and Streeck 1988). 
Therefore, in general, the economic and industrial relation system tended to change from 
the level of macro-economic management to the micro-level of the firm. Management 
began to play an important role in the process of economic adjustment through regaining 
the authority lost in the previous decade. As a result, micro-concertation at the firm 
level emerged in some countries, such as France where a form of concertative 
workplace politics was encouraged by the Auroux reform in the 1980s, the Auroux 
reforms created the institution called the "group d'expression". Also in Italy the trend 
through participative mechanism at plant level was developed in order to encourage 
greater flexibility in work organisation, however, unlike France, in Italy although the 
state had a significant influence, it did not occur by legislation (Baglioni 1990, Hyman 
1989). The emergence of micro corporatism has been also evident at enterprise level in 
Spain. Labour and social welfare legislation were implemented through the participation 
of social actors in new institutions at company level (Martinez Lucio 1992: 518). In 
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addition to these developments, there has been a fundamental change in the approach to 
the management of labour. Consequently, strategies of individual employers have also 
become important including the increased employee involvement at the workplace (team 
briefing, quality circles), human resource management approaches (which basically 
undermines the collectivism on which trade unions and collective bargaining depend so 
much). 
The levels of collective bargaining have undergone a degree of change, with a trend 
towards decentralisation from national and industrial level to that of the company in a 
number of countries. Yet this trend has been far from uniform, being far more 
pronounced in some countries, such as the U.K., than in others including Germany, 
Denmark and the Netherlands (BIRR 200, September 1990). As has been already 
mentioned above, in the 1980s there were clear efforts at a development away from 
centralised bargaining over wages and towards a new decentralised form of bargaining 
over the management of work practices in the employers' industrial relations strategies. 
In the case of Sweden, the first move towards decentralisation occurred in 1983, when 
the three white collar industrial unions broke away from their bargaining cartel (PTK) 
and agreed to bargain separately with the engineering employers' association, VF. In the 
context of France, the decentralisation of bargaining to the company level has clearly 
been affected by innovative employers. And in Italy confindustria's industrial relations 
strategy has also moved from the search for centralised tripartite agreements in the late 
1970s and early 1980s to the more recent move towards decentralisation and company 
level bargaining (IRS 465, June Employment Trend 1990). On the other hand, in 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal there has not been one single trend in collective 
bargaining. the different levels of bargaining (between centralisation and 
decentralisation) have presented an unstable picture. However, in general, the trend 
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towards decentralisation can be explained by referring to the view that management 
sought to take advantage of industrial relations institutions so that they can provide 
formalised and non-conflicting workers' participation at plant and company level in the 
consideration of the growing instability of markets. The overall effect of these changes 
undermines trade union movement in general. 
Yet, this development made trade unions to be less important as social partners in the 
political market and this further weakened solidaristic trade unionism. In short, instead 
of institutional mediation, the market relations become crucial and also the increasing 
deregulation of labour relations was seen in the 1980s. A considerable decline in the 
various forms of industrial action has also been observed more or less everywhere in the 
last decade. With the exception of Australia and, in part, Sweden, the basic conflict 
indicators from 1974 to 1982 (yearly average) are lower than figures for the period 
1968-73 (Cella and Treu 1987). In addition, there has been an important decline in 
strikes in Spain, stability in France and Sweden, instability in Italy and Germany and a 
substantial decline in Britain and Denmark. During recessions strikes are supposed to 
become longer and more bitter (as in the British mining strike or the German conflict 
over working-hours reduction in 1984). Yet, there can be fewer of them as the 
small-scale, opportunistic strikes typical of periods of expansion decline. Obviously 
there has been a decrease in the share of traditional bread and butter strikes over wages 
and working conditions in industry. Some strikes in the industrial sector have had 
different aims such as shorter hours. Traditional strike aims tends to be more commonly 
found in the civil service and some public service strikes. In brief, strikes appears to be 
based on economic variables and to be pro-cyclical. Under the pressure of recession, 
strikes take on a defensive character and, broadly speaking, tend to decline. Hence, this 
development has also a negative effect on trade union movement (Baglioni 1990, 
Crouch 1990). 
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In the political arena the weakness of the unions has also been witnessed primarily due 
to changes in the political and economic climate. A conservative regime has been a 
dominant policy in most countries such as in Denmark, Germany and the U.K. In some 
countries Thatcherist neo-liberation was regarded as an alternative ideology, which 
meant that trade union power was undermined and the outcomes of collective bargaining 
were controlled not as means of compromises among partners but rather via pursuing 
monetarist policy, including strict money supply control, the high level of unemployment 
and anti-union legislation. In the other countries where the political climate seemed to be 
more favourable to the unions such as in France, Greece and Spain, a soft version of 
monetarist policies (or alternatively as Hyman (1994a) described it II Socialist 
monetarist" policies) was witnessed. 
In other words, apart from some statutory rights and protection for employees, the 
governments in those countries did not bring any serious changes for trade union 
movements. Besides, trade unions have suffered from the austerity economic policies in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. This development, later, brought about an important 
influence on trade union solidarity particularly among the major confederations. This is 
evident during the main general strikes in 1988 between UGT and PSOE in Spain and 
Intersindical and UGT -P in Portugal (Martinez Lucio 1992, Barreto 1992). 
(ii) Trade Unions' Response to Crises. 
As has been mentioned before, trade unionism in the 1980 has faced many problems 
including membership decline, a decrease in the authority of central confederations, 
inter-intro union conflict and like. As a result, these developments seem to underpin the 
disaggregation thesis (Hyman 1992a). As opposed to the disaggregation thesis or 
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pessimistic arguments on trade unionism, a counter argument has been put forward to 
support the view that "the diagnosis of a crisis of interest aggregation IS 
over-simplified, over-generalised and over-deterministic" (Hyman 1992a: 158) 
According to this counter argument, unions are still able to respond to the changing 
situations in which they have to survive by constructing new types of solidaristic 
alliances between workers. Also, the impact of the 1980s on trade unionism has been far 
from uniform, although trade unions have been hit by centrifugal fragmentation in similar 
vein the impact of sectoral and occupational shifts in employment has been very 
different. According to this thesis, the issue of a trend from collectivism to individualism 
can be questioned in that in reality most union members have joined trade unions for 
instrumental reasons or trade union benefit arrangements. Therefore, in this sense 
unions in most countries have recently made various attempts to provide facilities in 
order to recruit or retain members, those efforts can be regarded as means of returning 
to old model trade unions (Hyman 1992a). For instance, Belgian unions provide 
unemployment insurance payments and a direct material incentive for workers to 
become members. Unions can also utilise other forms of "membership retention" 
including access to a pension benefits in Italy or to retraining facilities for unemployed 
union members in Denmark and unions in America are also said to turn to new tactics in 
order to attract workers including offering new services such as credit cards and setting 
up of union "employee partnership funds" to be used by unions to buy company shares 
(EIRR 212, September 1991, ILO 1990). Taking development of collective bargaining 
as a predominant function of unionism and as an expression of collectivist principles into 
consideration some caution needs to be exercised about the role of collective bargaining , 
because if collective bargaining in capitalist countries is used as a channel in which 
individual economic goals are achieved, in this sense "new individualism" can also be 
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seen more or less same opportunity for trade unions in order to improve the quality of 
life or achieve economic goals (Hyman 1992a). 
It is also worth stressing that another central issue on trade unionism is that sectoral and 
occupational shifts in employment are said to be an inevitable source of union weakness 
and decline. However, in fact it is not necessary for new categories of workers to be 
against collective organisations, as long as unions adjust their policies in terms of 
distinctive interest of those workers. For example, in Sweden and Finland women are a 
majority of union members and across the GECD member states the share of women in 
unions rose from an average of 25% to 31% between 1971 and 1988. It is widely 
accepted that with women this is proportionately located in part time, temporary and 
subcontracted work, union organising efforts in such low density sectors will inevitably 
increase women's representation and the relative weight of service sector employees 
within the unions (EIRR, 212 September 1991: 16-17). As opposed to this growing 
employee groups, traditional groups such as coal miners, dockers and steel workers no 
longer possess an important influence on central confederations. In an optimistic view 
this may lead to a more active initiating and co-ordinating role for central 
confederations. 
Moreover, the 1980s has also witnessed a decline in membership of communist oriented 
confederations such as the CGT in France, the CGIL in Italy. This is probably due to the 
relation between pro-labour political parties and trade unions and the action of 
governments and employers. This development can be referred to a decline in a 
class-political ideologies. However, it may result in an mcrease in inter-confederal 
solidarity between confederations (Hyman 1992a). In Southern Europe, the basis for the 
confederations' co-operation was strengthened as a result of the unity against the 
governments' economic austerity programs. What is also argued by this counter 
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argument is that the crises of trade unionism stems from a traditional style of the trade 
unionism. That is why the changes in employment can produce an opportunity for trade 
unions to reconstitute collective relations with the working class by providing 
solidaristic ties between the unionised and the non-unionised, full time and part time 
workers and the like. 
(iii) Conclusion: The Evaluation of Different Trends. 
What is clearly significant is the fact that no single explanation can be given in order to 
suggest any single trend for the past and present developments in European trade union 
movements due to variety of circumstances and the complexity of the process between 
different trade union movements. Thus, it is quite fair to give a more cautious 
explanation for different developments in national union movements. Obviously, one 
trend focuses on the recurrence of corporatism which was a dominant policy allowing 
many governments to involve labour in social concertation or in several incomes policy. 
Because, during the course of those years when economic expansion and positive-sum 
political exchange emerged, there was a lesser risk of the disaggregation of the working 
class, in other words, compared with the past, in the 1990s trade unions suffer from 
several unpleasant developments in the industrial relation arena. Jessop (1990) suggests 
that there are a number of reasons which explain possible new attempts for concertation. 
First of all is that new forms of socialisation like health, education and political parties 
require informal co-operation among different policies communities rather than 
concertation among the leading organisations of capital. 
Meanwhile, there is quite likely to be a shift towards more worker or union involvement 
in micro corporatism at the plant and enterprise level. In this respect, Muller-lentsch's 
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co-operative dimension of intermediary unionism may be reinforced at company level 
(Hyman 1994a). Second, governments can be expected to choose a more selective 
corporatism. Subsidiary reasons include the fact that incomes policies in Fordism 
depended on F ordist mass workers, now it may occur around the polyvalent skilled 
workers to the disadvantage of peripheral workers. Finally, taking the separation 
between the economy and the state into account, a growing trend towards "private 
interest government" may be expected which would help to develop a different means of 
mediating between state, economy and civil society. This would also develop the basis 
for concertation among different "private interest governments" under the dominance of 
the states. 
In addition, due to the governments' considerations about the economic and political 
implementation of austerity programs, there has been some tendencies towards 
concertation in some countries in more recent years. In January 1991, the Irish 
government, the trade unions and employers' organisations reached an agreement which 
is called the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) (EIRR 193, 
February 1990: 13-15). The attempts by the governments for social concertation 
between social partners have been also evident in Spain, Portugal and Greece at the 
beginning of the 1990s (EIRR 235, August 1993: 14, EIRR 244, May 1994: 22-23, EIRR 
245 June 1994:10-11). The relatively soft attitudes of the governments in the Southern 
European countries may reflect the external pressures of greater European integration 
and the Welfare politics of the unions (Barreto 1992, Martinez Lucio 1992). In a 
different vein, it can be suggested that in the European single market case, what is called 
"Euro-pluralism and pressure politics" can be seen as the emergence of unified European 
policy (Regini 1992). In other words, in recent years a great deal of attention has also 
been paid to the implementation of the single European market (SEM). Under the 
continued internationalisation of the business, the main question is what is to be the form 
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of trade union framework at the European level. Accordingly much of the discussions on 
labour movement in a future Europe has been based on the view, that an integrated 
market may in some way bring with it some sort of European wide negotiations, in other 
words, unions and employer organisations cooperate at a European level in negotiations 
on wages and conditions of work. The SEM causes the prospect of larger companies 
having to introduce European level arrangements on a single-employer basis (Myrdal 
1990). 
It is also worth mentioning that a changing structure of the labour force is very 
important; for example, the emergence of new professional and social groups which 
differ from traditional wage earners. The old proletarian stereotypes have lost their 
unifying force within the working class. Furthermore, employers in most countries seek 
to use labour more flexibly. Their aim is to provide both internal flexibility (shift in work 
organisation, working hours, the evaluation of job tasks and the like) and external 
flexibility (changes in number of employees, non-standard and a typical form of 
employment contract). Therefore, it seems safe to argue that there is a tendency for 
labour movement towards a greater self interest. This is probably due to creating a 
workforce marked through strong divergence of interests. This segmentation and the 
diversification of workers can undermine the solidarity between them which is necessary 
for any co-operation in order to pursue some common interests. (Baglioni 1990). 
However, it can be wrong to believe that changes in the structure of employment bring 
about an end to unionism and union militancy. There is a some evidence to suggest that 
service employees can replace manual groups in relation to union militancy (although 
this trend can be undermined by the privatisation of public services). In addition, in spite 
of the fact that the growth of private non-manual employment in the tertiary sector has 
not been able to bring a sufficient increase in unionism (yet, this not an universal 
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tendency), for example, Scandinavian private service employees have a high rate of 
union membership (Crouch 1990). 
Another tendency focuses on the neo-liberaVThatcherite solution. The exhaustion of 
both the corporatist and the liberal approaches to management of the Keynesian welfare 
state and the crisis of the political system can give rise to the neo-liberal politics. 
Basically, Thatcherism undermines the provision of the welfare state and the unions by 
privatisation, deregulation and so on. In fact, Thatcherism is associated with a degree of 
decisional autonomy. In this sense, Jessop (1990) also suggests a secondary tendency 
towards the development of a "strong state" where governments make a union-exclusion 
policy. This results from the weakening of the corporatist bodies involved in political 
representation and intervention. Jessop goes on to comment that this trend may become 
important if the international economic crisis is intensified and unless there is any 
possibility for liberal corporatist arrangement. Accordingly, it can be said that Jessop's 
secondary tendency seemed to become dominant in the U.K. case in the 1980s. 
Another possible trend in the labour movement likely to occur in European labour 
relations is the emergence of more pragmatic and procedural forms of co-operative 
labour relations, known as "institutionally weak versions of the German model". This 
can be driven either from the reluctant acceptance of common imperatives by previously 
adversarial-bargaining actors such as in Italy and partly in the U.K. or from the creation 
of new forms of labour representation often under the impulse of management in 
situations of weak unionism as in France (Regini 1992). Again there is no guarantee that 
this has been a convergent trend for most countries. 
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However, it must be emphasised that these sorts of institutional developments may lead 
to labour relations actors abandoning ad-hoc arrangements and informality and 
becoming involved in negotiations of rules and institutions rather than engaging in 
neo-liberal policy. Under these circumstances there have been some examples of 
European trade unions explicitly reviewing their positions and directions. The strategies 
used by some unions for example UGT and CCOO in Spain, UGT-P in Portugal and 
GSEE in Greece, have adopted oppositional approaches to the governments' austerity 
measures and their attempts for legislative changes in favour of employers. This was 
evident during the one day general strikes in those countries. Unions like CeIL in Italy 
and DGB in Germany seem to have begun to discuss more co-ordinating and planing 
strategies, usually concerning the policies and including forming crucial links with other 
unions and redefining workers' interests as employees and citizens. On the other hand, it 
is also evident that some unions in different countries have pursued more integrative 
approaches in relations with employers at the micro level, as in the case of EETPU in 
England. 
The final point to make is that there is always some scope for solidarity among workers. 
And also there is the possibility for labour organisations to exercise a redefinition of 
interest within workers in a solidaristic manner by unifying ideologies and trying to 
convince their members that trade unions can promote the long term general interests of 
the working class, as against the immediate interests of particular groups. As Hyman 
(1992a: 166) said that "it is always necessary to campaign and struggle for (relative) 
unity among workers and their organisations". In short, what should be noted, though, 
is that unions in the past enjoyed the political and economic climate and they were able 
to develop their power and strength. Yet, now governments and employers are taking 
the initiative to respond effectively to the loss of initiative they suffered from the waves 
of militancy in the 1970s and to take full advantage of the current situation (recession, 
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unemployment and the weakness of trade unions), however, it must not be forgotten 
that the course of capital accumulation has always created new crises and capitalist 
arrangements in labour relations are usually unstable. It may be difficult to suggest any 
more stable and conflict-free alternative. Under these circumstances, it can also be 
argued that the class struggle combined with the new forms of solidarity among workers 
is likely to remain in modem capitalist societies as a cornerstone of the labour 
movement. In this sense, in the following chapters, an attempt will be made to show that 
in the Turkish case, unions still have the strength and capacity to respond to a hostile 
external environment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980s AND AFTER AND ITS IMPACT 
ON TURKISH UNIONS 
There has been serious discussion on the concept of "strategic choice" in industrial 
relations systems. It has been argued that the framework of industrial relations systems 
and their practices and outcomes are shaped or affected through the interconnection of 
environmental factors combined with "the strategic choices" of the state (public policy 
decision-makers), employers, managers, union leaders and workers (Kochan, Katz, 
Mckersie 1986). As opposed to these external pressure, the changing unions' role and 
identities have also been discussed among the European academics (Muller-Jentsch 
1988, Regini 1992, Hyman 1994). 
In this sense, it can be argued that in Turkey in the 1980s it became increasingly evident 
that substantial changes in the nature of the Turkish industrial relations system can be 
regarded as the sign of the new strategic choices of, first, the military government and 
then the conservative governments and employers. Most Turkish trade unionists and 
academics considered the restrictive labour legislations as the main cause of the 
deteriorating trade union situations in Turkey. However, it may be suggested that other 
parameters which seem to be an outcome of "strategic" options including the 
stabilisation programmes of governments involving in privatisation, contracting out, 
massive lay-offs efforts and the policies of employers' anti-unionism can also be seen in 
this light. 
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Hence, it is possible that Turkish unions under the increasing environmental pressures 
will either continue operating within the new situation or adopt new policies or 
strategies to affect the nature of their environments. It could also be argued that the type 
of unionism between "business" and "political economism" that has so far dominated the 
Turkish labour movement has made it appear that few significant strategic choices or 
ideologically driven decisions have been made at the top level of union leadership. In 
other words, Turkish unions seem to have reacted to changes in their environments in a 
more pragmatic way to influence day to day relations rather than acting as a result of 
strategic decisions made by unions themselves. In this context, the main purpose is to 
analyse the external conditions, constraints, institutions, policies and strategies which are 
likely to influence and reshape the role of unions under the changing circumstances of 
the 1980s and 90s. 
One of the important tasks in part 2 is also to examine how trade unions in Turkey affect 
the extent and nature of current difficulties. Can trade unions produce effective 
responses to new external pressures? Do they have such capacities? What sort of 
opportunities and policies are available to unions and can Turkish unions possess an area 
of strategic choices in responding to the challenges and changes of the 1980s and 90s. 
The military intervention of 1980 and, after that, the election of the conservative Ozal 
government in 1984 is widely accepted as marking a turning point in Turkish economic, 
social and political structure. The new economic situation in the light of free market 
principles has had a considerable impact on the Turkish industrial relations system. 
Therefore, the main argument to keep in mind is that the 1980s also registered a 
dramatic change in the Turkish trade union movement. Unions were influenced and 
reacted to such factors as : economic deregulation in the public sector, restrictive labour 
policies, anti-labour legislation, mass unemployment and more recently new employer 
strategies. Since 1980 Turkey has undergone a radical transformation of its political-
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economy. Foreign-oriented economic policies have replaced the mixed economy and 
import substitution policies in Turkey. Although significant progress in the structural 
readjustment of the economy has been made during the past decade, there have been 
high levels of inflation, big budget deficits and production problems. 
Considering increasing international competition, the adaptation of free market 
principles and foreign economic relations of Turkey have become more significant. The 
application for full membership to the European Community on 14 April 1987 has 
further increased these needs. In this context, an immediate concern is now to discuss 
the implication of these political and economic transformations for organised labour. 
(i) The 1980 Military Intervention Period. 
Before looking at significant changes in Turkish trade uruons m the 1980s, some 
significant points should be made concerning the impact of the military intervention of 
1980 on the country and the trade union movement as a whole. Like the other countries, 
Turkey experienced a relative period of growth through the 1960s until the first oil 
crises of 1973. As a matter of fact, before entering the 1980s, Turkey, particularly in the 
late 1970s, faced undesirable economic and political circumstances. For instance, 
inflation was accelerating and reached an alarming triple digit level, to over 100 percent; 
unemployment was increasing and fiscal problems of the 1970s tripled external debt, 
eventually resulting in the cancellation of external sources and comprehensive 
rescheduling agreements between 1978 and 1980 (1). 
In fact, the problems which Turkey faced were not only economic but also political. As 
in England, in Turkey in the late 1970s an increasingly militant and organised working 
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class movement was said to be a main obstacle to the success of the government's crisis 
management policies. What is more, there was a great deal of violence in the streets 
between the left and the right groups. In other words, the increasing unrest in the 
political and social life of Turkey made the ruling class unable to rule. 
The response of the ruling class to the crises of economy was to impose the stabilisation 
policies. In other words, the economic and political crisis of the 1970s forced the 
Demirel government, with IMF pressure to implement an export-led growth model. In 
connection with this, a package of economic measures was published in January 1980 
just before the 12 September 1980 military intervention. Margulies and Yildizoglu 
(1989) argues that the 1980 austerity programme in Turkey in a way was distinctive 
from the first two austerity programmes implemented in 1958 and 1970. The first two 
had been designed to overcome the bottlenecks in the process of capital accumulation or 
the crises in Turkish capitalism, whereas the 1980 programme was not simply due to the 
consideration of economic problems but also it was designed to implement some 
necessary political and legislative changes. The stabilisation policies were likely to be 
resisted particularly by labour. These developments eventually led the military to 
intervene in 1980, this was the third intervention in 30 years. 
The inability of the civilian government to implement these policies seemed to be one of 
the main reasons for the military take over of 12 September 1980. This can be clearly 
seen from the continuity of economic policy before and particularly after the coup. This 
is also clear from the statement of the president of the Turkish industrialist and Business' 
Men Association (TUSIAD), Ali Kocman, that for him the inevitability of a military 
intervention was due to the economic bankruptcy of Turkey in 1980, inflation and the 
shortage of commodities combined with the problems of terrorism and anarchy (The 
ILO mission report on Turkey, 1982) (2). 
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Unlike the military intervention of 1971, the 1980 action had economic objectives. In 
other words, it aimed at a closer integration with international capital by encouraging 
export-oriented monetarist policies as well as providing an order and stability for 
Turkish political life. In order to reach the economic targets the policy of a free market 
economy became a significant objective. By doing so, the main economic task was to 
reduce the size of the public sector, to open the economy to free trade and to reduce 
wage increases. That is to say that less state involvement in economic activities became 
significant. The deregulation policies such as privatization, contracting out and market 
orientation were as the primary priority in government strategies. Regulating the income 
distribution against labour in general was also one of the main purposes of the structural 
adjustment program of the 1980s. Moreover, combined with an identifiable economic 
program, the political system was restructured by setting up a new constitution. This 
constitution was designed to eliminate all the progressive institutions and movements 
which had been the legacy of the 1961 constitution. 
During this period, while the Military government often stressed social peace and 
political consensus in the country, some factors including anti-democratic legislation, 
depoliticisation of public life and de-unionisation appeared to be the main framework of 
the political system. Shortly after the 12 September 1980 military take-over, the 
National Security Council abolished the 1961 constitution and closed down three union 
confederations DISK, HAK-IS and MISK. TURK-IS was not shut down but it could 
not engage in trade union activity, DISK was outlawed and its leaders were imprisoned 
and prosecuted with the death penalty. The reasons for TURK-IS not being suspended 
from the view point of the military was perhaps the conviction that TURK-IS unions' 
leadership had not been directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities. Moreover, 
the ideological aims and objectives of these organisations were compatible with certain 
provisions of constitution of 1961 and the Turkish penal code. Yet, this explanation is 
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not sufficient to explain why TURK-IS was not closed down. For a more analytical 
answer it might be asked what sort of role did TURK-IS play in Turkish industrial 
relations system. Was TURK-IS "responsible" or "loyal" to the existing regime or the 
state? In the words of General Secretary of the Confederation of Turkish Employers' 
Organisations (TISK) 
" According to Mr. Ibrahimoglu, one of the main problems was the penetration of the 
confederation of progressive trade unions (DISK) by persons whose political objectives 
overshadowed the trade union objectives of the organisations. DISK, he said, which 
was particularly active in the private sector, had been a well organised trade union 
which had become manipulated by subversive elements for whom exaggerated wage 
claims, wildcat strikes, boycotts and violence were common weapons to be used for the 
achievement of its political ends. TURK-IS, on the other hand, was, by and large, a 
more moderate, responsible organisation and devoid of the political motivations for 
which DISK had become known." (The ILO mission report on Turkey, 1982:4). 
Wages were also immediately frozen. Until the new trade union legislation was passed, 
collective bargaining activities were undertaken by the Supreme Arbitration Council 
established by the National Security Council. The arbitration council agreed with the 
view that high rate of inflation in the 1970s was caused by wage increases. The 
government-controlled arbitration council kept nominal wage increases deliberately and 
consistently below annual inflation rates for about four years (1980-1984). And no 
strikes were recorded between 1980 and 1983 (Koc 1989). In this sense, it can be 
argued that changing and reshaping the structure of the economy and of Turkish 
industrial relations against labour in general was one of the key goals of the 1980 
military regime. 
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(ii) Transition Period Towards Democracy. 
The military government of 1980 gave Ozal, the architect of the stabilisation measures, 
the chance to be able to prepare the ground for export-oriented industrialisation without 
the struggle of interest groups like unions. Ozal was appointed in charge of the economy 
by the military after 1980 and then he won the general election and became prime 
minister by advocating Margaret Thatcher style economic policies. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion it is convenient to argue that the Ozal 
government came to power in 1984, since then the explicit long term purposes of 
governments have been to adopt a more market-oriented strategy of resource allocation 
and an outward-oriented trade policy. In short, the economic model has shifted from 
import-substitution to export-oriented development. As a result, there has been a radical 
restructuring of the economy. The main aim announced by the government was the 
opening up of the Turkish economy to the outside business world. Therefore, since 1980 
a great deal of attention has also been paid to the implementation of foreign capital or 
multinational companies in Turkey. The governments have made several attempts in 
order to make Turkey an attractive country for foreign capital. With the enactment of 
the foreign capital framework decree in 1986, designed to accelerate and encourage 
foreign capital flow, the Foreign capital department was set up to gather various 
decision-making organisations in one centre and to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and 
formalities, with the positive effect of all these measures, the foreign capital licensed 
granted from 1980 to 1989 has amounted to 4.9 billion US dollars (Buyukuslu 1991). 
To this extent, the government's policy has been designed to encourage econOffilC 
growth especially in view of the developing integration of Turkish and international 
markets and the country's application for full membership of the European communities. 
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A number of studies suggest that some progress with reasonable success in economic 
measures has already been made in this direction. A realistic exchange rate policy has 
been introduced and then exports have grown. For instance, in reviewing Turkey's 
foreign trade the growth of export in 1979 was well behind cross-country norms 
covering only 3.2 percent of GNP. However, export registered more or less a five-fold 
increase in just eight years rising from $ 2.3 billion in 1979 to $ 10.2 billion in 1987 
accounting in 1985 for 14.9 percent of GNP. Moreover, the increasing competitiveness 
of Turkish industry is proved by the increase in the share of industrial goods in overall 
exports, from 35.9% in 1975 to 79.7 in 1990 (TUSIAD, 1990). 
It is quite safe to suggest that the 12 September 1980 military intervention gave the Ozal 
conservative government the opportunity for the implementation of the monetarist 
economic programs by suppressing most organised social opposition and making them 
to be depoliticised within the democratic decision making process. Even Ozal himself 
admitted that "if not for the military intervention, we would never have reaped the 
rewards of our programmes" (Marqulies and Yildizoglu 1989). 
In spite of the fact that the Ozal government was in favour of the principles of free 
market forces, in practice it was highly interventionist in labour relations. It aimed to 
limit the role of trade unions and the influence of collective bargaining so as to create a 
flexible labour market at every level. Therefore, it can be argued that Ozars Motherland 
party's economic arguments challenged the whole economic history of Turkey. Taking 
the new process of capital accumulation into account, the economic policies of the 
1980s succeeded in satisfying the interest of the ruling class, particularly through the 
lowering of real wages and restoration of labour discipline. The government attempted 
to limit working class activity for the success of the economy at the expense of 
substantial human and environmental costs. Combined with the restrictive provisions of 
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the 1983 laws, the governments pursued wage policies in accordance with its Friedman 
type stabilisation programmes involving restraint especially in the public sector, where it 
acts as employer. 
The result was a radical decline in workers' real wages. As a report prepared by TURK-
IS (1989:23) indicated, the real wage index which was 100 in 1979 fell to 43,68 in 1988. 
During the same period the drop in the real wages of civil servants was from 100 to 
52,4. Also, according to the Research Department of Petroleum Chemical Rubber 
workers union (Petrol-Is 1989:217), the share of wages within product value in 
Manufacturing industry fell from 14,75 in 1979 to around 6% in 1987. Another union 
publication (DERI-IS 1989) showed the workers were working 51 minutes for lkg of 
bread and 13.5 hours for just 1kg of beef in the leather industry in 1987. 
There has been also dramatic changes in the structure of the labour force in the 1980s. 
The total civilian employment was 16,771,000 in 1991. The employment status of labour 
force in the 1980s with employees, self-employed and unpaid family workers categories 
accounted in 1985, respectively for 33.9%, 22,7% and 42.4% of the total. The share of 
agriculture in total employment was estimated in 1991 at 50.1 (it was 58.2 percent in 
1985), while the share of industry was at 20.5 percent (it was 17 percent in 1985) and of 
services was 29.5 percent (it was 25.8 percent in 1985). According to recent official 
labour market statistics above, employment in agriculture is reported to have decreased. 
On the other hand, employment in industry and services (Tourism, Transportation, 
Commerce etc.) has demonstrated the most dynamic growth, although industrial 
employment still only accounts for 20.5 percent of total employment compared with 
27.5 percent in Greece, 35.3 percent in Portugal and 32.9 percent in Spain (OECD 
Economic Survey 1991-1992). 
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In the last two decades, Turkey has faced a considerable unemployment problem, 
basically due to her economic transition. In these periods. this development has given 
rise to an estimated 500 to 800 thousand people entering the labour market annually. 
The increase in the labour force was mostly absorbed by industry, services and informal 
sectors. The Turkish economy is widely accepted to be in labour surplus. There are a 
number of reasons for this, including the high level of increase in the rate of population, 
the increasing participation of women in the labour force, a decrease in agriculture and 
handicraft employment and finally the relatively capital-intensive nature of new 
industries and, more importantly, considerable decrease in the share of the public sector 
in total employment in large manufacturing enterprises due to the government's 
deregulation policy. Therefore, the level of unemployment was estimated at more or less 
3 million in the mid-1980s (Petrol-Is 1991). 
It was on the basis of these economic and political framework that the gradual return to 
democracy took place. In 1983 a civilian government was elected, yet, returning to 
democracy did not bring significant changes for Turkish unions. Broadly speaking, the 
period of Ozal governments was witness essentially to a vital deterioration in the relative 
economic and political position of organised labour as opposed to capital in general. 
Despite the hard time resulting from the 1980 military intervention, unions restructured 
themselves and total union membership reached its pre-1980 level of more or less 2 
million. In terms of the total labour force, which is around 21 million, union density was 
at about 10 percent. On the other hand, OEeD's figures show the union density around 
18,7 in Turkey, which is higher than in Spain, 16 percent and France, 12 percent and 
lower than in Portugal, 30 percent and Greece, 25 percent (EIRR 212, September 
1991 : 17). However, according to ministry of labour statistics (1993), considering the 
potentially unionisable work force of 3,573,426 wage earners, it reached 58 percent. 
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However, by looking at the official figures making a judgement about exact umon 
density in Turkey can be misleading due to not only the unreliability of the figures of the 
ministry of labour, but also the stability of union density. In this sense, the main thing 
which has been ignored by Turkish academics and unionists is the impact of the 
significant decline in the size of the unionisable workforce and cultural and ideological 
changes of 1980s on the unionisation rate. Before 1980 the size of the unionisable 
workforce (Unionisable workforce in this context means that workers are legally able to 
j oin unions) was about 5 million, this figure dramatically dropped to around 3.5 million 
during the 1980s, mostly due to the governrnent's attempt to deregulate the economic 
activities for a more flexible labour market. While labour legislation was designed mainly 
to weaken the power of the unions in relations with employers, various attempts were 
also made to reduce the institutional regulation of conflict so as to expose labour 
relations more directly to market forces, particularly in public sectors. Among other 
reasons for the decline in the unionisable workforce and union economic and political 
power at macro level, four significant themes will be discussed in the Turkish case 
below. 
(iii) Issues of Current Importance: Anti-Union Legislation, Cultural and 
Ideological Offensive, Collective Bargaining, and Privatisation. 
a) Anti-Union Legislation: 
Combined with an identifiable economic program, the political system was restructured 
by setting up a new constitution in 1982. This constitution was basically designed to 
eliminate all the progressive institutions and movements which had been the legacy of 
the 1961 constitution. The new constitution was designed to limit further trade union 
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rights. It covered a great number of details concerrung trade umon activities. For 
example, according to this new constitution, trade unions are not allowed to take part in 
politics (Article 14) and are also prohibited from affiliating with political parties (Article 
52). The right to strike was also limited in many ways, strike actions cannot be used to 
damage social peace and national wealth (Article 54) (Saglam 1987). 
As discussed earlier, the industrial relations system in Turkey was formed and shaped by 
the Constitution of 1961, which entitled both employers and workers to the right to 
organise, the right to strike and the right to bargain collectively. Between them, the 
unions Act No.274 and collective agreements, strikes and lockouts Act No.275 of 1963, 
based on the guidelines of the constitution of 1961, developed a system of democratic 
industrial relations in Turkey. Like the Australian and German legal systems, the Turkish 
legal system was shaped with its high degree oflegalistic intervention ("Juridification"). 
However, the constitution of 1982 (at present) seems to regulate the Turkish industrial 
relation system in a more detailed and less democratic manner than the former 
constitution. Trade unions and employers' organisations and their confederations are 
governed by the provisions of the trade unions Act of 1983 No.2821 and the collective 
Agreements, strikes and lockouts Act of 1983 No.2822 shaped by this new constitution. 
It can be argued that the new laws limit many trade union rights which the Turkish 
unions enjoyed before the military take-over. 
(i) The impact of the legislation of 1983. 
The new labour legislation was a continuation of the 1982 constitutional restrictions. In 
fact, the constitution of 1982 (set up after the military take-over of 1980) received full 
support from the business sides. Halit Narin, ex-president ofTISK (the main employers' 
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organisation) and also a member of the constitutional drafting committee, argued that "it 
was a commendable work which brought justice and balance between the employers 
and workers" (TISK 1982:2). Many other major businessmen and industrialists 
welcomed the new constitution. The new labour legislation was also supported by TISK 
and was in line with its earlier proposals (Buyukuslu 1991). 
While TISK was successful in convincing the military to enact the laws corresponding to 
its aims, TURK-IS failed to raise much opposition. The initial proposals of TURK-IS 
were not taken seriously by the military rulers (3). On the other hand, the imprisoned 
DISK leaders and those of its affiliates were neither in a position to propose 
amendments to the labour laws nor were they allowed to express their criticism. This 
legislation includes all manual and white collar employees in the public as well as the 
private sector; it does not, however, cover civil servants and certain public employee 
categories such as the newly created "Contract employees". 
It can be argued that the characteristic of the 1983 legislation seem to be designed as 
part of political and economic choices made in the 1980s. Particularly in terms of trade 
union freedoms the legislation has various "negative motives II including imposing certain 
restrictions on union membership, excessive restrictions on the right to strike, problems 
related to collective bargaining, implementing heavier penalties for violators of the laws 
and expanding the scope of the compulsory arbitration mechanism and of "non-covered 
personnel II in collective bargaining and interference in the administration and activities of 
trade unions. The legislation is structured in a system where there are too many 
intertwined rules, entangled procedures and time intervals affecting the process of 
collective bargaining and strike. In short, the new labour laws aimed at marginalising 
trade union activities. It was a system designed to curb all trade union rights and 
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liberties, which was best described in a report of the Director-General of lLO following 
his visit to Turkey: 
" Laws Nos. 2821 and 2822 (respecting trade unions and collective agreements, 
strikes and lock-outs respectively) constituted a legal strait-jacket in which the trade 
unions found themselves, faced with interference in or control of practically every 
activity that unions should normally be able to carry out, free from any State 
intervention ... " (lLO 1989:6). 
The president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz at the time also described the legislation in 
these terms: 
"It is a rare collection of irrational restrictions and prohibitions which make trade 
unionism and collective bargaining a bundle of impossibilities. There are even some 
cases, such as restriction of the venue of a union congress to a certain city, or 
restriction of international relations of unions, which show that some of these 
restrictions can not be explained rationally and that they have been invented only for 
the sake of restricting" (lLO 1990: 17). 
The restrictive and even repressive measures in the Turkish legislation in the 1980s 
seemed to hit the trade union movement in many ways. Trade unions were not only 
banned from involvement in political activities but also prohibited from receiving or 
giving support to political parties. The leadership of TURK-IS particularly opposed the 
provisions because: 
"such provisions are, without any doubt, against the freedom of unions... being 
independent from politics does not mean non-political action" (TURK-IS 1983: 172). 
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In fact, these restrictions also prevent uruons from pursumg their socio-economic 
interests because it is not easy to distinguish where the industrial action is focused on 
either political causes or socio-economic interest of workers. Legal restrictions on union 
membership were also extended. For instance, civil servants, the employees of essential 
services and certain public employee personnel, such as public school teachers, postal 
employees and police, are not allowed to organise within unions. Similarly some 2 
million public servants are denied the right to organise. 
The government also created other non-union category in the public sector, termed the 
"contract employees". The category is believed by the unions as a special status devised 
to pave the way for privatization program more effectively. It might also be argued that 
the implementation of new employment practice in the public sector seems to have 
brought "contract employees" closer to the civil servants status, denying them the right 
to join unions and to strike and consequently causing interest division within the 
working class. 
The government also created the concept of "coverage of collective agreements". 
According to the trade union Act No.2821, any persons with varying degrees of 
managerial authority who can legally join unions are excluded from the scope of 
collective agreements. Any workers authorised to have the right to manage are 
considered as the employer's representative. For instance, apart from the general 
managers and directors, supervisors and foremen are treated as workers who can join 
unions but not be covered by collective agreement. 
As most union officials stressed in interviews, this practice is often used by employers to 
extend the scope of "non-covered employees". In practice highly skilled workers (e.g. 
engineers, technicians etc.) are chosen by employers for this category. Their wages are 
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usually kept above the other workers' wages who are covered by collective bargaining. 
And what is more, workers among "the non-covered employees" who are not members 
of a union are most likely to be promoted in the companies. Therefore, there is a 
considerable tendency among the "non-covered employees" not to join unions or to 
withdraw from union membership. Even if they stay in their unions, conflicts of interest 
arise within their workers. According to a research official in TURK-IS (4), the number 
of "the non-covered employees" for collective arrangements has recently reached around 
25 percent of the total labour force. This figure clearly indicates the deunionisation 
efforts of employers. 
In the field of collective bargaining, trade union rights are also restricted by the legal 
requirement that any union must have 10% of workers in a given branch of activity and 
500/0 in any given establishment before it can enter into negotiations. This provision 
provided the platform for a "union-busting" campaign in August 1989 by the Yapi ve 
Kredi Bank against the BANKS union which represented about 11 % of employees in the 
banking and finance sector. By engaging in a concerted campaign to coerce its 
employees into resigning their membership of BANKS, management was able to force 
union membership below the 10% threshold and thus end its status as a legal bargaining 
agent (TURK-IS 1989). These provisions were used in July 1990 to remove the 
bargaining rights of the independent steelworkers' union, Celik-is, at the Iskenderun and 
Karabuk enterprise where half of its membership was employed (petrol-Is 1990). 
By asserting a popular criticism that union policies do not often represent members' 
interests and unions violate democratic principles in their internal administration, the 
1983 Act results in detailed provisions on election procedures. In other words, the 1983 
legislation allows for considerable government interference in the internal affairs of trade 
unions and imposes detailed eligibility requirements on candidates for union office. For 
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example, in order to be elected to leadership posts of one of the national unions, a 
person must have had continuous employment experience as a worker for at least 10 
years (Celik 1988). This provision was used in August 1989 when two trade unionists 
were not allowed to stand for election to the national executive committee of the glass, 
earth, and cement workers union KRISTAL-IS because they had not fulfilled the 
requirement of 10 years' continuous employment in the sector (5). A system of 
inspection was also set up in the 1983 labour legislation. This brings about a close, day-
to-day supervision of the activities of trade unions. With respect to alleged misuse of 
funds and violation of union democracy principles, unions and confederations are also 
subjected to financial and administrative controls conducted by Ministries of Finance and 
Labour, acting jointly, at least once in an election period. A strike ballot is also required 
before strike action (Celik 1988). 
In addition, unions may not be established at the enterprise level or on an occupational 
basis and require prior authorisation for international affiliation. Sanctions for violations 
of Turkish labour legislation are severe, and include the dissolution of unions and 
imprisonment of individual offenders. The provisions means that all individuals 
convicted on ideological or political grounds are disqualified from union office (Yol-Is 
1986). 
The most serious restrictions in the new labour legislation were those on the right to 
strike; while not making strikes completely illegal, the collective Agreements, strikes and 
lockouts Act of 1983 No. 2822 makes them extremely difficult. Strike action is further 
obstructed by the lengthy procedures that must precede the declaration of a legal 
stoppage and the possibility of imposing compulsory arbitration procedures. 
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The same Act imposes a compulsory arbitration mechanism for those establishments and 
activities where strikes are forbidden. These work fields where workers do not have the 
right are as follows: water, electricity and gas; funeral and mortuary; life and property 
insurance; fire fighting; banking and public notaries; petrochemical works starting from 
naphtha or natural gas; production, processing and distribution of natural gas and 
petroleum; urban public transportation by land and sea; any health institution such as a 
hospital, dispensary, sanatorium, clinic, chemist's shop or pharmacy; educational 
institution, (public or private sector teachers), day care centres and retirement homes; 
cemeteries and any establishment run directly by the Ministry of National Defence. It is 
reported that about one-fifth of the unionised workforce is involved in these fields 
subject to compulsory arbitration, which seems to be an high ratio for Western 
Countries that are committed to free collective bargaining and right to strike (Celik 
1988). 
The other restrictions of 1983 Act on strike can be summarised as follows: Clause 31 
states numerous instances when strikes may be temporarily prohibited particularly in the 
case of war, fires, flood, avalanches and earthquakes and clause 33 allowed government 
to postpone strikes for up to 60 days where public health or national security are 
threatened (Taskent 1987). For example, the government implemented this measure 
once on 22 March 1989 when it decided to postpone the implementation of the decision 
of a strike by 24,000 steelworkers (Cumhuriyet, 23 Mart 1989). On 26 January 1991, 
the government intervened against the increasing wave of industrial unrest using the 
excuse of the supposed threat to the national security posed by the growing Gulf crises 
to decree a 60 days suspension of all strikes. The measure brought to an end some 160 
strikes and existing collective negotiations and provided for the imposition of 
compulsory and binding arbitration through mechanism that were not impartial and did 
not enjoy the confidence of the workers concerned (TURK-IS 1991). 
183 
When a strike is postponed, the dispute has to be settled by a new body called the 
Supreme Board of Arbitration. A strike ballot is also required before strike action. In 
other words, according to the collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs Act of 1983 
No.2822, a strike vote must be taken in a enterprise or plant if one-fourth of the workers 
including union members, non-members and non-covered employees request a strike 
ballot within six working days after the union's strike announcement. Some restrictions 
on strike pickets are also imposed. For instance, there must be only four strikers at the 
entrance of company and they must not resort to the violence, force or threats. 
According to the same Act, work by those (members or non-members) in the workplace 
during a strike must not be impeded in any way by strikers. With the exception of a sign 
saying "strike in progress", other placards, banners or slogans must not be posted and 
no huts, sheds or shelters may be erected. Solidarity and general protest strikes as well 
as political activity by unions, beyond immediate social and economic Issues, are 
forbidden (Koc 1991). 
Associated with these developments, individual labour legislation also created a new 
framework in which redundancy, dismissal and retirement became easier (Celik 1988). 
The considerable body of legislation passed since 1980 seems unsympathetic to trade 
unionism. In general, a whole ensemble of legislative measures has been aimed at 
reducing "union rights" gradually narrowing the scope of union membership and the 
right to strike, interfering the union internal democracy and increasing the power of 
compulsory arbitrary system. 
(ii) An assessment of the legislation in the light of international standards. 
A detailed comparative analysis between international regulations on trade union rights 
and legal regulations currently in force in Turkey shows that the 1982 Constitution of 
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the Republic of Turkey, as well as the 1983 legislation, No 2821 (the trade union Act), 
No 2822 (the collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts), and their amendments 
introduced in 1986 No 3299 are in violation of the principles of ILO Conventions Nos 
87, 98, III and 135 as well as in violation of the European Social Charter and the 
principles ofICFTU and ETUI, both in their spirit and application (6) (TURK-IS 1981). 
As far as Convention No 87 is concerned, Turkey is the only country in Western Europe 
that has not yet ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87). As regards the right of civil servants to join trade 
unions, Turkey is the only European country which has banned civil servants from 
joining trade unions. However, in an interview, an official from the ministry of Labour 
(7) stated that both civil servant and contract employees are considered as engaged in 
the administration of the state and thus excluded from the scope of the convention. 
Although Turkey has ratified ILO Convention 98, covering the protection of workers 
and organisations against attacks on trade union rights and interference and encouraging 
voluntary collective bargaining, serious restrictions are imposed by the daily practices of 
the employers and governments, such as the creation of "contract employee" category in 
the public sector and of "non-covered personnel" in collective bargaining. Workers are 
still deprived of the right of negotiating their working conditions. The numerous 
limitations on the right to strike in Turkey extend far beyond the essential public services 
where many other countries impose similar restrictions on strike activities. Furthermore, 
where this right is recognised, there exist a whole series of laws banning certain actions 
widely legitimate in other countries and circumstances, such as the right to collect 
money to assist strikers and the right to establish picket lines around an undertaking 
which is on strike. The same can be said about ILO Convention No 135 on the 
protection of workers' representatives and Convention No IlIon discrimination and the 
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European Social Charter are also international regulations which are flouted by Turkish 
legislation. A significant number of cases, related to unfair dismissal against shop-
stewards and union members was reported in the 1980. 
However, the legal approach which demonstrates the violations of international 
regulations article by article can run the risk of giving the idea that these violations 
resulted from isolated clauses. In fact, they make up a system which is aimed at 
containing the trade union movement, in order to reduce its possibilities to express itself; 
its field of action, its resources and influence. The important question might be: what are 
the formal approaches of the government and employers to trade unions rights in 
Turkey? The government and employers' organisations (TISK) often state that although 
they have some regard for international regulations, the conditions should be adopted to 
"national circumstances" (8). Therefore, it is no longer a case of "adapting international 
regulations to national conditions", but rather the case of ignoring all international 
regulations. That is why, it can be argued that there is a need for more widespread 
attention to be given to attacks on trade union rights in Turkey. 
b) The Cultural and Ideological Offensive: 
Before 1980 the economic, political and social policies of the state, the generally limited 
scope of industrialisation and the relatively small size of the industrial working class 
meant that trade union development had certain advantages or disadvantages on the 
basis of collective identity and union attachment compared with the advanced European 
countries. In this context, the fundamental problem facing trade unions in the 1980s was 
their capacity to create the specific institutional and cultural structures that would allow 
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other strata or organisations to support the trade union movement, particularly during 
the economic and political crises. 
In essence, trade unions in Turkey might elaborate an ideology of solidarity between 
industrial and other workers and the mass of small producers, small shopkeepers, 
mainly, self-employed. When the industries such as mining, steel and paper developed in 
the relatively large industrial cities, the broad section of the population in these cities 
became dependent on the industrial workers, because the consumer and seller relations 
between self-employed and workers helped to serve as a bridge toward broader sets of 
community relations. 
Turkish unions until few years ago were not successful in developing ties with other 
strata and organisations (student unions, teacher associations, professional groups etc.) 
and therefore were not politically effective. Census results showed that there were 
1,624,000 wage earners in 1955, but around 7,600,000 wage earners in 1992 (Aydinlik, 
27 September 1993). These figures indicate that there has been a significant increase in 
the number of working class. Although there is not data available on this issue, the major 
increase has been observed in the white collar workers in service sector. Union 
membership was also affected by the increasing number of white-collar employees, 
mainly in the service sector, as these workers are usually reluctant to joint unions. 
Moreover, a decline in Agricultural employment also gave rise to the expansion of the 
informal sector in big cities. In the 1980s emigration continued from small towns to 
large cities. Emigrant labour without any skill was obtained by either the informal sector 
(as street sellers) or by the expansion of the service sector, tourism and construction (as 
casual, temporary or seasonal workers). Some were employed by small enterprises or 
artisans, where there is not effective trade unionisation. The urban informal sector has 
constituted a powerful constraint on trade unions as well as the development of a 
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working-class conSCIOusness. Informal sector workers are difficult not only to be 
organised in unions but also to mobilise politically. 
Since the working class and its organisational forms, including uruons, can not be 
separated from the total environment in which they operate, the vital significance of the 
nature of the political economy and wider societal influences in shaping the salient 
features of the Turkish working class and its relation with the trade unions also appears 
to be an important factor. 
One of the open and direct offensive policies of the governments against trade unions in 
the 1980s was to discredit them in relation with workers through claiming them as 
ineffective and useless organisations. The aim was to create a credibility gap between 
workers and unions. The attitude of the ruling class in this period was to undermine 
worker solidarity and weaken the confidence of the working class in the trade unions. 
Unions were scapegoated as the cause of the severe economic and political problems of 
1970s. The government and employers' anti-union disposition can be best explained by 
the words of the President of the employers' organisation, Balit Narin, at the time: "We 
criedfor about 20 years, now it is our turn to laugh" (Milliyet, 23 February 1983:1). 
Another example of the above-mentioned attitude towards trade unions was the 
statement of Prime Minister Ozal during his party's convention in November 1986: 
"Workers are our friends, but not trade unions" (BASISEN 1986:5). Latter, Ozal also 
declared that "My battle is against trade union leaders, not workers" (Cumhuriyet, 3 
December 1989:3). 
So, one of the new strategies of the government to attack trade uruons was an 
ideological offensive by declaring them the cause of many problems in the country. 
Therefore, at the national level, the government no longer required the unions' 
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collaboration for the economic, political and cultural integration. In this respect, 
"populist disclosure" of the 1960s and 70s for the masses, particularly, the unions were 
replaced by "restrictive democracy" for the unions in the 1980s. The purpose of the 
ruling class was not only to create an anti-union environment through anti-union policies 
but also to undermine the working classes' organisational power and discredit them with 
regard to the workers. 
It is worthwhile to stress that economic liberalism, supported by "restrictive democracy" 
(it is difficult to talk about political liberalism) in the 1980s gave rise to a cultural and 
ideological dilemma. A novelty which the Ozal government after mid-80s brought to 
Turkish public life was the gradual extension of the philosophy of "individualism". In 
fact, the popular wisdom was "tum the comer" and be rich under the expansion of 
liberal ideology. This means that material things are becoming more important and the 
rising importance of materials gains in the society, particularly among the younger 
generation, led corruption or cheating to be tolerable or acceptable. This of course 
affects ethical issues, collectivism and solidarity among workers. Due to political 
considerations the state deliberately let the new city emigrants build their shanty towns 
quite near city centres and even extended municipal services to these urban centres. 
Hence, the lower wages were likely to be balanced by providing capital gains, welfare 
benefits, to working class. Employers seemed to be also happy for this development, 
since the new urban centres caused the expansion of domestic production. 
(i) The impact of the cultural and ideological offensive on unions. 
The cultural and ideological results of these developments for trade umons are of 
importance. In the 1970s workers who lived in urban centres had a permanent job in the 
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factories and were generally members of a union. They were involved in unions and 
politically active in union activities and their political orientations were widely affected 
by left-wing ideologies. In contrast, in the 1980s workers who live in these places often 
do not have a regular job, mostly work in informal activities and are reluctant to 
organise within unions. 
Compared with the coffee shops and mosques in the shanty towns, trade unions have 
become less important for workers. Let us not forget that the depolitization of masses as 
the deliberate policy of government during and after the military intervention of 1980 
has resulted in a considerable shift towards the fundamentalist Islamic movement and the 
emergence of hooliganism in urban centres. This might have been as a consequences of 
the "ideological attack" of ruling class against the ideologies of socialism, social 
democracy and etatism in favour of liberal discourses. The social dimension of these 
ideological changes have also affected the unions' image as collective organisations. An 
additional ideological attack on unions and their leaders has been the blame for the 
disruption caused by prolonged strikes. Anti-union campaigns, centred on allegations of 
malpractice and corruption inside unions and the blame for displaying no respect for 
national economic interests and social stability was also launched by the media, mostly 
owned by large companies in Turkey. This of course affects the public image of unions. 
Employers and their leading organisations such as TUSIAD and TISK have powerfully 
been determining Turkey's political agenda. This effectiveness of course drives from 
their capacity of being owners of capital. The means of mass media, such as newspapers, 
magazines, television and radio stations are replaced under their direct influence. In 
Turkey union leaders consider this as "media war" against trade unions. 
Recently, this fact has once again revealed itself very clearly, during the strikes in 
Istanbul in 1991 and 1993 led by the Municipal Workers Union, Belediye-Is. At this 
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strike no public support could be secured at the desired levels (Petrol-Is 1991). The 
disruptive consequences of this strike has damaged popular sympathy for unions, since 
the strike paralysed the public services. Particularly after the excessive escalation of 
unionised worker wages at the beginning of the 1990s, the media has began to proclaim 
its opposition to unions quite openly. while some journalist was saying that "] want to be 
a Municipal Worker", the others were raising the questions: "do the trade unions have a 
right to ask for the high wages, while the other working groups' wages such as doctors, 
teachers and civil servants are becoming less than those of workers ... is it fair to pay 
very high wages only to organised workers? while there are millions of people seeking 
for employment, they are even ready to work below the minimum wage level" (9). While 
the attack of the media associated with the employers and government's official 
statements has carried a crucial weight in undermining the unions' public image, the 
unions could not achieve much success in convincing the public of the justice of their 
demands or in determining the political agenda on the basis of workers' interests. 
As already noted, the 1980s witnessed a strategic and continual confrontation with trade 
unions, mostly in connection with the ongoing austerity economic programmes, 
increasing international competition and the specific problem of Turkish capitalism. It 
can safely be argued that one of the key purposes of the governments in the 1980s was 
to create the social and cultural conditions which seemed to be in line with the 1980s' 
economic and political choices of the ruling class. 
The governments and employers have concentrated on more emphasis on the popular 
term "national needs" through stressing the fight against inflation, reducing budget 
deficit and improving the domestic economy's competitiveness abroad. The creation of 
the social and cultural conditions also required an "ideological control". Therefore, while 
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the image of the unions has been weakened in public eyes, the emphasis at an ideological 
level has been shifted toward "individualism". 
Combined with this development, changes in the employment patterns has brought about 
interest differentiation in the working class. An increase, particularly in service and 
informal sectors in the last decade have had an impact on the pattern of labour relations 
developed in the 1960s and 70s. The emergence of a "social state" in the same period 
strengthened labour solidarity and indeed trade union power and also helped to develop 
the idea of "collectivism" among the workers. However, changes in the political and 
economic environment of unions in the 1980s has affected labour behaviour in relation 
to the unions. In short, decline in collectivism is associated not only with the changing 
patterns of employment but also the cultural and ideological offensive of the ruling class. 
In this respect, "restrictive democracy", with a new emphasis on market liberalism and 
individualism has resulted in the crisis of the attitude of the working class and of 
traditional trade union culture and ideologies. 
c) Trends in Collective Bargaining: 
Shortly after the military intervention of 1980, the military government enacted several 
measures concerning the activities of unions suspended. In relation to collective 
bargaining, the Act No.2364 was prepared and gave the authority to the Supreme 
Arbitration Board to renew the expired collective agreements in all sectors. During the 
interval 1980 to 1983, this Arbitration board remained in force until the new legislation 
of 1983 was enacted (Dereli 1984). In the course of these years, while free collective 
bargaining was absent, the main purpose of the Supreme arbitration board was to reduce 
the general wage level in line with the government's stabilisation and liberalisation 
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policies, designed to control the high inflation. In doing so, some general principles and 
rules in collective agreements were standardised to create similar wage and employment 
conditions in all sectors. Therefore, the natural outcome of the government's collective 
bargaining policies was a significant decline in workers' purchasing power. 
The structure of collective bargaining in the 1980s was shaped by the collective 
agreement, strike and lock-out Act of 1983 No.2822 which can be summed up as 
follows: An agreement can be at the plant, covering one workplace or multi plant level. 
An agreement covering a few plants of the same company or a state-owned organisation 
in the same industry is called a company agreement. By the same Act, a union has to 
represent at least 10% of the workers in a particular industry and has more than half of 
the workers in the plant or enterprise level in membership to acquire bargaining status 
(Celik 1988). 
At a time when union structure was centralised at industry level, the level of bargaining 
was reduced to local levels (single plant or company level) due to the government's 
pragmatic considerations. The double criteria has been a much-criticised issue in both 
ILO and TURK-IS on grounds of its allegedly curbing of unions' freedom to bargain 
without any hindrance. In fact, after the first collective agreement legislation in 1963, the 
nucleus of collective bargaining developed at the local level in Turkey. Industry-wide 
bargaining which was so prevalent in Western Europe did not become so important in 
Turkey for reasons such as the undeveloped state of employers' associations and the 
tendency of public economic enterprises to engage in bargaining separately. 
During the course of interviews, it became apparent that unions in Turkey do not wish 
to give any authority concerning collective bargaining to the central confederation. 
Therefore, due to both legal obligation and the willingness of member unions, the major 
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bargaining activity of unions is carried out by the industrial associations. However, when 
TISK (as the only leading confederation of employers) and its employers' associations 
became more powerful, they began to develop multi-employer agreements commonly 
called "group agreements" in Turkish labour practices in which firms in every given 
branch of industry are divided in terms of their size and financial strength and they 
negotiate as a group. This type of bargaining has been widely used by employers, 
particularly in the Metal, Textile and Chemicals Industries. "Group Bargaining" became 
more common as a result of which a master agreement emerges usually covering the 
whole or greater portions of an industry. Moreover, some enterprise agreements, 
particularly, in the public sector tend to cover the whole industry (e.g. railways, mining, 
steel), thus creating the effect of an industry wide agreement. 
The explanation given by most employer organisations' officials for the preference of the 
larger employers' organisation including, metal, textile, chemicals and food industries for 
multi-employer bargaining is that it saves time and effort. It also helps to regulate the 
market and prevents employers from competing from with each other in relation to wage 
increases especially under unchecked inflationary pressures and unstable political 
conditions. It should be mentioned that "group agreements" are not legally enforceable 
in Turkey (Buyukuslu 1991). 
During the military intervention of 1980, collective bargaining activity was banned. After 
three years' suspension, unions renewed their collective bargaining relationship with 
employers in both public and private sector. While on the average 1775 collective 
agreements were made each year between 1964 and 1980, this figure increased to 2292 
between 1984 and 1990. This increase was due to the predominance of local level 
bargaining in the 1980s (Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1991). It can be argued that in the 
1960s and 70s the government adopted a relatively non-interventionist approach to 
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collective bargaining, there was, however, a dramatic change in the government's policy 
toward free collective bargaining in the 1980s. Combined with the 1983 anti-labour 
legislation, the government pursued wage policies in accordance with its monetarist type 
austerity programs involving wage restraints, particularly in the public sector where it 
acts as employer. In spite of the fact that unions made various attempts to receive more 
understanding and flexibility in collective bargaining through searching the channel for 
"dialogue", these efforts were usually in vain due to the employers' and, more 
particularly, the government's tough stance against union's wage demands. This also 
gave rise to an important deterioration of the traditional good relations of TURK-IS 
with the governments. 
(i) Changing strategies in collective bargaining. 
As has been mentioned earlier, in the 1960s and 70s most collective agreements were 
concluded at plant or company level. Also, in the mid-70s multi-employer bargaining 
called "Group Bargaining" became an important trend in collective arrangements 
particularly in the private sector. The important basics of bargaining structures of the 
1960s and 70s tented to persist and remain relatively stable (after the return to 
democracy) until the mid-1980s. 
However, due to the shifts in government and employers' policies, bargaining structure 
gradually modified. While the centralised and bureaucratic collective bargaining 
mechanism has been widespread in the public sector through multi-plant level 
agreements, the trend in the private sector has been towards more company or plant 
level bargaining. Broadly speaking, in the face of increasing national and international 
competition and considering Turkey's full membership application to the European 
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Community (10), employers' organisations began to employ new strategies so as to 
overcome the difficulties driving from labour-management relations. The key problems 
stressed by the officials of employers' organisations are improving productivity, the 
quality and labour cost factors in production. They are regarded as very important on 
the basis of competing with imported goods in the domestic market as well as increasing 
exports (TISK 1992). According to the survey carried out by TISK, average labour 
productivity in the manufacturing sector in Turkey is one-fourth of that in EC countries. 
For example, value added per employee in Turkey was $4,163 (1975-100) in 1987 
whereas it was $21,994 in Belgium, $23,471 in Germany, $15,436 in UK, $15,553 in 
Spain, $19,892 in Italy and $5,426 in Portugal (Buyukuslu and Hyman 1992). For this 
reason, with the help of the ILO TISK developed a project in order to overcome the low 
productivity level of Turkey. The main aim of this project was to identify the factors 
which have a negative impact on productivity in undertakings, to offer solutions and to 
give training to both managers and workforce. 
The main factors for the low level of productivity are given by the officials of TISK as 
follows: (1) the lack of tripartite co-operation between parties both at macro and micro 
level (2) long industrial disputes and their distracted effects on productivity (3) 
managers of undertakings are short of the knowledge of the modem management and 
organisation methods. Considering the last point, it can be argued that Turkish 
management has been able to exercise a much tighter system of control. Meanwhile, 
paternalism has always become very significant to enhance workers' motivation and 
promote effective work performance in labour-management relations. However, it is 
important to stress that the structural characteristic of industry, mainly, small family and 
medium size firms in which the employer regarded himself as having a right to exclusive 
control, led to authoritarian and paternalistic practices. In fact, similar managerial 
characteristics could be seen in larger, technologically-advanced firms. This is probably a 
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reflection of the historical development of social structures and the distinctive cultural 
orientations of Turkey. 
On the basis of this background of employers' attitudes, collective bargaining developed 
a distributive character rather than an integrative character and it focused mainly on 
wage issues. The issues such as productivity, work allocation, job evaluation, job 
security, training and the introduction of new technology have never been discussed 
during the negotiations. Therefore, the content of collective agreements mainly includes 
detailed provisions related to wage and fringe benefit (11). This trend has also continued 
in the 1980s. In other words, major Turkish employers (although not always 
strategically) have taken a pragmatic stand in relation with collective bargaining. By 
systematically rejecting workers' participation in management the employers did not 
prefer to share their management authority with the workers or the trade unions. 
In fact, there are few signs that Turkish employers have been pursuing different forms of 
decentralisation strategy evident in other European countries. Due to intensified national 
and international competition, large employers particularly were forced to decentralise 
the structure of bargaining. This has been usually done through divisionaling their 
organisation and contracting out some of their activities to the sub-contractors. As a 
result, there has been a crucial shift from multi-plant agreements to single-plant 
agreements. However, in the Turkish case although economic pressure has required a 
restructuring of the workplace, most employers have been reluctant to discuss issues 
like the active participation of employees at the workplace with union representatives at 
the bargaining table. 
Provisions in the legislation related to workers' participation in management are not 
adequate. The provision which had encouraged unions to participate on the boards of 
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large public enterprises was abolished by the military government. Yet, there has been a 
slight development on this issue as a result of the attempts of some public sector unions. 
F or instance, committees at the workplace have been called, for example, the High 
Council of Labour Peace at Caykur (the State Tea Corporation) and the committee of 
Collaboration at MKE (The Machinery Chemical Industries). The most common type of 
committees set up by collective bargaining agreements decide on matters such as 
discipline, the resolution of rights disputes, the duties of shop stewards and the 
implementation of the agreements (12). However, in general the collective agreements 
lack important provisions regulating workplace relations between workers and 
managers, since the collective agreements deal only with income issues. 
It should be mentioned that the legal provisions of 1983 created a desirable outcome for 
TISK and as well as its affiliates. The 1983 Act limited the scope and coverage of 
collective bargaining by creating new employee categories such as "contract employees" 
and "non-covered personnel" for collective agreements. In this respect, decentralisation 
and changes in the nature of collective bargaining have been associated with the 
employers' deunionisation efforts (13). 
As a matter of fact, in more recent years, the close relations with European countries 
and the United States, the need for a continuous re-organisation of production, the 
significance of product quality and finally flexibility for international competition have 
already given rise to some effects on managerial strategies in industrial relations. It can 
be argued that compared with the past, Turkish industry seems to be better equipped 
now with professional managers who are competent in devising methods including total 
quality management, quality circles and team briefing (14). Thus, strategies of individual 
employers were noted in 37 private companies, including Koc Holding A.S., Turyag 
A. S, Oyak-Renault, Simko, Eczacibasi, Sise-cam and Brisa (Kalite 1993, MPMY 1989). 
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However, new employment practices have not prevailed in Turkish Industry yet. 
Therefore, it seems safe to suggest that employers in Turkey have not yet adopted 
human resource management practices as a way to undermine trade unions. There is 
evidence to support this view that in most companies mentioned above before the 
implementation of these practices the management received full unions support (Kalite 
1993). During the interviews, most union officials seem to regard HRM techniques as a 
tool to improve productivity, rather than undermine the union situation at companies. 
However, in one case, the Sise-cam factory in Cement, Ceramic and Glass industries 
wanted to implement quality circles at work place, the union members, Kristal-Is, 
rejected this practice on the ground that the company did not accept the union proposal 
concerning permanent employment for employees (Milliyet 13 December 1992). It has 
been also reported that Tofas-Fiat, the largest car company in Turkey has reached an 
agreement with the Metal workers' union (Turk-Metal) on redundancies, productivity 
and temporary wage freezes. This development has been considered as a sign of a 
productivity coalition at micro level by the company managers (15). It can safely be 
suggested that in the foreseeable future, management is likely to consider human 
resource management methods as an alternative way of dealing with employees, 
ignoring the collective representation channels of unions. The main reason for this is 
substantial increases in the number of multinational companies in Turkey in recent years 
(16). 
In this sense, a great deal of attention has also been paid to the implementation of 
foreign capital or multinational companies on Turkish collective bargaining system. As is 
well known, the large (increasingly multinational) companies are usually reluctant to join 
employers' organisations. In fact, many of the large or multinational companies in 
Western countries in the last decade have been so willing to bring their own industrial 
relations "framework" rather than joining the central employer organisations. 
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Multinational or large companies in Turkey are not, however, reluctant to deal with 
either employers' organisations or trade unions. This may be because the larger 
employers are obliged to do so by Turkish labour legislation and they also used to enjoy 
engaging in multi-employer bargaining. 
However, they have recently begun to engage in single-plant agreements. The increasing 
number of multinational companies might also explain the move from multi-employer 
agreements towards single-employer agreements. There is always a possibility for them 
to bring or create their own management strategies and then leave the relevant 
employers' organisation, as in the case of Brisa. In the rubber industries, Bridgeston (a 
Japanese Company) with domestic capital Sabanci (Lassa) came together in a joint 
venture called Brisa. The Japanese company did prefer to bring its own labour 
management practices and did not want to remain in the relevant employer organisation, 
Kiplas, the Chemical, Petroleum, Rubber and Plastics industry employers association of 
Turkey, and then Kiplas lost its members (mainly rubber companies). There was a 
reasonable dialogue between Brisa and Laspetkim-Is (the main trade union in the rubber 
industries). The top managers of Brisa took the leaders of Laspetkim-Is with four 
officials of this labour union to Japan so as to show how industrial relations practices 
work there. 
Although this trend has not prevailed in other companies, there has been also clear 
developments away from centralised bargaining "grup toplu is sozlesmeleri" over wages 
towards a new and different decentralised form of bargaining over the management of 
work practices in the employers' industrial relations strategies. On the other hand, in the 
same period public enterprises have been subject to direct government intervention in 
wage regulation. Although state managers have dealt with the process of collective 
bargaining, the final negotiations have been under the relevant minister's control. In 
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some cases, the prime minister has directly involved in negotiations (17). The interesting 
dilemma was that while the government advocated the principles of free market policies, 
it imposed a restrictive and interventionist wage policy on negotiations. However, things 
did not go in line with the expectations of the conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) 
particularly in the late 1980s. 
Eventually, the general anti-labour attitude of the Motherland Party governments gave 
rise to the re-emergence of a militant union struggle. In other words, the response of 
labour unions to the tough bargaining approach by the government and employers was 
an increase in industrial action. This mass movement is widely described as "Spring 
Mobilisation". 600,000 public sector workers engaged in actions and mobilisation 
including street demonstrations with the purpose of tipping the scale in their own favour 
in the collective bargaining process. As a result, this development brought about a set of 
collective bargaining agreements which enabled workers to make up for the post-1980 
losses. In 1990 the real wages of unionised workers increased above the pre-1980 level. 
Despite every obstacle put up by the government and employers, real wages rose 
considerably in 1989 compared with 1988. Taking 1983 as the base year, the index for 
real wages increased from 62,4% for 1988 to 81,70/0 for 1989. As a result of successive 
collective bargaining in 1990 and 1991, workers continued to fully compensate for the 
income losses of the post-1980 period. 
In this period, multiplant bargaining with single enterprise agreements were widespread 
and collective bargaining tended to be more centralised in the public sector. One of the 
important reasons behind the successful conclusion of the 1989, 1990 and 1991 
collective bargaining agreements was the collective action of trade unions affiliated to 
the TURK-IS confederation under TURK-IS's co-ordination and assistance (TURK-IS 
1991). During this period, what was observed is that particularly in the case of public 
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workplaces, collective bargaining procedures were not conducted separately with 
different associations but undertaken at government level, encompassing the entire 
sector. During this process public employers' associations were responsible only for 
technical aspects. Therefore, it can be argued that unions this time particularly at the 
political level, through mass industrial action and renewal of the confrontation were , 
effective in discouraging the government's restrictive wage policy. 
However, this achievement of the unions and unionised workers has resulted in a new 
antagonism towards labour unions and union members. The success of labour unions in 
winning back the wage losses of the previous decade, in turn, led to employers to adopt 
new strategies. The most widespread methods exercised by the government and 
employers particularly after the signing of collective bargaining agreements are as 
follows: (1) closing down their business permanently or temporarily (2) dismissing a 
large number of workers. For instance, 574 workers were dismissed after a collective 
agreement between the Turkish Metal Workers Union and Eregli Iron and Steel 
Company in May 1991. In some companies union members are sacked, and only re-
employed if they agree to leave the union and sign up at the minimum wage. More than 
300 workers were forced to accept such a procedure at the Sanko Plant in Edime in 
October 1991: After being dismissed from their original jobs, they were given 
employment at an affiliated factory of the Sanko company (3) dividing the company into 
small units so as to reduce labour costs and making it difficult to unionise, to practice 
collective bargaining and organise strikes. Therefore, sub-contracting within the business 
has become a widespread practice, particularly in textiles, construction, metal, 
communications, cement and timber processing. Employment of temporary or seasonal 
workers and part-time employment, are becoming commonplace, although there are no 
reliable statistics available about these sort of workers (18) (4) speeding up the 
privatisation process in the public enterprises. The outcome of these developments for 
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workers and unions has usually been massive lay-offs and new replacement at prevailing 
minimum wages, resulting in unemployment, loss of membership and reduced average 
wages in the company despite the gains in collective agreements. 
d) The Evolution of Privatization ("Ozellestirme") and its Impact on Turkish 
Trade Unions: 
In many countries, irrespective of their regimes or stages of development, the policies of 
governments in the 1980s dramatically shifted in favour of market-based solutions as 
opposed to the previous dominant "Keynesian" approach to economic management. 
Their policies focused on improving public sector performance by several forms of 
"commercialisation", such as deregulation and privatization (Ferner 1988). Thus, the 
privatization of public enterprises has become a key strategy in governments' market-
oriented approaches. Basically, the privatization programmes in general have been 
designed to reduce the size and scope of the public sector and strengthen the market. 
Turkey, like most other countries followed the privatisation trend. The "sell-off 
philosophy" has been a central pillar of governments economic policy since 1984, even if 
the results so far have been sometimes less than convincing. Here, the Turkish 
experience with privatization, and more importantly, its impact on trade unions will be 
examined. 
(i) The State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and the privatization process In 
Turkey. 
In the 1930s, the "etatist" period of the country, State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 
provided the initial impetus for industrialisation in Turkey. In the post-war period, while 
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the SEEs continued to play a central or modified role in industrialisation, they also 
helped the development of private business, particularly through providing subsidised 
inputs to the private sector, a process facilitated by extensive price deregulation (19). As 
has been noted earlier, as a result of the structural adjustment programme in 1980, 
government shifted its economic policy from the import-substitution strategy to export-
oriented growth. The general thrust of the strategy was to rely on market forces and 
reduce the scope for state intervention especially in economic activities. The SEEs were 
viewed as one of the causes of economic crises in the 1970s. The underlying problems of 
the SEEs, often stressed by the governments, were as follows: low productivity and 
efficiency; decline in the growth and profits of organisations, which in tum created 
financial problems for government budgets; lack of competitiveness in their market 
shares and the absence of autonomy and managerial incentives. The latter may be due to 
frequent interference from politicians and bureaucrats and considerable increase in 
militancy in public sector unions, particularly in the late 1970s. 
In addition, labour hoarding was regarded as another problem of the public sector, 
because public sector employment in Turkey was expanded, mostly due to political 
concern with generating support for the government in power. After returning to a 
democratic regime, the pressures and proposals in favour of privatisation of the SEEs 
were intensified by the Ozal conservative government. Hence, privatization appeared 
one of the most significant parts of the policy agenda of the government for the first 
time in 1984. 
F or the government, privatisation would offer a way to make the economy more 
responsive to the market, so increasing industrial efficiency, and generating real growth. 
It would be also a tool to increase the liquidity of the capital markets, to reduce budget 
outlays to industry and provide a flow of badly needed revenues to the exchequer. 
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Two mam strategies seemed crucial during the privatisation process. First, the 
government identified the key state companies, TURISAN (a tourism chain), THY (the 
Turkish National Airlines), and USAS (an airline catering company) which were given 
priority for privatisation. Controversially, all these companies were already very 
profitable and productive. This was somewhat against the government's thinking that 
through privatization these companies would become more productive and efficient. 
Second, the government also identified the major candidates (or customers) as ideal 
buyers for privatisation. Foreign investors rather than domestic ones were chosen as the 
principal candidates for taking over the companies. Three basic ways were used to 
implement privatization in Turkish case: first, direct sales of public sector companies. 
This is a complete transfer of ownership from public to the private sector. Second, 
transferring the management rights of the companies and finally selling of the stakes of 
the companies (Akguc 1991). However, in Turkey domestic companies were interested 
in obtaining the management rights of the highly profitable public enterprises rather than 
taking over them. This might have also been one of the reasons that the government 
encouraged multinational companies to buy off these enterprises. 
The mam thought here is that through considering international competition, the 
adaptation of free market principles and foreign economic relations of Turkey in the 
1980s became more significant for the government's strategies. In the 1960s and 70s the 
public sector was considered as the most important element of the programme of 
national reconstruction and as the assistant of domestic private capitalist development. 
In contrast, since the 1980s, the public sector, through privatization, has been regarded 
as an aid to attract foreign capital. It is obvious that the government was concentrating 
on privatisation not only as a means of improving company competitiveness or efficiency 
but also as a crucial strategy for promoting the development of the capital market, 
mainly, international capital. 
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Although it seemed initially quite ambitious, the Turkish privatization programme has 
been problematic. Several reasons can be given for the failure of the privatisation 
programme. Firstly, the legal base of privatization was not clear, therefore, the 
government was faced with the cancellation of three major sales by judicial decision. 
Second, there was considerable opposition from interest groups including employees, 
unions, shopkeepers, small producers, farmers as well as the established bureaucrats and 
some managers in the SEEs, who might have been affected by privatization. Within the 
parliament, the opposition parties such as SHP (left of centre) and RP (Islamic party) 
were also significant opposition circles. The parties opposed the privatization 
programme of the government on the ground that the programme was designed to solve 
the fiscal problems by regarding it as a budget-deficit financing technique. They were 
also concerned about selling off some of the SEEs which would be strategically crucial 
on economic and military grounds to foreigners. 
Some academics in Turkish universities also began discussing the legal basis of 
privatization. The themes like "government choice" or "public choice" and "property 
rights" were debated (20) and for them political rationality would come progressively 
into conflict with market rationality. During the period between 1980-1990 opposition 
by unions was considerable even before the implementation of privatization, because the 
adverse impact of certain labour practises such as wage restraint in collective bargaining 
and creation of a new status for workers as "contract employees", contracting-out and 
massive lay-offs appeared as a preparation for privatization. 
With the formation of the DYP (the Conservative True Path Party) and the SHP (the 
Social Democratic Populist Party) coalition government following the October 20, 1991 
election the privatization programme has become more complicated, particularly after 
Mrs Ciller became prime minister. While she has wanted to speed up the privatisation 
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process, Mrs Ciller's junior partner, the social democratic populist party has tended to 
adopt an essentially cautious and pragmatic approach to privatization. As a result, the 
political constraints on privatization have become more considerable. For example, due 
to the attempts of some MPs like Mumtaz Soysal within the SHP, the privatization of 
PTT (Posta, telegraph and telecommunication) and TEK (Electricity) still remains 
blocked by the court. 
(ii) The impact of the privatization process on unions. 
It can be argued that government's strategies were also to fundamentally reshape the 
industrial relations system during the 1980s. In relations with privatised industries, and 
enterprises in preparation for privatization, there is evidence of new comprehensive 
industrial relations strategies in some cases including the reduction of labour forces, the 
exercise of new management practices, changes in the structure of collective bargaining 
and contracting-out of some economic activities to private firms. These developments 
amounted to a policy of labour exclusion particularly affecting public sector trade 
umons. 
In the Turkish public sector a system of "tripartite political exchange" between public 
sector unions and governments had been developed. In other words, in the 1960s-70s 
the sector not only helped the consolidation of economic development for the country, 
but also ensured a margin of comparative stability for union organisations and created 
the conditions for union growth which reached a density of 80%-90%. However, this 
"tripartite political exchange" was diminished through the abolition of the "workers' 
participation scheme" in the SEEs in 1983. It can be assumed that exclusion from 
political exchange may reduce unions' effectiveness in this sector. In this respect, unions 
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may be forced to move into a more uncertain situation involving new labour practices 
from the previous, relatively stable framework of relations. 
The SEEs cover around 750 thousand employees, with their family members this 
reaches an interest group of about 4 million people. There is no doubt that the 
privatization programme has already affected TURK-IS, since it is largely organised in 
the public sector. In reviewing the various publications of unions, Petrol-Is, Yol-Is, 
Kristal-Is, Harb-Is, Hava-Is, Deri-Is, Basisen, Turkiye denizciler, Demiryol-Is and 
Tekgida-Is, it can be argued that in general, they all consider the privatization efforts as 
a move which aims at undermining the trade union movement. The main concern is that 
a large number of workers in the public sector would be laid off before and after 
privatization. For example, the attempts of the ministry of transportation to contract 
certain activities to private companies to reduce the workforce can be seen as a step 
towards privatization. 
Unions also criticised the policy on the ground that the government announced the sale 
of the most profitable companies to private capital, particularly, foreign companies. For 
them, "national interests" are in danger. The key question is why the government does 
not rehabilitate or sell off the inefficient SEEs. Therefore, their criticism also centres on 
the policy choices of government in the privatization programme (various publication of 
Yol-Is, Petrol-Is, Turkiye Belediye-Is, Agac-Is, Hava-Is, Saglik-Is and Deri-Is) (21). 
Most unions regard the state owned companies as a symbol of Turkey's economic and 
political independence and "public property". They also stress the social function of 
these enterprises. Firstly, the SEEs have had a considerable function in correcting 
imbalances in the distribution of national income mainly through regulating and 
sometimes stabilising the prices of goods. Second, the enterprises have made an 
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important contribution to social stability by creating employment particularly in newly 
emerged cities such as Zonguldak, Karabuk etc. This also created further jobs for local 
shopkeepers in those areas and discouraged people from emigrating to large cities for 
jobs. Finally, the SEEs introduced most of social welfare programs and contributed to 
the education of workers as well as managers. For unions, the problems of productivity 
and efficiency derived from mismanagement. 
However, widespread doubts among Turkish unionists centre on the possibility of lay-
offs and losing members following privatization. In fact, after the privatisation of five 
cement companies, USAS (airline catering concern) and ANSAN (the bottling company 
to cola) and later TELETAS (Telecommunication company), massive lay offs were 
witnessed. For example, Swedish airlines SAS service partners took over USAS, and 
within one year 50% of the workers were laid-off (Cumhuriyet, 23 Nisan 1993). During 
1987-1991 the five cement companies (CITOSAN) were bought by French SCF 
(Societe' des Ciments Francais), and since then 8,000 workers were dismissed. After 
buying major stakes in the Telephone company (TELETAS), Belgium Bell Telephone 
Manufacturing Co forced the company to dismiss 25% of its workforce (Hava-Is 1993). 
In the petroleum, chemical and rubber industries, according to Petrol-Is' officials (22), 
the Akdeniz Fertilizer Factory was sold off to a private Turkish company TEKFEN 
HOLDING in 1989. Before the privatization process Tekfen Holding employed 740 
workers and among those 668 belonged to Petrol-is; however, three years later in 1992, 
these were 398 and 306 respectively. The rate of unionisation in this company dropped 
from 90.2% to 76.8%. What is more, after massive lay offs the jobs done by previous 
workers were given to subcontractors. In the same industries, IPRAGAZ was sold off to 
a French-owned company, Primagaz, and within five years workers who belonged to the 
union were all dismissed, the company became union-free in the end. 
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The president ofHava-IS (23), Attila Aycin, in an interview claims that there have been 
serious changes reported in the status of unions and collective bargaining arrangements 
after the privatization of most companies. There have also been observable moves in 
management practices including more restrictions imposed on recruitment of new 
employees, increases in unfair dismissals and flexibility demands in working hours. 
Management also sought to introduce various individualist methods of employee 
participation and reward. For example, performance-related pay was introduced in most 
cases. Mr Aycin pointed out that after privatization in most companies unionised 
workers were the first target to be dismissed. 
The implication of privatization for trade unions in Turkey seem to be very complicated 
for two crucial reasons. First, there has not been any serious ownership changes in large 
and important SEEs where unions would be badly damaged (24). After negotiating with 
IMF and the World Bank the Ciller government announced that around 25%-40% of the 
workforce in the public sector is likely to be laid off (Petrol-is 1993). Second, in spite of 
the fact that it is too early to draw a general conclusion about the implementation of 
privatization on unions in general, it is, however, possible to examine the effect of the 
preparation periods for the privatization process on unions. In other words, remarkable 
changes taking place before privatization might be regarded as prerequisites for 
privatization. The companies were restructured in preparation for privatization. 
(iii) The effect of preparation periods for the privatization process on unions. 
In this context, it is quite safe to argue that, particularly after 1984, the conservative 
governments' deliberately imposed new labour practices on the state owned companies, 
which have undermined union's power in the public sector. These practices include: 
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(a) The creation of a category of "contract employees": As part of its market 
orientation philosophy and privatization programme, the Ozal government imposed new 
policies on the public sector. According to the new personnel regime, there would be 
three categories employed by the SEEs; namely "civil servants", "workers" who are 
employed under a labour contract, and "contract employees". The last category aimed at 
curbing union power by denying unionisation rights, collective bargaining rights and job 
security against lay-offs. In 1992 this category covered 190,3 56 employees in the public 
sector. This means that out of 620,282 total employees in the sector, 30.68% of 
employees were employed as "contract employees" and thus became ununionised 
between 1985-1992 (KIT raporu 1993). 
(b) Contracting-out: In the late 1980s the contracting-out of certain work to outside 
firms also became significant as part of government deregulation policies. Contracting-
out has been used to allow private companies to enter the market. Essentially, the 
government has made use of it to hand over to private companies certain public services; 
including postal services, municipal services, distribution of electricity and auxiliary 
services in the SEEs. The other types of work, including public works, construction or 
repair of highways, dams, auxiliary facilities for SEEs' plants were also undertaken on a 
subcontracting basis. According to research carried out by Petrol-Is in the petroleum, 
chemical and rubber industries, in 1990 11.80/0 of the total workforce worked for 
subcontractors without any union affiliation (Petrol-Is 1992). Another more recent 
development is also the crucial tendency of municipal authorities to contract out some of 
the local public services such as sanitation, meter-reading, refuse collection and 
maintenance of parks to outside companies in response to the budget problems of large 
cities, in particular, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The Municipal Employees' union 
(Belediye-Is 1993) reported that after contracting-out these activities, 1789 workers 
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were dismissed, and all of them were union members. Contracting-out was regarded by 
most unions within the privatization sphere as the cause of the deunionisation process. 
(c) Lay-offs in the public sector: The increase in reported lay-off cases before and during 
the privatization process is also noteworthy. This, indeed, gave rise to loss of 
membership and of unions' bargaining status and their power at some plants. For 
instance, dismissals reported by TURK-IS affiliated unions in 1992 were 39,609 workers 
in all sectors, and out of this total around 28,000 workers were laid off in the public 
enterprises alone, sometimes through "compulsory retirement". The unions also noted 
that dismissals in the public sector were mostly due to the privatization process. In fact, 
the figures not only show the number of dismissals but also the loss of union 
membership, since unionised workers were the primary target during the redundancy 
cases (petrol-Is 1993). In short, these anti-union practices can be attributed to the 
attempts of the government's privatization programme. There is a phrase in Turkish: "a 
rose garden without thorns". This means in this context that the government would sort 
out all labour problems before selling off the companies to domestic and foreign capital. 
The first important government strategy was to stop the expansion of employment and 
to initiate large scale lay offs in the SEEs. Two significant factors seems to lie behind 
these reductions: (a) restructuring of working practices to increase labour productivity: 
(b) termination of uneconomic activities. Second, contracting out of some economic 
activities of these companies to outsiders was implemented with considerable 
effectiveness. The hiring of contract workers also became significant. These policies 
helped to reduce potential membership and diminish union power. Third, in order to 
make these enterprises more attractive for buyers the aim of the government was also to 
tum them into profitable companies. As a result, the increase in wages was limited and 
real wages subsequently fell. 
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This was made possible by the creation of the so-called "public sector collective 
bargaining co-ordination board" in 1984 and further the establishment of the public 
sector employers' associations in 1986. These organisations pursued a bargaining policy 
much tougher than in the 1960s and 70s. The reason for this is, probably, that in the 
1960s and 70s, government approaches towards labour relations in the public sector 
were more pragmatic. State enterprises were used for political objectives. Compared 
with the private sector, public sector managers were more tolerant in their relations with 
unions. One additional reason is that, particularly in the late 1970s, the public sector 
witnessed the emergence of politicisation within workers. Therefore, during the 1980s 
the emphasis also shifted towards depoliticising public sector labour relations. 
Fourth, an important factor that caused the undermining of public sector unions was the 
artificially-created "contract employee" category by the government. This is a category 
in which workers are denied the right to join unions. This has, no doubt, brought about a 
potential as well as actual membership of loss for unions. 
(iv) The possible future effects of privatization on unions. 
A crucial question which can be raised here is what is possible impact of privatization in 
the future on the role of Turkish trade unions? In other words, how will this 
development affect the traditional pattern of labour relations and the role of unions in 
general? A pessimistic scenario can be, first, suggested. As part of the government's 
deregulation and privatization efforts, a legislative change was made in 1986. According 
to Article 3 of the 1986 amendment (Act No.3299) "in the public sector, a single 
enterprise-level collective agreement should be made when enterprises or plants have 
independent legal corporate status as a result of separation". This is to say that when 
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the enterprises or plants are broken up and sold piecemeal, the privatised plant will have 
separate bargaining with independent legal corporate status. This means that the existing 
collective bargaining and labour relations might be disrupted. And different unions are 
likely to claim bargaining rights for the same companies. 
Thus, the disruption of the bargaining relationship can further give rise to inter-union 
rivalry. Privati sed enterprises may tend to diversify their economic activities into new 
branches and this can have profound implications for unions. While the traditional 
pattern of labour relations with established unions in the core business will continue at 
least in the foreseeable future, the new branches of privatised companies may choose 
union-free environments. The removal of political control by governments and ministers 
will encourage the autonomy of management to make direct industrial relations 
decisions and implement new workplace practices at workshop level. While this can 
reduce the influence of government or ministers, the capacity of management to exercise 
strategic choices at plant level is likely to be increased. In addition, in the new 
deregulated environment, a desire to reduce labour costs and to strengthen management 
control by slashing the size of the workforce and restructuring the companies' labour 
relations practices will probably prevail. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to draw a relatively optimistic picture of the 
implementation of privatization on the future of unions in Turkey. First, privatization 
will, probably, result in the replacement of the "political orientation of management" by 
"market orientation of management". This means that privatised enterprises will be 
released from direct ministerial control. Therefore, government intervention in collective 
arrangements will be eliminated and the chances of establishing "free collective 
bargaining" will be increased. This will also change the domination of right-wing unions 
in the public sector (these unions traditionally established good relations with the 
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ministries of conservative parties). Hence, there would be substantial opportunities for 
unions as well as their confederations to set up new balances within the privati sed 
enterprises to discuss new dimensions or strategies as against their traditional way of 
dealing with labour relations. Second, some management of privati sed companies are 
also likely to prefer to carry on the institutionalised trade union relations, since they do 
not know how to deal with conflict with workers and the grievances etc. In this case, 
unions can be considered an important element for management to take into account 
while preparing its strategic innovations. Third, assuming the whole company is sold 
off, this means merely a change of ownership; the status of unions can remain unchanged 
within the same industry. And as a result, employees who have been under the "contract 
employees" status in the public sector are likely to regain the "worker" status. As 
"contract employees" some civil servants may move into "worker" status, since they are 
no longer considered public sector employees. Therefore, they will begin to enjoy the 
same union freedoms and the right to strike and this can help unions extend their 
membership. Fourth, if one analyses Turkish legislation on strike activities, it can be 
realised that some strike restrictions are imposed only if these activities such as land, sea 
and rail transportation are performed by public agencies. Therefore, after privatization 
these workers will be entitled to the right to strike, if the system of compulsory 
arbitration is not imposed on these activities. 
Some recent developments on this issue make it even more difficult to write a general 
conclusion. One thing, however, is becoming more obvious; irrespective of pessimistic 
or optimistic predictions, it can be argued that uncontrolled workers' action against 
privatisation is likely to determine future developments. In fact, after the government 
announced a new austerity programme on 5 April 1994, including extensive privatization 
and programmes of closure, the responses of unions have been very striking. Most 
unions have started organising marches and demonstrations against government policies. 
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(iv) Conclusion. 
In this chapter the econotnlc and political changes and institutional changes and 
constraints and, more importantly, their impact on Turkish unions have been discussed. 
It can be argued that Turkish unions have faced a great number of challenges, not only 
because of changes in internal developments in economic and political structures, but 
also due to international economic pressure and the growth of competition in world 
markets. 
Therefore, Turkish uruons have become a problem for the state and employers. 
However, unions have also been regarded as democratic elements to display to 
European partners in consideration of the application to the Ee. That is why, legal and 
institutional rules prevented the complete erosion of the union movement in Turkey. 
This is also because the purpose of the Turkish governments was not only to stabilise its 
problematic democracy, which is under heavy international pressure, but also to control 
inflation and the budget deficits through wide public sector agreements with unions. 
As regards anti-union legislation, the 1983 legislation presents the government and 
employers with all the resources and all the necessary excuse for containing trade union 
movement. On the other hand, the absence of all effective sanctions against those who 
attack trade union freedoms makes it very dangerous for the workers to exercise the 
remaining freedoms because of the economic situation in Turkey and the lack of any 
protection against redundancies and unemployment. What type of trade union freedoms 
can there be when there is no real protection for the workers, and as long as there is 
mass unemployment and no unemployment benefits? It is becoming more and more 
obvious that the full exercise of trade union freedoms can only be achieved by 
completely changing the legislation, and the 1982 constitution, not only the chapter on 
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trade umon rights but also the more general clauses, and the very spirit of the 
constitution itself 
After a coalition government was formed by the centre right True Path Party (DYP) and 
the left-of-centre Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) on 20 October 1991, the 
minister of labour (25), who is an SHP deputy, proposed amendments including a job 
security system, unemployment insurance and civil servants' unions. However, the 
government has made no progress in bringing labour legislation into line with the 
principles of freedom of association. There is no doubt that the absence of basic 
freedoms for trade unions and workers reflects badly on a government which claims to 
have brought Turkey into the ranks of democratic nations and which is currently seeking 
to join the European Community. 
It is worth mentioning that by only concentrating on the government anti-union 
legislations, TURK-IS is missing the key fact that Turkish trade unions were attacked in 
several ways, especially by the governments' "Thatcherite" monetarist policies. In fact, in 
real terms, anti-labour legislation, as it has been seen in other European countries, has 
been part of anti-union policies of the governments. In short, to achieve the 
deunionisation of workers, the government and employers, apart from the vast resources 
provided by the legislation, do not miss any opportunity to undermine Turkish trade 
unionism, which is now linked to the efforts of privatisation, cultural and ideological 
offensives and new collective bargaining and employers' practices. 
As far as the changing nature of collective bargaining is concerned, it seems very 
complicated to suggest a general trend in collective bargaining and the new role of 
unions within this system. It can be argued that due to worsening economic and political 
conditions, the institutionalisation of conflict through collective bargaining is still valid 
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and a national consensus might be urged by the governments and employers. The 
centralisation trend in collective arrangements in the public sector in the 1980s presents 
a good example for this development. However, more recent developments through a 
different form of decentralisation at micro level in the private sector seems a major 
obstacle for the centralisation trend. 
The attempts at privatization in Turkey also resemble some general trends in Europe, 
where it has been widely discussed with reference to the UK case with its focus on neo-
liberalism or Thatcherism and the association of an ideological and political campaign 
against the public sector, mainly concentrated on radical anti-unionism. However, in the 
Turkish case it would be wrong to talk about an explicit fundamental anti-unionism 
strategy. Government strategy was, initially, to focus on the question of the 
"inefficiency", "uncompetitiveness" or "unprofitability" of public sector companies so as 
to defend privatization as the only way out of the structural crisis of the Turkish 
economy. The privatization process in recent years can also be regarded as part of the 
ideological offensive of Turkish capital and government to weaken the trade unions. 
In short, the main question is whether the unions can strategically organise resistance 
against these changes or collaborate in the modification of industrial relations patterns. 
In this sense, the other critical questions are whether the government seeks 
"compromise" for a more productive environment or tries to adopt a strategy of "labour 
exclusion" policies. After responding to these questions, the next questions might be 
whether trade unions can respond to the pressure for change by mobilising workers' 
resistance or can they participate to influence the nature of the new strategies? 
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NOTES: 
1) According to Central Bank publications (1982), the foreign debt stood at 13 
billion Dollars in 1978. 
2) Ian Lagergren, Chief of the International Labour Standards Departments in ILO, 
went to Turkey to prepare a report for the examination of the complaints of 
alleged infringement of trade union rights submitted by the World Confederation 
of Labour, the World Federation of Labour, the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions and a number of other trade union organisations against the 
government of Turkey (Report on direct contacts mission to Turkey, Geneva, 
August 1982). 
3) A personal interview with Mustafa Basoglu, the president of the health workers' 
union and the general secretary of TURK-IS at the time of the interview (29 
March 1993). 
4) A personal interview with Bulent Kupeli, a research assistant for TURK-IS (1 
April 1993). 
5) A personal interview with Aziz Celik, responsible for education department in 
the Glass workers' union (Kristal-Is )(2 April 1993). 
6) Various reports of the committee on freedom and association and of the 
committee of experts on the application of conventions and recommendations of 
the ILO concerning Turkey since 1980. 
7) This information was received as a result of a visit to the Ministry of Labour in 
Ankara. A number of officials were interviewed at the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security's research, planning and co-ordination section and the section on 
trade union affairs. 
8) A personal interview with the president of employers' confederation (TISK), 
Refik Baydur. He said that although no legislative change is necessary, if it 
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happens, it should be done m consideration of "national conditions" (11 
November 1993). 
9) A personal interview with Yildirim Koc , the consultant of the president in 
TURK-IS, and responsible of workers' education in the Construction and 
Building workers' union (Yol-Is) (30 April 1993). 
10) After 20 years important progress between Turkey and the EC, Turkey will join 
a customs union. The trade barriers are scheduled to be lifted in 1995 which is 
likely to mark the most important change in Turkey's business environment. 
Those sectors of industry which are most vulnerable to import competition are 
under strong pressure. 
11) A personal interview with Nilgun Kaner, a research assistant and also responsible 
for the women's section in the Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber workers' union 
(Petrol-Is) (1 November 1993). 
12 ) Various collective agreements examples signed in different industries such as 
textile, paper, cement, ceramic and glass, metal, shipbuilding and construction 
show that this sort of committee has been recently included in negotiation. 
13) A personal interview with Ismail Hakki Kurt, responsible for education seminar 
for workers in the Defence Industry workers' union (Harb-Is) (26 October 
1993). 
14) A personal interview with Tugrul Kutatkudobilik, the director of industrial 
relations KOC Holding A.S (22 October 1993). 
15) A personal interview with Vefik Evin, the vice president of the Metal Employers' 
organisation (MESS) (8 September 1993). 
16) In 1991 the share of the EC in OECD foreign investment in Turkey accounted 
for half of total foreign investment in Turkey: U.K., 15,4%; Germany, 8,80/0; 
Netherlands 9%; France 8%; Italy 7%. The major investing countries of the EC 
with respects to the numbers of firms are Germany (343) firms, the UK (156) 
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firms and the Netherlands (80) firms. The number of firms ofEC origin increased 
more than twelvefold (from 58 firms to 722 firms) in the 1980s, while the 
number of non-EC firms increased over fifteen times (from 69 firms to 1,090). 
The service sector have attracted the most investors, accounting for 67% of all 
foreign capital companies, followed by manufacturing with 28%. However, 
where investment is concerned, manufacturing leads with 49.3%, services follow 
with 43.6%, agriculture at 4.7% and mining at 2.40/0 a long way behind. The 
leading sub-sectors within these categories are iron and steel, automotive and 
chemicals in manufacturing and, in services, tourism, banking, and trade. 
1 7) This was particularly evident during the 1991 miners strike between the president 
of the General Mine workers' union (Genel Maden-Is), Semsi Denizer and prime 
minister, Yildirim Akbulut (Karakas 1992). 
18) A personal interview with Sukran Ketenci, the most famous journalist in labour 
relations in Turkey (21 October 1993). 
19) For more detailed information about the role of SEEs in the development of 
Turkish economy see Korkut Boratav and Ergun Turkcan (1993), Turkiye de 
sanayilesmenin yeni boyutlari ve KIT ler, Iktisat politikasi secenekleri 1, Turk 
Tarihi Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, Ikinci baski, Istanbul. 
20) This information is based on a seminar organised by DISKIBANK-SEN on 9 
October 1993. Academics like Prof. Mumtaz Soysal (who is currently appointed 
as foreign minister), Prof Izettin Onder, Prof. Yakup Kepenek and Journalist, 
Sukran Ketenci expressed their opinion on the government's privatization 
programs. 
21) In general there is a lack of union publications on union responses against the 
privatization programmes. However, among few most useful publications see 
(Petrol-Is 1989) "Ozellestirme Uzerine" , Aralik, Istanbul and (Hava-Is 1993) 
"Kuresellesme ve Ozellestirme" 15 Eylul Istanbul and also see Tek Gida-Is 
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(1993), Tek Gida-Is Dergisi sayi 54, Deri-Is (1992) Deri-Is Sendikasi 24. Olagan 
genel kurul calisma raporu 3-4 Ekim 1992 Istanbul, Kristal-Is (1992) Kristal-Is 
sendikasi 11. Genel kuru124-25 Temmuz, Istanbul and finally Petrol-Is Sendikasi 
21. Merkez Genel Calisma raporu. 
22) A personal interview with Halil Yedibela, a lawyer in the Petroleum, Chemical 
and Rubber workers' union (petrol-Is) (19 October 1993). 
23) A personal interview with Attila Aycin, the president of the Airways workers' 
union, (29 September 1993). 
24) A total of 115 companies will be privatized in the next few years (Iktisat 1994) 
Iktisat Dergisi sayi 348 Nisan. The government has announced that 44 and 71 
companies will be sold in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Out of these, the Ciller 
government has declared urgent privatization of ten large companies, Sumer 
Holding, Petkim, Petlas, Turban, Testas, Halic Tersanesi, Et-balik, TZDK, 
DMO, Tekel in 1994 and thirteen other large companies, Yem Sanayi, Erdemir, 
Tupras, Petrol ofisi, THY, Turban, Havas, Deniz nakliyat, Ditas, Sumerbank, 
Etibank, TEK and PTT in 1995 (petrol-Is 1994) Petrol-Is dergisi Nisan. 
25) A personal interview with the Minister of Labour, Mehmet Mogultay , during the 
interview, he stressed the need for changes in labour legislation particularly in the 
issues like the right to organise for civil servants, job security and unemployment 
insurance. For him, the major obstacles for legislative changes come from his 
party's coalition partner (DYP) and other conservative parties in the parliament. 
Mr. Mogultay's proposed amendments on the legislation have been often 
criticised both by employers and unions (1 0 November 1993). 
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CHAPTER 8 
TURKISH TRADE UNIONS' RESPONSES IN A HOSTILE 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF TURK-IS 
In comparison with the 1960s and 70s, in the 1980s and 90s the unions have been 
operating in a more hostile environment since the military intervention of 1980. The 
changing economic, political and social climate combined with the more restrictive 
legislative framework and the hostile attitudes of the governments and employers in the 
past and current decade has undermined the Turkish trade union movement. All these 
developments have eroded the role of Turkish trade unions in industrial relations due to 
the decline in their industrial and political influence. 
However, these adverse strategic attacks against unions seem to be important in shaping 
unions' policies and strategies. Therefore, attention here will be paid to the analysis of 
changes in union objectives, means and struggles against the hostile external 
environment. Also, in this part it will be argued that in the Turkish case the strategies or 
policies adopted by the unions have been influenced through the impact of external 
forces (due to the hostile attitudes of the government and employers) and changing 
behaviour of union leadership (due to their political orientations, international support 
and pressures from below). In this context, the responses of Turkish unions to the 
external environment in the 1980s and 90s have not systematically developed as a 
consistent, cohesive and integrated set of strategies. It is rather that union leaders at 
national level, mainly due to the intensified pressure from the rank and file, have adopted 
policies to meet the challenges of the critical periods and to carry out day-to-day 
relations with management. As this study attempts to demonstrate, the decisions of the 
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national leadership of Turkish unions have been subject to a restricted range of choices, 
mainly affected through both the impact of external forces and their own unions and 
workers' behaviour. Therefore, the options available for Turkish unions can differ from 
those of unions in other countries. That is why unions' policies in Turkey have been 
widely shaped as a result of inter-action between the external environment and unions 
own internal rationality. 
(i) The 1980 Military Intervention Period. 
It can be argued that in the 1960s and 70s the ruling class sought the incorporation of 
trade unions in order to implement this economic and political policies. However, during 
the period of military government between 1980 and 1983, trade unions were openly 
attacked by declaring them the cause of economic and political crises. Until the general 
elections on 6 November 1983 the three years of military intervention gave rise to a 
substantial shift in the balance of class forces against the Turkish working class. 
During this period the working class lost its organisations and remained passive because 
of the repression and political restrictions imposed by the military government. Although 
some resistance, including the slowdowns and lunch boycotts, were reported at the large 
factories, Arcelik, Cevizli Tekel, Phillips, Nasas and Profilo in Istanbul in mid-1982, in 
general the Turkish working class and their organisations had to stay silent (1). 
In a interview, a shop steward at the factory of Arcelik said that "during the military 
dictatorship, things were changed .. it was difficult for us to direct industrial action. .. 
we and workers were under close inspection. .. imagine employers also employed some 
ex-military offiCials as managers ... "(2). 
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It is obvious that the military made it extremely difficult for workers and trade unions to 
raise their grievances against management at the workplace. This meant that at both 
national and workplace level the labour movement was under repression and the 
resistance of workers was limited. In this context, the anti-labour constitution and labour 
legislation were prepared to limit trade union power, particularly in order to implement 
the stabilisation policies prepared by International Monetary Fund (IMP). This can be 
clearly seen from the continuation of the economic policy pursued by the civilian 
government after the coup. Therefore, in the 1980s the ruling class has not needed co-
operation with unions; it has chosen the way in which trade unions have been 
undermined by several legal restrictions and monetarist economic policies. It is now 
necessary to raise the questions of the reaction of TURK-IS against the military 
government of 1980 and the nature of the strategic option TURK-IS applied to 
counteract these economic, political and social developments. 
When the military came to power, the president of TURK-IS at the time, Ibrahim 
Denizcier, sent a message to the leader of the coup, Kenan Evren stating that 
"TURK-IS believes that the Turkish military forces intervened in the country for the 
peace and safety of Turkish people ... the Turkish labour movement welcomes your 
statement about changes in the constitution returning democracy again and protecting 
the rights of workers ... " (TURK-IS 1980:1). 
Thus, it is quite clear that TURK-IS openly gave its support to the 1980 military 
intervention. This support was more obvious as the general secretary of the 
confederation Sadik Side took office as minister of social security in the military , , 
government. The first reaction to this situation was external. In November 1981, the 
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International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) suspended TURK-IS 
membership. On the other hand, the member unions in general did not seem to be uneasy 
that the general secretary was holding two positions both in the confederation and in the 
military government. 
Orhan Balta, the president ofTEKGIDA-IS and one of the ex-general secretaries of the 
confederation, explained the silence of members: 
"TURK-IS and its members hoped that once democracy was re-established, various 
restrictions on trade unions would be lifted.. in this process we thought that our 
general secretary could play an important role ... " (3). 
However, on September 27, 1980 the military government declared that "unions, 
mainly, members of TURK-IS are to continue their activities in compliance with 
democratic principles. Yet, those who exploit the workers, who wish to direct the 
workers their own ways and misuse trade union rights, will not be given any chance" 
(Cumhuriyet:7, 27 September 1980). 
Shortly after this statement, TURK-IS warned its affiliates to direct their organisational 
activities in accordance with the military government's declaration. In fact, in those days 
any union meetings had not only to be approved but also closely supervised by the 
government's officials (4). Furthermore, the degree of freedom TURK-IS's members 
facing varied in different parts of the country. For example, while the congress of unions 
were banned for more than a year in Istanbul, the key industry centre, in Ankara only 
three union congresses were allowed (Financial Times 1981). 
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The restrictive policies of the military government on trade unions continued as the time 
passed. In February 1982, the government further forbade unions and all professional 
organisations from setting up any link with their international affiliates unless they 
received prior permission from the martial law commanders (TURK-IS 1983). As a 
result of these developments, the leadership of TURK-IS seemed to lose hope in what 
could be obtained from the military government. The president of TURK-IS at the time, 
Ibrahim Denizcier, made several visits to the prime minister, Bulent Ulusu, to stress 
workers' and unions' concern over restrictions placed on the rights of trade unions. 
Particularly when the first draft of new labour legislation was published, most members 
of the confederation began to raise their voice. Eventually, the Presidents' Council (an 
informal organ composed of the presidents of all the affiliated national unions) decided 
to take up an action plan including organising a number of summit meetings with 
government and collaboration with International Democratic Organisations particularly, 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (TURK-IS 1983). TURK-IS began to 
make several complaints against the government concerning allegations of violations of 
trade union rights in Turkey to the ILO and European trade union organisations against 
the government (5). 
Interviews with the top leaders of TURK-IS unions, and some leaders of local unions 
and a number of workers' representatives who also experienced the military years in 
Turkey, demonstrated that as the military government came to power on 12 September 
1980, most of the union leaders at national and local levels welcomed this intervention 
on the grounds that like the 1971 military intervention the coup would destroy the rival 
unions and TURK-IS would be only labour confederation in the country. However, this 
dream did not become true when the 1982 constitution was declared. The constitution 
included anti-democratic principles as far as the rights of trade unions were concerned. 
It was evident in the speech of the ex president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz (who 
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became president in the 12th general congress 24-28 May 1982, after the military 
intervention); "] should admit that] could not guess how much democracy and the 
freedom of and rights of workers would be demolished" (TURK-IS, on ucuncu genel 
kurul tutanagi:7). 
During the 13th general of congress TURK-IS on 21-25 December 1983, some 
representatives of member unions, such as Behzat Akdogan from Vol-Is and Ali Ekber 
Guvenc from Basin-Is, condemned the 1982 constitution and the new labour legislation 
(TURK-IS 1983). It is a fact that particularly after this congress, TURK-IS's leadership 
concentrated on putting pressure on the government to provide some changes in the 
labour legislation. But, without any serious actions at the workplace, these attempts had 
to fail. On the other hand, the leaders of TURK-IS and of its member unions also did not 
tend to produce or organise any protest against the attitudes of the government. 
(ii) Changing Strategies in TURK-IS Unions Traditional Stand. 
After three years of military government, the option available for TURK-IS was the 
traditional one which has always encouraged it reliance on good relations with 
government. In this context, the leadership of TURK-IS tried to have good relations 
with the new civilian government, particularly by lobbying government ministers. In 
other words, while a new industrial relations system was being established in Turkey in 
1983, there was no change witnessed in the policies and strategies of trade unions and of 
TURK-IS. The confederation carried on the same policies. Particularly, the "above-
party" policy of the confederation remained unchanged. This is also to say that it kept its 
traditional policy of "dialogue" with government. 
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On the other hand, the general economic and political policies of the government against 
labour organisations were not the same. Unlike the labour policies of the governments in 
the 1960s and 70s, in the 1980s the attitude of government in relations with unions was 
no longer a tolerant one. This was mainly due to the significant shift in the economic and 
political approaches of the government. The reluctance of the government to respond to 
crucial calls by TURK-IS for a "dialogue" was particularly evident during the 
conservative Ozal government. At the same time, there were significant discontents 
within the working class, especially concerning the issues of wages and working 
conditions. 
Broadly speaking, the government's legislation particularly in the 1980s, resulted in a 
more hostile environment and the loss of influence for unionism. Legislation dispensed 
with the ways in which unions could act more like social partners. They were no longer 
consulted by government, nor were their agreements or co-operation on economic and 
political policies sought. Within TURK-IS there was a more general confusion and 
uncertainty about how to respond to the problems of a radical challenge from above by 
the government combined with the apparent ambivalence of the membership below. 
Individual unions within TURK-IS agreed with the need for "unity" to oppose the 
government's policies. 
There was, however, no common agreement about how to fight it, why to resist it or the 
material means to commit unions to a common strategy to oppose it. This was mainly 
due to different political outlooks of union leadership and the different interest of unions 
organising different types of workers. The problem for TURK-IS was how to challenge 
the external pressure and on what basis it could be challenged. Like in Germany, in 
Turkey the policies and strategies of trade unions can be understood by "etatism", a 
willingness to rely on the state for the solution of general problems in industrial 
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relations. In this respect, traditionally Turkish uruons have usually been willing to 
maintain co-operative and orderly relations with governments. 
However, particularly in the mid-1980s TURK-IS began to re-examine its stance after 
several talks with government about the legislation ended up without any concession. In 
other words, TURK-IS came to the view that it should reconsider its previous 
dependence on government co-operation, and seek instead to produce new tactics 
against the government' policies. In fact, the government's anti-union practices further 
made it clear that the government strategies would offer few concessions, even to right-
wing and moderate unionists in TURK-IS, which would allow them to argue that 
establishing good relations with government worked. 
Eventually, union leaders felt they had to do something about it. Therefore, small 
ineffective meetings organised by TURK-IS in various part of the country, Istanbul, 
Izmir and Bursa took place (TURK-IS 1985). It can be argued that TURK-IS pursued a 
cautious strategy in relation to the government to carry out union activities within the 
bound of "legality". During the period between 1984-1988, TURK-IS and its member 
unions employed more moderate action strategies against the hostile environment which 
were as follows: (a) carrying out various lobbying activities against anti-labour 
legislation by demanding changes in the 1983 legislation; (b) seeking collaboration with 
international bodies such as ILO, ETUC and ICFTU; and ( c) making efforts to organise 
a series of summit meetings with the government as well as the ministers. However, as 
part of TURK-IS's "soft" attitude against government there was no attempt to 
encourage the unions and workers to take industrial action. In this climate, three summit 
meetings in 1984 and 1985 were held between the government and TURK-IS officials 
(TURK-IS 1993). 
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The attempts at "dialogue" with the government did not produce any significant result 
for unions. While the reluctance of the government to enter into a dialogue with TURK-
IS continued, this policy resulted in the largely acceptable assumption, particularly 
among social democratic factions of the confederation, that TURK-IS had pursued the 
line of least resistance against the anti-union policies of the government. Therefore, 
during the 14th general congress of the confederation, inter-union opposition against the 
leadership of TURK-IS was witnessed. The social democrat faction accused the 
executive committee of the confederation of following the traditional policies which 
were no longer successful. The opposition circles including Petrol-Is, Yol-Is, Deri-Is, 
Hava-Is and Maden-Is urged more militant strategies such as co-ordination in public 
sector collective bargaining arrangements, resorting to the strikes-weapon when it is 
necessary and creating a grass-roots movement at the workplace. Moreover, the 
delegates of 17 regions belonging to different unions asked for more radical responses to 
the general attitudes of the government. 
However, the opposition movement against TURK-IS administration failed at the end of 
the congress. Sevket Yilmaz backed by the right-wing and moderate faction of the 
confederation was reelected (TURK-IS 1986). Although TURK-IS organised the six 
open-air meetings in 1986 to protest against the government policies, there were no 
serious changes observed in TURK-IS strategies until 1987. The government's strict 
stabilisation policies, particularly on wage issues, combined with its labour exclusion 
policies at national level forced TURK-IS, despite its traditional policy of "above-
politics", to oppose the Motherland Party (ANAP) during the 1987 general election. 
Before the election the president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz said that" Workers would 
not vote for the party which destroyed all workers' rights" (Cumhuriyet, 8 August 
1986). This was the first sign of a change in the confederation's stand with regard to 
politics. 
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Therefore, it might be suggested that the confederation and its member unions began to 
use their "political power" as an important weapon. This policy was strengthened by also 
extending the confederation's international relations, because Turkish unions became 
aware of the new reality that since Turkey had made an application for full membership 
to the EC, the Turkish government had become vulnerable on issues like democracy and 
human rights. Therefore, by establishing new communication channels with international 
bodies the confederation and individual unions aimed at putting "international political 
pressure" on Turkish governments. This strategy worked for unions and forced the 
government to give promises for necessary changes in the labour legislation in order to 
bring workers and union rights to the level of International standards, mainly, those of 
the ILO. Therefore, the key policy after mid-1980 seemed to abandon the soft attitudes 
and adopt new tactics based on the use of "political pressure" at both national and 
international platforms. 
In this period, TURK-IS made several complaints concerning allegations of violations of 
trade union rights in Turkey to the ILO and European trade union organisation against 
the government (TURK-IS 1989). The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
also urged the European Institutions and governments to exert some pressure on the 
Turkish government in order to have trade unionists released from prison, establish 
without delay a democratic system in Turkey and restore normal trade union rights. 
The Turkish government was also condemned by the ILO many times. According to 
various ILO reports, the committee on Freedom of association examined the substance 
of similar complaints 17 times between 1981 and 1990. As a result of national as well as 
international pressure, in 1986 the government amended some provisions of the 1983 
legislation with the stated aim of bringing them into line with the principles of freedom 
of association. However, the amendments in the legislation were regarded as cosmetic 
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changes without any significant impact on real practices. On the other hand, workers' 
discontent began to grow as a result of the austerity policy pursued by the government. 
The government continued to tum a deaf ear to all trade union protest and did not seem 
to be prepared to remove soon the restrictive labour provisions from Turkey's 1982 
Constitution and amend labour legislation to bring them into line with ILO standards. 
The strategy which had been followed by the TURK-IS and its members against the 
government tended to undergo a crucial transformation due to the spontaneous 
resurgence of the rank and file movement as a reaction to the rapid decline in the 
purchasing power of the workers salaries. The spontaneous industrial actions and 
protests took place at the workplace level without union control. In some cases, there 
were sit-ins at the companies to protest against the managers as well as union officials 
(Petrol-Is 1993). An increase in the discontents of workers urged unions to reconsider 
their position in relation to government and employers policies. This development also 
caused the leadership of TURK-IS to change the confederation's stand against the 
government. This is evident in a statement of the president of TURK-IS, Sevket Yilmaz 
that 
" for about two years we have pursued the policy of "dialogue ", that is why we have 
been accused of being ineffective ... the government miscalculate our silence, while we 
are asking for "dialogue ", they thought that we do not have power anymore due to the 
legal restrictions ... in 35 years of TURK-IS's history we did not go to the streets, now we 
are forced to go out andfightfor our democratic rights ... " (TURK-IS 1987:1). 
In this sense, the leaders of TURK-IS were under heavy rank and file pressure. 
Basically, they faced two crucial problems. First, there were still disagreements among 
different functions about the way in which TURK-IS should act. The question was that 
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TURK-IS was traditionally based on "economic" or "bread-and-butter issues usually in 
line with "Business type of unionism" within the legal framework. Therefore, right-wing 
unions within the confederation such as Dokgemi-Is, Teksif and Tekgida-Is warned 
TURK-IS leadership against slipping into a dangerous area between "legality" and 
"illegality", and urged them on more moderate policies. On the other hand, the social 
democratic faction went further in its claim that "the general strike" may be needed in 
response to the anti-union policies of the government and to prevent the erosion of the 
confidence of workers and to maintain the cohesion and unity of the union intact (6). 
In fact, there was a growing anger among other interest groups such as civil servants, 
some professional organisations (Doctors, Architects and Academics), human rights 
organisations, student unions, farmers, small shopkeepers and, more importantly, 
opposition parties against the economic and social policies of the government. This 
meant that conditions outside the labour movement were also favourable. Although 
there was a widely-shared view about the need for a change in the strategies of the 
confederation among all factions, the significant question was still whether the wage-
struggle should be combined with an anti-government political struggle. However, 
further developments between the government and TURK-IS associated with a growing 
pressure from "below" forced the confederation to change its traditional stand in favour 
of more radical policies. On the other hand, the question of "legality" in the face of 
"illegal actions" (most unions were cautious about it) was secured by a strategic 
manoeuvre by creating a new slogan: "We are fighting for Western pluralist democracy 
with full rights for the unions" (Tercuman, 22 May 1987). 
This vital slogan was often used by umon leaders, particularly when they were 
threatened by government officials for breaking the legal procedures by being actively 
involved in "politics". It was on the basis of this particular question that the year proved 
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to be a turning point for Turkish unions. The wage struggle of unions combined with the 
new line of political activity under the new title of "demand for democracy II continued 
after 1987. These developments not only demonstrated considerable changes in the 
traditional corporatist image of TURK-IS but also proved its political strength while 
taking independent political action in relation with the ruling class. This was more 
evident when TURK-IS's unions stood up against the conservative party during the 
referendum for the political freedom of the pre-1980 political leaders in 1988 and local 
elections in 1989. 
In short, the new emphasis on "democracy" can be regarded as a move from "pure 
business unionism" or "bread and butter unionism ll towards more "political unionism". In 
other words, there were considerable changes in the unions' commitment to business 
unionism over the period. It might be argued that there were some recent significant 
changes in the style of bargaining. In terms of the time and process of collective 
bargaining, a successful co-ordination for collective bargaining arrangements in the 
public sector was achieved under TURK-IS's supervision. Collective bargaining for 
600,000 public sector workers was conducted between TURK-IS leadership and the 
ministers and prime ministers in the last decade (TURK-IS 1989). This development 
towards the "centralisation" of the collective bargaining process might allow us to talk 
about "political economism" in the public sector. In this context, it is possible to suggest 
that while the unions still acted as Business unions or as a Turkish type of IIAmerican 
unionism", in as much as they proceeded to defend and improve their members' 
economic interests through collective bargaining they also searched for II social 
partnership" and "co-operation" with the government, at least in the public sector. There 
have been clear signs in unions demands for the new agenda, particularly, for more non-
pay issues such as demands for more employee involvement, health and safety 
committees etc. (petrol-Is 1993). 
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Generally the bargaining agenda has not been widened in practice. On the other hand, 
some unions, such as Laspetkim-Is, Kristal-Is and Metal-Is, which usually deal with the 
multinational companies, have recently agreed with their employers to improve industrial 
efficiency and to implement the new technologies (7). This also reflects the growing 
emphasis on "the social partnership" at workplace level. Therefore, the unions' agenda 
seem to have varied union to union, mostly, in terms of the sectors (public or private), 
industries and the nature of companies (small, large or multinational). 
In general it is unsafe to argue that TURK-IS and its members underwent an equally far-
reaching shift in their political stance. In fact, their political composition was relatively 
stable in the last decade, although the social democratic factions succeeded in gaining 
more seats in the executive committees of most unions. In the last general congress of 
TURK-IS for the first time in the confederation's history, unions with different political 
affiliations came together and changed the long-standing executive committee. As a 
result the group called themselves "reformist" was elected on 13-12-1992 (TURK-IS 
1993). 
This can be regarded as an important move towards a "common agreement" or 
"solidarity" among unions for the emergence of the most moderate or radical solutions 
to the anti-labour policies of the governments and employers have appeared as the 
product of the existing leadership's realisation that "something has to be done" if they 
want to secure their unions economic and political influence in the future. 
According to some academics like Toker Dereli, Nusret Ekin and Gulten Kutal in 
Turkey (8), this changes in the attitudes of the confederation was most probably due to 
the successful inter-group opposition from the social democratic faction within TURK-
IS. However, in addition to this view, one subsidiary reason can also be given for the 
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explanation of changes in unions' attitudes, that there has been substantial development 
in the internal democracy within the individual unions in the 1980s. According to the 
general consultant for the president of TURK-IS and education official for Yol-Is 
, 
Yildirim Koc, There have been 48 percent changes in the leadership of branches on local 
level, 49 percent changes in the leadership of unions on national level and 32 percent 
changes in the president of national unions in the 1980s. Regarding the last point, it also 
shows that 32 percent of the council of the presidents within TURK-IS has changed in 
the same year. In most cases during the elections the social democrat candidates were 
able to come to power in unions' executive committees. For example, in the two largest 
unions, Harb-Is and Deniz-Is, all executive committees were changed in favour of social 
democrats. The same development was observed during the elections of local branch 
officials and of delegates (9). 
While workers and individual uruons have intensified the conflict against the 
government, TURK-IS has not only publicly supported them but also made efforts to 
plan and co-ordinate the activities. In connection with this, another major development 
within the confederation has been a move from "decentralisation" to "centralisation" 
particularly in decision-making processes. In other words, with regard to union 
government, the decision-making process, particularly in general and collective 
bargaining policies, has taken place at national level. A shift towards much more 
formalised and centrally structured systems of decision-making was partly due to the 
1983 legislation, because the 1983 Act introduced detailed and formal regulations 
concerning both the calling and authorising of collective bargaining arrangements and 
industrial action. 
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However, the impact of legislation varied union to union and union responses were 
sometimes dissimilar in a manner consistent with their democratic and political 
orientation and rationalities. This can be clearly seen from the major strikes as well as 
collective bargaining arrangements. For example, in some cases, particularly during the 
strikes, some unions gave greater authority and more resources at the regional level of 
organisation. This was evident in the 1988 strike in the leather industry in Kazlicesme 
and the 1991 strike in mining in Zonguldak (10). It is worthwhile mentioning that in 
dealing with the restrictive legislation itself unions tried, as far as was possible to act 
within "the legal framework". 
Although TURK-IS's umons displayed a "uniformity" in their response to external 
pressure, it does not mean that they always shared the same opinion about the major 
issues. For example, unions' statements and policies did not demonstrate one single trend 
in their reaction to the privatisation process. Right-wing unions within TURK-IS, like 
Turk-Metal, Teksif, Dok Gemi-Is, saw the privatization programmes as a form of 
economic rationality, whereas social democrats and moderate factions of TURK-IS, 
such as Hava-Is, Deri-Is, Petrol-Is, Basisen, Turk Harb-Is, Turkiye Belediye-Is, regard 
this move as a politically motivated phenomenon. Yol-Is (1988) stated that the SEEs 
would be sold off in favour of domestic and foreign capitals. Harb-Is was against 
privatization on the ground that this is a strategic choice of government to undermine 
wages and social rights. Belediye-Is argued that the SEEs should not be privati sed but 
reformed or rehabilitated. Tek Gida-Is also suggested that workers can buy the shares of 
the SEEs through "employee stock ownership plans". In contrast, Petrol-Is's reaction is 
one of the strongest: while the union calls for a "general strike" against the privatisation 
process, its leader, Munir Ceylan stated that ''privatization is a democracy problem in 
Turkey because, if a few monopolist capitalists control economic activities, they ti'ould 
also control the social and democratic developments" (petrol-Is 1989: 13). 
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Finally, TURK-IS's reaction against privatization is rather puzzling. While the general 
consultant of TURK-IS's president, Yildirim Koc, argues that "not only unions but also 
the welfare state is the target" (Aydinlik, 27 Temmuz 1993), the council of TURK-IS 
presidents declares that "we should not hurry to fall in a position to indicate whether we 
are completely against privatization or not" (Cumhuriyet, 9 Kasim 1993). In the 15th 
general congress of TURK-IS, the executive committee stated that they would accept 
privatization, if workers were not affected (TURK-IS 1989, TURK-IS 1994). 
It seemed that some members of TURK-IS were concerned about the need for unions to 
focus their attempts on influencing the form of privatization, rather than, opposing it. 
While TURK-IS does not seem to have made any strategic decision against the process, 
among member unions, however, the unity was provided in consideration of the 
possibility of lay-offs and losing members following privatization. 
It should also be mentioned that the methods of choosing industrial action were subject 
to the democratic processes and political considerations of the particular unions and 
their leaders involved. Some of TURK-IS leaders have been interrogated by the general 
prosecutor and subjected to occasional harassment for these activities. 
In the context of Turkey, the determinants of union' tactics and policies have had as 
much to do with ideological and political orientations of the individual unions. In 
addition, in terms of the sectors (public or private), the unions can pose different 
responses. For example, regardless of their political motives, most Turkish unions in the 
public sector have adopted more militant policies against the government's restructuring 
and privatisation programme. In short, the question is: how can ideological and political 
motives influence unions' policies and tactics and how can sectoral and enterprise 
realities also condition the responses of different unions? It should be mentioned that 
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TURK-IS's ideologies and policies have been shaped in a situation of trade umon 
pluralism. In other words, different industrial unions with the ideological differences 
belong to the same central. 
The Turkish case shows that while umons maintain their political and ideological 
positions, they can also pose practical positions and responses to the external pressures. 
Political differences can be minimised within the central organisation sphere of action. 
Yet, there can still be tendencies of continuity/discontinuity and convergence/divergence 
in policies and tactics in response to the government and employers' strategies. In this 
context, we can briefly focus on the situation of four members of TURK-IS, Petrol-Is, 
Genel Maden-Is, Turk Metal-Is and Teg Gida-Is (although all of which operate both in 
the public and private sectors, their political motives are distinguished in terms of 
conservative and social democrat discourses). 
a) The Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco, and Food Processing Industries Workers' 
Union (TEK GIDA-IS). 
Tek Gida-Is is one of the significant conservative unions within TURK-IS in particular 
in terms of size and superior financial resources. The union's leadership has traditionally 
relied on the governments and employers' sponsorship of the union development. Union 
leaders have focused on establishing a more unitary and vertical apparatus around the 
state economic enterprises. The vast majority of its member were employed in the public 
sector. In other words, the union's organising efforts until very recently largely included 
the public sector rather than the private sector. In fact, union's leadership has been 
dominated by few leaders in the last thirty years, who have been willing to moderate 
demands and to cooperate in policy implementation in the public sector in exchange for 
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grants of representational exclusiveness and formal consultation. Tek Gida-Is is also of 
importance in that until the 1980s the union's leadership influenced TURK-IS' general 
congress and leadership selection. Therefore, it also had a significant impact on the 
general policies of the confederation. In other words, the conservative and collaborative 
policies of Tek Gida-Is played a main role in delaying and containing TURK-IS' s 
radicalisation until recently. 
The state has become less interested in investing in the tobacco and food-processing 
industries in the 1980s. Multi national companies have begun to operate. Therefore, Tek 
Gida-Is had to revise its position and role with regard to labour relations in the state 
economic enterprises and the government's restructuring program. The key dilemma for 
the Tekgida-Is, as for the other public sector unions, was: with the restructuring of the 
public sector (with liberalisation and privatisation programmes), how to respond and 
organise the pursuit of centrally planned and organised campaigns against the 
government "commercialisation" efforts in the public sector. Although the union's stance 
in relation to political rationalities has remained the same, its policies and influence 
within TURK-IS appears to have changed. The key policies have been pursued which 
focus on the maintenance of organisational stability through expanding membership 
recruitment towards private sector and new education programmes for workers (11). 
In addition to these developments, Tek Gida-Is continued to defend and improve their 
members' sectional interests, particularly, pay and conditions, through collective 
bargaining; however, there have been some recent notable changes in the bargaining 
agenda. In terms of the bargaining agenda, collective bargaining has been widened to 
cover more non-pay issues including: job security, working hours, workers participation 
in management and some general workplace committees (worker'S health and industrial 
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safety committees, committees for exarrurung cases of job description changes, 
committees for organising workers' paid leave of absences, etc.) (12). 
In the 1980s and 90s the political composition of Tek Gida-Is has remained remarkably 
stable, it has continued to represent the right of TURK-IS. Although the union's 
ideological stance did not change, its general approach to industrial relations shifted in 
favour of more radical policies. The challenge for the union has been not only to 
improve the current conditions of existing members within its union but also to work to 
extend the struggle to those currently affected by the crises of the 1980s. Therefore, for 
the first time in TURK-IS' history Tekgida-Is' leaders did not try to exercise their 
influence and status to affect the leadership selection during the last congress of TURK-
IS, which would have allowed them to exclude social democrat rivals from top positions 
in the country's leading confederation. 
b) General Mine Workers' Union (GENEL MADEN-IS). 
The closing down of some mining industries has emerged as one of the major policies of 
the government in the generalliberalisation of the framework of economic regulation in 
the public sector. The miners' unions have historically had a strong political and 
ideological attachment to the state enterprise sector. The nucleus of the mine workers' 
union was the Turkish miners' federation, which was also known as a strong 
conservative union. The union also had a reputation for union bossism, corruption and 
wildcat strikes. Union officials used to seek for representational exclusiveness through 
forming collaborative relations with the state managers. 
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The union's headquarters is located in the biggest coal fields in Zonguldak. The key 
problem for the union has always been the tension between skilled ground workers and 
unskilled underground workers. Compared with underground workers, skilled workers 
had competitive advantage in pay and employment conditions in the 1960s and 70s. 
While underground workers recruited seasonally from the villages were suffering one of 
the highest rates of work-related accidents and fatalities in the world, they seemed to get 
a little benefit from the collective bargaining arrangements. These workers were kept 
isolated from the union's activities because of the leadership's common practice of 
appointing union representatives (shop stewards) among skilled workers instead of 
allowing their elections. Therefore, wildcat strikes witnessed in the 1960s and early 70s 
were caused by underground workers' discontent with both the state managers and 
union officials. 
However, in the hostile economic and political environment of the 1980s, combined with 
the government's factory closure down and privatisation programmes, the policy choices 
for the mine worker's union (Genel Maden-Is) seem to have posed a more direct 
challenge to government policies and strategies rather than accommodating them. Thus, 
the preoccupation displayed by Genel Maden-Is was the maintenance of organisational 
stability. It is significant to mention that Genel Maden-Is is one of the first unions which 
changed its political and democratic rationality through improving its internal 
democracy. The conservative outlook of the union was changed due to social democrat 
unionists' successes during the union's congress in the same period. 
The government's hostile attitude towards miners has marked a new orientation and role 
for the trade unions. As a result, Genel Maden-Is has defended the nationalised 
enterprises as significant resources for unions. It has considered unions positions in 
general in the state enterprise sector as strategic to their general well-being. The leaders 
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of Gene1 Maden-Is have questioned the character, practice and objectives of their 
organisations as policy options available during the 1960s and 70s have become 
inoperable during the 1980s and 90s. Genel Maden-Is has, therefore, addressed the need 
to adjust to new perspectives. In this regard, the national centre of the union and its 
branches have agreed on the key issues, including an affirmation of a democratic 
political agenda of individual and collective rights for workers and centrally controlled 
campaigns around political issues. 
Centrally determined policies, particularly, on the issues of closure of the mIllmg 
industries and privatisation of SEEs have been effective. This was evident during the 
famous 1991 miners' strike and after. This was basically achieved through establishing 
successful communication channels between local branches and the union's centre and 
solidaristic projects between skilled workers and underground workers. It is also 
convenient to talk about the decentralisation of decision-making processes, particularly 
during the major industrial actions in the same period (13). 
By bringing the key political issues on the agenda the successful leadership of Genel 
Maden-Is has become a good example for the other unions in the sense that they have 
set up a crucial link between the union and a whole community. They have also brought 
the lessons of the miners' struggle to the attention of workers in other sectors and 
industries. Therefore, during the "spring mobilisation" in late 1980, their struggle rapidly 
broadened, with other workers joining it. In short, the mine worker's union has 
responded to the pressure for change with more resistance, since the government has 
offered to the workers nothing in exchange for the economic and political "sacrifices". 
Genel Maden-Is has recently played a significant role in the reshaping the policies of 
TURK-IS. Its successful leader, Semsi Denizer, was elected as the general secretary of 
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TURK-IS at the last congress of the confederation. His influence on the radicalisation of 
TURK-IS is said to be important. 
c) Metal Industry and Allied Workers' Union (TURK-METAL). 
Turk Metal is one of the strongest conservative union within TURK-IS. Unlike the other 
conservative unions, it has undertaken a major expansion beyond the state economic 
enterprises. Turk Metal's executive committee has insisted on maintaining strict control 
over the local branches. This is probably because they want to preserve the hegemony of 
conservative unionists. The union's leaders consider their centralised organisation and 
bargaining practices as a ideal model of the Turkish unions. These leaders have been 
ideologically very close to the governments' national development project and they have 
been the most willing to compromise with the governments and employers. 
Turk Metal has succeeded in establishing a representative cartel in its industry. The main 
reasons for this can be given: firstly, union leaders have relied on assistance from public 
and private sector managers to secure their bargaining status. Second, centrally 
determined wage policies for the collective arrangements have produced relatively high 
wages and steady increase, particularly for automotive and manufacturing industries 
workers. These privileged workers group have helped to maintain low labour costs and 
conflict free relations in these industries. And, finally, they have also contributed to 
promote the development of private industry. 
On the other hand, Turk Metal has attempted to influence the ideological and political 
development of smaller unions like Saglik-Is, Seker-Is and Tez-Is by providing financial 
assistance and emergency strike funds. By doing this, the union's main concern has been 
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to strength their position and influence within TURK-IS in order to affect the 
confederation's general policies. They have also wanted to secure the right-wing 
positions in the confederation's executive committee. 
The changes due to the pressure of international competition and an increase in the 
number of multinational firms in the metal and manufacturing industries in the 1980s let 
Turk Metal revise its traditional policy towards labour-management relations. 
Particularly, the attempt of foreign firms and some large private companies to establish 
"union free employee relations" has forced the union to reconsider its policy and role in 
industrial relations. However, the union's response to the pressure for change seems to 
have been to adopt more moderate tactics. The union leaders in most of the union's 
publications have begun to use the terms like "modernisation" or "rationalisation" of 
their policies (Turk Metal 1993). 
The union's leaders believed that managers in the private sector are searching for "labour 
consensus" as a reaction to a productivity drive. In other words, workplace 
developments introduced by management have been regarded by them as an attempt to 
improve the productivity and competitivity of the sector rather than to bypass union 
organisation. Therefore, such policies, the adaptation of team working, quality circles 
and the extensive use of direct management-employee committees are welcomed by the 
leadership of Turk Metal. The new tactics and strategies of the union seem to have been 
responses pragmatically to management initiatives and they make accommodations in 
order to protect established representative cartel of the union in the metal and 
manufacturing industries. In short, unlike the other unions within the confederation, 
Turk Metal has adopted business-oriented policies with regards to the external pressure. 
This new direction has also allowed the union to introduce new individual services 
According to the union officials in Turk Metal, the union has extended its large 
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professional and research staff in the 1980s. It has worked closely with European and 
American advisers to strengthen the union's special service bureaus of organisation, 
training and public information. There has been a great deal of increase in the workers' 
education activities. The union has also organised several training trips for the workers' 
representatives to the European countries. It has recently open various private hospital 
and resting houses for both the current and retired members (14). 
As a matter of fact, the growing emphasis on the extend of individual services and 
working with employers to improve industrial efficiency through "company level 
compromises" have become the key policies of the unions. In this context, Turk Metal's 
collective bargaining strategies have also been altered. The union has traditionally 
pursued centrally determined bargaining policy. However, more recently, the union has 
moved to place a greater authority and more resources at the regional level of 
organisation in the wage and non-pay issues. It is interesting to note that during the 
workers' mobilisation in the late 1980s Turk Metal has also supported the other unions' 
politically motivated policies. The union's central committee gradually has agreed on 
various compromises at micro level involving wage stability for greater job security and 
fringe benefits, however, it has also supported workers' solidarity within TURK-IS as 
pressures to strength its position within the confederation, which was weakened in the 
last decade. In short, while TURK-IS's member unions have been searching for new 
identities and solutions to the internal and external crises, Turk Metal has felt to adopt 
more pragmatical and tactical approach to the undergoing changes both within the 
confederation and outside of the confederation. 
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d) Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Workers' Union (PETROL-IS). 
Petrol-Is is the most powerful social democratic faction of TURK-IS, which organised 
some major work branches in petroleum, chemical and rubber industries in both public 
and private sectors. In the 1960s and 70s Petrol-Is seemed to represent an intermediate 
ideological position between their conservative and socialist rivals. They mainly pursued 
some moderate social reforms. In fact, in these years Petrol-Is also engaged in long 
struggles with the employers in the private sector. On the other hand, the union 
encouraged more moderate tactics to influence grievance procedures and to lift 
constraints on collective bargaining in the public sector, in particular, when the 
Republican People's Party (RPP) was in power. 
The military government in 1980 closed DISK. So, some of ex-DISK members joined 
Petrol-Is. This, later, played a significant role for the radicalisation of Petrol-Is, 
particularly within TURK-IS. After 1980 the local branches of Petrol-Is have struggled 
to organise workers in various workplaces especially in the petroleum and rubber 
industries. The unionisation effort of the union has confronted particularly strong and 
persistent challenges from the state managers and employers. The main question for 
Petrol-Is to redefine its policies was: what do the government and employers offer to the 
workers in exchange for the "sacrifices" demanded by flexibilisation, rationalisation and 
privatisation? The respond of Petrol-Is to the external pressure was to pose a more 
direct challenge to the government and employers' policies and strategies. 
Petrol-Is has been one of the first uruons within TURK-IS which has initiated a 
democratic political agenda as a major policy of the confederation in the late 1980s. It 
should be mentioned that Petrol-Is has attempted to generate a new "consensus" among 
the other social democrat unions, because although the social democrat faction of 
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TURK-IS are distinguished from the conservative faction by their insistence on political 
unionism, there has been a significant disagreement among the social democrat unions 
concerning the appropriate objectives of political action and its importance relative to 
collective bargaining. Petrol-Is has pursued the policies as a basis for unity. This has 
given opportunities for solidaristic trade union activity. This was especially evident 
during the major strikes in the late 1980s. The union has also responded to the pressure 
for workplace developments such as human resource management policies with more 
resistance. 
Petrol-Is has also claimed more militant strategies for TURK-IS. Basically, the union has 
long advocated an alternative strategy of developing political means to win the struggle 
against the hostile attitudes of the government and employers. Rule books and the 
direction of union publication and union education programmes have been modified on 
the basis of new agendas such as the government's taxation policies, minimum wages, 
females in production and their problems and workers health and safety and 
environmental problems. Petrol-Is has attempted to develop its internal and external 
relations through a greater use of outside consultants and advisers and establishing clear 
lines of communication with particularly their European colleagues. More recently, the 
union has also tried to bring some new negotiating issues to the bargaining table, which 
include vocational training, reskilling, participation and autonomy at work (petrol-Is 
1993). 
The union has recently faced the problem of a decline in its membership, in particular in 
the public sector. The union leaders have reacted to these challenges with a series of 
tactics which combined reunionisation efforts and political mobilisation of members. It is 
a fact that the union's leaders have been successful in constructing a strong 
organisational network between other members in other branches and other unions. In 
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short, the main strategy of Petrol-Is in the 1980s and 90s seem to have preferred to 
exercise political actions to remove persistent legal hindrances to unionisation collective , 
bargaining and lay-offs in the public sector and to direct broader terms of class wide 
mass mobilisation as means to develop reactive policies against the hostile attitude of the 
ruling class towards labour. In this respect, one of the key effort of Petrol-Is was to 
radicalise TURK-IS to enforce new solidaristic projects for all Turkish working class 
(15). 
(iii) The Major Strikes, the Mobilisation of Workers and TURK-IS. 
The Turkish industrial relations system has posed a number of problems which have 
culminated in a high propensity to strike in recent years. The recent increase in strike 
activity is noteworthy even when compared to the late 1970s which were known as 
strike-prone years. As can be seen from Table 4 below, the work days lost due to strikes 
were 2,911,407 in 1989 with 39,435 participating workers, in contrast to 1,147,721 
work days lost in 1979 with 21,011 strikers. The average length of time a worker was 
on strike rose sharply; it was 74 days in 1989 as opposed to 55 days in 1979. This is an 
extremely high ratio by international standards and if we look at the years 1990 and 
1991, it can be said that the trend reached the peak level (Cali sma Hayati Istatistikleri 
1993). 
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Table 4: Strikes 1963-1992 
Years Strikes Strikers Lost work days 
1963 8 1,514 19,739 
1964 83 6,640 238,261 
1965 46 6,593 336,836 
1966 42 11,414 430,104 
1967 101 9,499 350,037 
1968 54 5,289 174,905 
1969 77 12,601 235,134 
1970 72 21,156 220,189 
1971 78 10,916 476,116 
1972 48 14,879 659,369 
1973 55 12,286 671,135 
1974 110 25,546 1,109,401 
1975 116 13,708 668,797 
1976 58 7,240 325,830 
1977 59 15,682 1,397,124 
1978 87 9,748 426,127 
1979 126 21,011 1,1247,721 
1980 220 84,832 1,303,253 
1981 - - -
1982 - - -
1983 - - -
1984 4 561 4,947 
1985 21 2,410 194,296 
1986 21 7,926 234,940 
1987 307 29,734 1,961,940 
1988 156 30,057 1,892,655 
1989 171 39,434 2,911,407 
1990 458 166,306 3,466,550 
1991 398 164,968 3,809,354 
1992 98 62,189 1,153,578 
Notes: Strikes were banned after the military coup of 1980. 
Strikes were allowed again in 1984. 
Source: Calisma Hayati Istatistikleri 1993. 
It is hardly surprising then that in recent years considerable attention has been focused 
on explaining the causes of increasing strike activity. They can be summed up as follows. 
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first, one of the most important factors is the decline in workers' real wages since the 
year 1980. According to the calculations of the state institute of statistics, state planning 
organisation and the office of the under-secretary of treasury and trade, the real wage 
index which was 100 in 1979 has dropped to 43,63 in 1988 (TURK-IS 1989). However, 
in more recent years, compared to the years 1985, 86, 87, the drop has slowed, probably 
because of more effective collective bargaining activity. Unions tried to make up for the 
losses with sudden leaps, being tempted to bring up high demands to boost wages. 
Second, in the 1980s employers, both public and private, achieved a much stronger 
unionisation ratio, making collective bargaining much harder than in the past. This is due 
to the legal provisions encouraging employers to organise more effectively than in the 
past. Moreover, the new legislation of 1983 created a centralised structure with a single 
national affiliate in each industry. Therefore, the present outcome seems to be desirable 
for TISK as well as its affiliates. In other words, the last decade has witnessed the 
growth of bigger and more active employers' unions, such as Mess in metal working, 
Kiplas in petroleum, chemicals and rubber, as well as those in the food and textile 
industries. 
Third, the expansion of the scope of labour agreements-although resisted by unions-
from multi-plant to large enterprise and multi employer bargaining tended to increase the 
number of work days lost, if and when strikes occur in conjunction with them. In other 
words, the response of trade unions in Turkey to the tough bargaining approach by 
employers' organisations has been increased strike activity and where strikes are 
unlawful, new concerted protest techniques they have devised such as work slow 
downs, calling in sick, massive absenteeism and mass demonstrations. 
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Fourth, inter-union rivalry, basically prompted by unions concerned to protect their 10% 
representativity status encourages high and often unrealistic wage demands (extremely 
high wage demands sometimes involving 400 to 600% wage rises, the result of which 
was usually a high cost agreement for the employer). 
Finally, in Turkey comparative wages have always served as the main criterion in wage 
negotiations. The high wage levels achieved first in glass and steel industries in 1989 and 
then in the Istanbul Municipal Authority recently have served as a stepping stone for 
other unions to follow suit and surpass them. The main debates in negotiations seemed 
to derive from wage-related issues, therefore, the managerial issues - discipline, 
grievance committees and more job security etc. - did not appeared as the major causes 
of industrial disputes. 
However, 1989 was registered as a year of an increase in the curve of workers' and 
other labourers' struggles; it was, mainly, the beginning of deepening conflict with the 
ruling class. For the first time in Turkish working class history, workers of different 
political affiliation, different religious and ethnic roots and various geographical regions, 
raised a legal and independent mass movement in order to pursue more broad economic 
and political interests of the working class. This mass movement, which first emerged 
outside unions among the rank and file, ultimately forced the unions towards a tough 
position in relation to the government and employers. Workers particularly in the public 
sector carried out widespread action in the same year and the period is now well known 
as "Spring Mobilisation" in Turkish trade union history. 600,000 public sector workers 
engaged in actions and mobilisations including street demonstrations with the purpose of 
tipping the scale in their own favour in the collective bargaining process. Workers sav" 
the real value of their wages decline steadily since 1980 in the face of the government's 
strict stabilisation programmes. Therefore, the unions united around demands for wages 
253 
to be readjusted to compensate for the losses of the 1980s. But the public sector 
employers' organisations and the Turkish government rejected these demands. The 
unions responded by a disciplined display of unity under TURK-IS's directive. All public 
sector unions agreed to enter the negotiations as one unit promising that no union would 
sign an individual agreement. A special four member co-ordinating committee was 
established, and unions agreed not to sign agreements without the prior approval of this 
committee (16). 
In response to the denial of their right to take strike actions, the different unions in the 
public sector adopted a series of new tactics for "collective action" that fell within the 
law such as slowing down the work, lunch boycotts, false requests for medical 
examinations, boycotting works transport, not working for over-time, sit-ins and even 
refusals to shave! For example, all workers at the Yenisan company in Istanbul let their 
beards grow for about 64 days as a sign of protest against the pay and conditions 
(Basisen 1988). 
Shortly after such effective action, Turkish workers were celebrating a victory III 
achieving a 142 per cent wage increase in the 1989 public sector collective agreement 
(TURK-IS 1990). The achievement of the new contract, which covered 600 thousand 
workers was won by a united trade union campaign that also included many innovative 
forms of industrial action by workers banned by law from striking. In a interview, a shop 
steward said that "the "spring mobilisation" had a very crucial role among the workers. 
They were able to see what they could do while they were struggling unified" (J 7). 
This mobilisation of public sector workers was supported by actions taken by private 
sector workers. It can be argued that the demands of workers not only tended to 
concentrate on the wage issues but also centred on the issues like lifting restrictions of 
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trade union rights, an end to the government austerity policy, to all forms of repression 
and exploitation of workers, and speeding up processes towards true democracy 
(TURK-IS 1992). This is more evident during the 1990 Zonguldak miners' strike and 
one day general strike on 3 January 1991 (TURK-IS 1991). The grass-roots mass 
movements called "Spring Mobilisation" or "Spring Actions" raised and separated 
spontaneously in 1990 and 1991 all over the country. 
Among the most important events was the miners' strike in Zonguldak in November 
1990. More extensive mass mobilisation took place during the growing unrest at the end 
of 1990 and beginning of 1991 (Kristal-Is 1992). In the biggest stoppage seen in Turkey 
for 30 years, 48,000 members of the miners' union, Genel Maden-Is at Zonguldak 
struck on 30 November against the state operated Mine Research Institute and Coal 
Mines Enterprise and in support of claims for improved pay and conditions. However, it 
should be mentioned that the Zonguldak miners' strike of 1990 seemed to be far more 
than just a strike. At the beginning the strike began with a demand for more pay and 
eventually it took up political demands under the famous phrase "Bread, Peace and 
Democracy". The miners' union, Genel Maden-Is before the strike called a meeting in 
Zonguldak of all trade union, social and community organisations to ask for support. In 
fact, it brought into action not just the strikers but a whole city. The daily marches 
involved most strikers, their families and local people. In addition, Artists, member of 
human rights association, writers, opposition political parties and others came to 
Zonguldak and joined the daily demonstrations. The Zonguldak Chamber of Commerce 
(mostly consisting of the local shopkeepers) declared its backing for the strike and also 
joined the rally. 
The day after the strike announced, the striking miners began a march from Zonguldak 
to Ankara. Even the most downtrodden people in Turkish society, the women, were 
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marching in the front line. The march, with around 80,000 people involved, was blocked 
by security forces and 201 strikers were arrested (Karakas 1992). At the same time, 
85,000 metal workers at 230 private and public sector companies went on strike. 
However, the president of the TURK-IS at the time and the leader of the textile 
workers' union, Sevket Yilmaz asked the union leaders not to sign any agreement unless 
the miners' dispute was resolved (18). In addition to this, on 3 January, TURK-IS called 
a 24-hour general strike in protest against continuing denials of human and trade union 
rights and to support the ongoing industrial actions. Despite being declared illegal, the 
strike was supported by 1.5 million workers (TURK-IS 1991). 
The radicalisation in the attitudes of the confederation over this period was most clearly 
seen in the firmness displayed by the workers, in terms of strike action and mobilisation, 
often in direct opposition to the union's passive attitude and even obstruction sometimes 
put forward by certain trade union officials. This factor caused trade union democracy 
and disrupted the complacency of certain trade union officials who carried out their 
tasks in a orderly manner with the government and employers. In other words, the rising 
struggles of workers against the ruling class made a significant contribution to the 
improvement of a new conception of trade unionism and the efficiency of trade unions. 
Under this circumstances, TURK-IS leadership had not much alternative in their 
strategies and supported the increasing labour struggle. In a interview, Atillay Aycin, the 
president of the airways' workers union, Hava-IS and well known as the most radical 
member of TURK-IS presidential council argued that "TURK-IS wanted to lead the 
movement rather than to stay behind it" (19). In mid-January 135,000 textile and paper 
workers went on strike. The political unrest reached the highest level in the country 
since 1980. 
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When we look at the nature of the process of dispute and resistance between the 
government and the workers in this period, the question arises whether the strike actions 
and the mobilisation of the masses in this period were a step in the direction of a 
working-class movement threatening the existing capitalist order. It is, perhaps, difficult 
to consider the action as a revolt in every sense, but it is quite possible to see it as a 
political as well as an economic process. This was partly due to a decline in the 
significance of the political contingency which had dominated public sector labour 
relations for so long in the past. Although unions, particularly TURK-IS, often by-
passed public employers' associations and made efforts to reach the final agreement with 
ministers and even prime ministers especially during the major strikes in the last decade, 
it seemed that Turkish unions were, in a sense in the process of taking revenge in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The nature of Industrial action over the period in question is as following: (1) it was 
spontaneous and independent from any top level organisation (2) it had massive 
participation (3) it was legal (4) it involved new forms of resistance. It is a fact that the 
stance of unionised workers towards Ozal's conservative party brought about the 
sympathy of other interest groups towards the unions, particularly during non-strike 
industrial action. In other words, after 1980 the unions in Turkey was able to secure 
support from unemployed, non-unionised workers, farmers, small traders, pensioners 
and other democratic organisations. 
In addition to these developments, efforts by civil servants to unionise further increased 
in 1991 and 1992. The achievement of the labour movement resulted in new inspiration 
for other working groups to organise in unions. Turkish public servants' unions at the 
beginning of the 1990s began to demand unionisation. The movement towards and 
struggle for unionisation, led by teachers, has continued with the organisation of public 
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servants in health, municipal and agriculture services. The number of existing unions of 
civil servants was estimated as 28 in 1991 and the approximate number of members they 
had as 150,000 in the same year (Petrol-Is 1991). Since it is not legally recognised, the 
process of unionisation of public servants has slowed. The negative attitude of the 
government and judicial bodies has been a significant obstacle for mass recruitment. The 
public prosecutors opposed the struggle of public servants for registration and brought 
actions to close Egit-Sen, Teachers' Union, Tum Bel-Sen, Municipal Officers' Union and 
Tum Saglik Sen, Health Civil Servants' Union (MBVY 1989, Gulmez 1992). 
However, before the 1991 general election, the political parties, particularly, the True 
Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) made explicit 
promises on union rights for public servants. Therefore, the union rights of Turkish 
public servants, covering around one and a half million, remained as one of the most 
significant issues on the industrial relations agenda. Successful labour union struggles 
combined with the emergence of public servant unions and increasing labour costs, 
particularly, after the signing of the collective bargaining in 1990 and 1991 have created 
intense pressure against labour unions and unionisation efforts at the company level. The 
government and business circles have initiated a counter-offensive against the unions. 
One of the main counter attack on labour unions was the massive lay-offs. According to 
the estimation of a union, Petrol-Is (1991), 300,000 union members at a minimum within 
TURK -IS unions were laid off in a period of between 1990 and the first half of 1992 just 
after the collective contract was signed. The officials of most unions agreed that lay-ofTs 
were not so much a result of technological progress as they were advocated by the 
employers. Rather, They were economically and politically motivated. In fact, the 
constant attempts seemed to be made to deunionise the unionised workplace. 
258 
A coalition government formed between the centre right, True Path Party (DYP) and 
the left-of-centre, Social democratic Populist party (SHP) (the current government) was 
welcomed by the labour circles in the hope that the new government would bring the 
vital solutions for the labour problems. At the beginning of 1992, the government 
proposed some legislative amendments and a top level labour council to discuss the main 
problems in industrial relations. In this context, TURK-IS prepared amendments 
designed to change the legal frame work related to trade union and collective bargaining 
rights, and a new draft law on job security, unemployment insurance and civil servants' 
unions. The minister of labour, Mehmet Mogultay (a SHP MP) began to prepare some 
reform bills initially but met with serious opposition from employers' organisations like 
TUSIAD and TISK. 
These developments were regarded as signs of softening government attitudes to the 
unions. However, as time passed there has not been any major changes observed in the 
attitude of the new government with regards to labour relations. While the unions have 
still been under attack from legal restrictions and the anti-democratic practices of 
employers, the policies of the government through privatisation, lay-offs and the use of 
subcontracting have continued to undermine the union movement. Although there are no 
official figures available, it is not impossible to expect a decline in the number of 
unionised workers. Particularly, more recent developments in labour-management 
relations in Turkey prove that the Turkish trade union movement is entering a more 
uncertain and equivocal era. 
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(iv) More Recent Developments and Growing Unrest Once Again Among the 
Workers. 
The prime minister, Tansu Ciller, unveiled on 5 April 1994 the country's most radical 
reform and stabilisation package since 1980. The new stabilisation program includes 
extensive privatisation, the sale or closure of dozens of public companies and a freeze on 
wages. When the government announced major redundancies and closures of plants and 
mines, trade unions threatened "all-out war". The first protest against the government 
policies was staged by the Public sector workers' platform, which represented most 
public sector workers belonging to different unions. The most immediate large-scale 
action was to call demonstrations around the country. For example, after the Ciller 
government announced its austerity package, workers at the Petlas Tyre company in 
Kirsehir, about 110 miles from Ankara, marched towards the capital in a convoy of 100 
vehicles to protest the government decisions that one thousand Petlas workers would 
lose their jobs (Petrol-IS 1994). In addition, thousands of mine workers staged a mass 
demonstration in Zonguldak to protest a decision to close several coal mines in their city 
which would leave about 11,000 people jobless (TURK-IS 1994). 
At the same time, the Turkish lira has fallen more than 30 per cent against the US dollar 
since January 1994, while the budget deficit stands at more than $6 billion, the highest 
level in Turkish history (Sabah, 14 April 1994). Meanwhile, industrial production has 
been slowing. 3500 workers have just been laid-off in the automotive industry since the 
announcement of new austerity measures, while the major car manufacturers have sent 
workers home on compulsory leave until the crisis passes. The biggest white-goods 
maker, Arcelik, has also announced that it is suspending production (Milliyet, 31 April 
1994). Employers are saying that "it is the time to sacrifice something in order for the 
economy to straighten itself out". Mainly, the government and employers have been 
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asking for lithe national consensus". When the government requested a big sacrifice from 
the interest groups, the labour union leaders and the workers were waiting in silence for 
their reaction. Nobody knew how much sacrifice was expected from the working class. 
However, the answer became more obvious when the state minister was quoted as 
saying that only 33,000 workers would be laid-off as result of plant or factory closures 
and privatisation in 1994. The other estimates are that the closures of the state 
companies will make about 150,000 people jobless (Deri-IS 1994). Most unions have 
immediately shown their determination to go forward with their protest action. Even on 
the day of the announcement the labour unions were in action, such as a spontaneous 
demonstration by the shipbuilding workers at one of the Golden Hom works. Other 
walkouts were soon staged at Sumerbank, Petkim, Kirsehir Petlas and Karabuk. The 
Petlas workers, who tried to march on the capital, Ankara, were blocked by police 
forces. Even the workers at Istanbul Water and Sewage Administration (ISKI) walked 
out to protest against the announcement that it, too, would be privatised. The union 
leaders involved in these marches made it clear that they expected the tempo to pick up 
in the coming months until they achieved their goals (Petrol-Is, 1994). 
While slogans appeared to be calling for a general strike, although this is still legally 
impossible, it is now one of the goals of the social democratic factions of TURK-IS like 
Petrol-Is, Hava-Is, Belediye-Is, Deri-Is and Maden-Is (Deri-Is 1994). Following the 
austerity policies announcement, it appears that there has been intense discussion among 
union leaders within TURK-IS, the unions and with workers, as to what to do (TURK-
IS 1994). 
261 
The crucial question in this critical period for the role of TURK-IS is whether TURK-IS 
will compromise with the government austerity programmes or will it direct the 
mobilisation of workers for the defence of broad economic and political interests? it can 
be argued that the spontaneous protests of workers have already gone beyond any 
collaborative intermediary role of TURK-IS. Therefore, the only role TURK-IS can play 
is to exercise its capacity for mobilising workers' resistance against the government's 
policies. In fact, there are signs to support this view that the president of TURK-IS, 
Bayram Meral stated that "trade unions are going to continue a series of actions until 
the government softens its new economic measures ... the government at the moment is 
taking the bread out of the hands of workers, and businessmen brought the country to 
the current situation not the workers ... /I (TURK-IS 1994:2). This statement shows that 
TURK-IS was forced to pursue a tough line in its relation with the government at this 
time most probably due to the pressure from below. TURK-IS has also established a 
general action committee which will co-ordinate further labour action. In addition, the 
confederation called the other relevant Turkish labour unions, HAK-IS, DISK to 
organise joint protest action against the austerity programmes. 
At this time the response of TURK-IS seems to be more clear. Bayram Meral, the 
current president of TURK-IS, urged the unions to continue a series of actions until the 
government rescinded its new economic measures. He accused the government and 
businessmen of putting the blame for the crisis on the workers. For him, the employers 
and government industrial policies have brought the country to the current situation. 
Therefore, TURK-IS seems to have taken the leading role in bringing together the 
unions as the members of TURK-IS executive committee have demonstrated by visiting , 
union leaders and persuading them to act in concert. Although there are frequent calls 
from the government for the workers to sacrifice for the economic and political health of 
the country, labour unions are willing to fight to the bitter end, by which they seem to 
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mean that a "general strike" might be implemented. In fact, The council of TURK-IS 
presidents has already voted in favour of a "general strike" (although it is illegal) 
(Cumhuriyet, 29 June 1994). 
(v) CONCLUSION: A Rediscovery of the New Political Solutions? 
In this study, the question concerning the type of unionism that Turkish unions represent 
can be addressed by examining the concepts of "Business unionism" or "economism" 
and "political economism". In this sense, the main argument is that Turkish unions 
demonstrated neither "pure economism" or "pure political economism" from the 1960s 
to the mid-80s. Rather, it seemed to be a combination of these. It is also argued that 
union policies and means may take different paths depending on the economic, political 
and social change that confront the workers. Therefore, the key question is here: does a 
broader social movement, possibly erode "bread and butter unionism"? In other words, 
does the Turkish case demonstrate that there might be the possibilities in some countries 
to work out political solutions against the challenges of external pressures in more 
recent years? 
In contrast with the trend in European trade unions, where some unions tend to adopt 
more business-oriented policies in order to respond to external pressures, Turkish unions 
seem to have been more prone to broad political actions. Although Turkish unions have 
traditionally organised at Industry level, industrial unionism has recently made important 
steps into the collective behaviour of workers. By renewing the traditional position of 
Industrial unionism for the first time in Turkish labour history, industrial unions , 
particularly in the public sector have formed important pressure groups towards 
"politics". The key policies adopted by Turkish unions in the late 1980s and beginning of 
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the 1990s have been the use of "political pressure" at both national and international 
levels under the popular slogan of 1980s "fight for Western pluralist democracy". 
However, this response of the unions to the political and economic environment of the 
1980s and 90s has not systematically developed as a consistent, cohesive and integrated 
set of strategies. Rather, it seems to have been product of a "common agreement" 
among the unions against the challenges of the critical periods in question, mostly, 
because of the threat of losing their economic and political influence. In reviewing the 
pattern of different unions' behaviour within TURK-IS over the period, the unions 
policies appear to have been shaped on the basis of their democratic and political 
positions. Yet, in respect of new solutions, there have been common elements of 
continuity and change, particularly in their demands towards more political practices 
with more moderate tactics. Although they have continued being concerned almost 
exclusively with economic issues, there have been significant moves to broaden the 
union agenda, emphasising broader political ambitions such as the issue of democracy. It 
is widely accepted that trade unions frequently try to adjust to external pressures by 
changing their policies and strategies. 
There is little doubt that the external and internal pressures have forced the Turkish 
unions to make some crucial changes in their policies as well as their democratic and 
political rationalities. This has, eventually, resulted in the unions reviewing the 
traditional positions of their role in industrial relations in favour of more confrontational 
relations with the government and employers as opposed to the their traditional 
corporatist image. However, the crucial question in this context might be the extent to 
which they will be strong enough to continue in this role. The answer still seems to be 
uncertain. 
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Undoubtedly, there may be some noteworthy differences in the unions' policies in the 
coming years in terms of the sector in which they operate and the company they work 
for. Some unions, particularly those in the private sector dealing with multinational 
companies, may tend to reach "micro corporatist type of agreement" at company level, 
while the others, the majority, can try to obtain economic favours for their members in 
return for "political restraint". A new intermediary "political mediation" role, especially 
for the public sector unions, might become important. Turkish unions' ability to meet the 
challenges arising from the changing external environment is determined by their 
endowment with the new reactive strategies of the confederation. The necessary 
strategies and policies are closely interrelated with the external and internal 
opportunities, and any conclusions regarding the future of Turkish unions need a careful 
elaboration of recommendations. 
NOTES: 
1 ) This information was provided with a group of workers' representatives from 
various companies in metal industries during an education seminar organised by 
the Metal Workers' Union in Istanbul (30 October 1993). 
2) A personal interview with a shop steward at Arcelik company in metal industry 
in Istanbul (22 October 1993). 
3) A personal interview with Orhan Balta, the president of the Food and Tobacco 
Workers' Union in Istanbul (9 October 1993). 
4) A personal interview with Yener Kaya, the president of the Leather Workers' 
Union in Istanbul (29 March 1993). 
5) According to various ILO reports of the Committee on Freedom of association. 
the committee has examined the substance of similar complaints 17 times 
between 1981 and 1990. 
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6) See various publications of Dok-Gemi Is, Teksif, Tek-Gida-Is, Yol-Is, Petrol-Is, 
Deri-Is, Hava-Is and Maden-Is and Demiryol-is for various years. 
7) A personal interview with Ersan Cicek, The education secretary of the Metal 
Workers' Union in Ankara (14 October 1993). 
8) A number of Turkish academics, Nusret Ekin, Toker Dereli, Gulten Kutal, Metin 
Kutal in Industrial relations field were consulted throughout the study to 
exchange information and share their experience about trade unions. Most of 
these academics are involved in unions' education seminars. 
9) A personal interview with Alaatin Karahan, the general secretary of Defence 
Industry Workers' Union (Barb-Is) in Ankara (13 October 1993). 
10) A personal interview with Ibrahim Kiziltan, the general secretary of the Leather 
Workers' Union (Deri-Is) in Istanbul (29 March 1993). 
11) A personal interview with Huseyin Karakoc, the general secretary of the Food, 
Tobacco and Drink Workers' Union (Teg Gida-Is) in Istanbul (25 October 
1993). 
12) Various examples of collective agreements conducted by Tek Gida-Is between 
1985-1992. 
l3) A personal interview with Mehmet Ozer, the leader of Ankara branch for the 
General Mine Workers' Union (Genel Maden-Is) in Ankara and various 
publications of the union (13 October 1993). 
14) A personal interview with Ozbek Karakus, the general organising secretary of 
the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Turk Metal) in Ankara (14 October 1993) 
and various publications of the union. 
15) Various publications of Petrol-Is. 
16) A personal Interview with Salih Kilic, the general secretary of TURK-IS ill 
Ankara (14 October 1993). 
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17) A personal interview with a shop steward at the Siemens company in Istanbul 
(13 September 1994). 
18) A personal interview with Zeki Polat, the general secretary of the Textile 
Workers' Union in Ankara (15 October 1993). 
19) A personal interview with Attilay Aycin, the president of the Civil Aviation 
Workers' Union in Istanbul (29 September 1993). (Currently charged with 
organising illegal meetings). 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
This research is the first work done on the contemporary Turkish union movement in the 
English language. It attempts to explain the Turkish unions with respect to Turkey's 
complex and uncertain economic, political and social conditions. The empirical part of 
the study was carried out by establishing direct contact with the state institutions, 
employers' organisations and unions. This was important because most of the significant 
strategies and policies were made by these social partners. It should be mentioned that 
the lack of research tradition in Turkey caused serious problems particularly during the 
interviews. For example, it was not possible to conduct an interview with shop stewards 
or the workers at their workplaces. 
On the theoretical side, in the absence of any conceptual and analytical framework for 
the role and model of the Turkish unions, the thesis has been constructed through 
relating it to the theoretical debates in the European literature. In this respect, some of 
the weaknesses in the discussion of the Turkish unions should be understood on the 
basis of not only the economic and political uncertainty or complexity of Turkey but also 
the lack of academic research interest in the area. Therefore, the study makes crucial 
attempts to contribute to our understanding about trade unionism in general by relating 
Turkish experience to the European context. The purpose of the study is to inform not 
only Turkish industrial relation students but also European scholars, who tend to neglect 
the Turkish trade union movement in their work. 
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Despite these problems, an attempt is made to interpret the nature and the process of 
trade unions within Turkey. In this context both the past and present theoretical debates 
and empirical findings have contributed to an understanding of the contemporary 
Turkish unions. 
(i) General View: Defining a New Role for Turkish Unions and "Political 
Mediation" in an Era of Uncertainty. 
As in the case of some European countries such as Germany, France, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, Turkey has had a state tradition through the civil bureaucracy or the military. 
What makes the Turkish case interesting is that the state in Turkey has been even 
stronger than its counterparts in many cases. In the 1930s the Ataturk government 
formulated a new national development programme that gave the state a dominant role 
in Turkey'S economic and political development. Kerr et al (1964) argue that the general 
strategies of industrialisation adopted by an ideal type of elite have significant 
consequences for workers and managers and their interrelations. In this regard, in 
Turkey a nationalist leader, Ataturk, with a mixture of the revolutionary and nationalist 
approaches, encouraged economic and political development within a comprehensive 
behavioural framework. He demolished the political and temporal power of the 
organised religion and traditional values through making institutional changes towards 
modernisation. In the case of the nationalist economy Ataturk insisted on industrial 
modernisation, as can be seen in the case of Japan and Germany after the second world 
war. 
The power of the state was regarded as a catalyst for peaceful transition to an industrial 
society. "Etatism" in this context was a powerful political and ideological concept. While 
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this concept prevailed, the state intervened actively in the labour-management 
relationship; first to protect industrial labour with all kind of social benefits in a sort of 
state paternalism and then, as industrialisation developed and industrial workers became 
organised, the labour movement was contained, channelled or moderated through some 
legal reforms. In this context, the modernisation approach is helpful to explain the 
background of the development of Turkish unions. 
In the 1960s and 70s the principal goals of economic and development policies were the 
adaptation of the idea of a "social welfare state". While the economic model was based 
on the expansion of the internal markets, on the political level, in order to maintain the 
stability of this model of capital accumulation the state established an institutional and 
political framework in which the ruling class united as a powerful social partner and the 
collaboration of labour was provided. State-centred development and populist 
incorporation provided a safety net for unions. During the entire import substitution 
industrialisation period the dominant ideology still remained within the confines of 
nationalist development and national solidarity. This model somewhat contradicted the 
strict rules of capitalist rationality. In this model, various groups such as agricultural 
producers and industrial workers were protected sufficiently to provide state planning 
economic and political developments on the pattern of the West. Particularly after 1960, 
taking the popular concept of populism into consideration, the role of the state was to 
include the masses (urban workers, commercialised farmers, shanty town marginals and 
the like) in economic, political and social practices in order to gain "social consensus" 
among different classes for economic growth. For the state, the significance of control 
over the labour market and labour discipline was one of the key elements of capitalist 
development in Turkey. Hence, through establishing an industrial relations framework, 
the state tended to exercise control over the political and democratic process which can 
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contribute to the rise of labour opposition and to the subjective development of the 
working class. 
The ideology of national development borrowed from a certain development of social 
democracy discourses in the West, particularly in its statist developmentalism and 
populism. In this regard Turkish unions gained a certain legitimacy due to their being 
accepted as an important interlocutor. The external environment of unions strengthened 
the position of labour and the role of trade unions in the Turkish industrial relations 
system. Moreover, the interests and demands of the Turkish working class in relations 
with the state and employers were significantly mediated in the economic, political and 
institutional arena by the unions. On the other hand, the project of the ruling class for 
the new institutionalised industrial relations system also conformed with the expectation 
of Turkish unions. Because the rights to unionisation, collective bargaining and strikes 
as well as some social reforms were granted from above in accordance with the 
requirement of the economic and political model of 1960s. In other words, the economic 
and political policies were not only designed to meet the need of private business but 
also prepared to create a relatively favourable attitude to the workers' unions. 
In short, in part 1 it is argued that the state policy towards labour was to seek a broad 
corporatisation of unions. TURK-IS and its member unions became better established, 
and took on the role of "mediating agency". Under this political and economic 
framework, the collective bargaining function became more important on the industrial 
relations agenda for Turkish unions. The nature of collective bargaining was also shaped 
by detailed legislative regulation of employment relations. Therefore, Turkish unions 
could not develop political identities in this period and the Turkish style of trade 
unionism which can be best described between "Business unionism" and "Political 
economism" was a serious option. 
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It might be argued that under this relatively favourable political and econonuc 
environment the policies of Turkish unions were heavily affected by external 
developments rather than the internal environment. As a result, the leadership of TURK-
IS and of its member unions tended to adjust their behaviour predictably and 
manageably for their external environment, that is, mainly, the state and employers. 
They, therefore, tried to rely on collective agreement as a main function of all unions for 
the regulation of wages and working conditions and were particularly dependent on the 
goodwill of governments to maintain co-operative and orderly relations in return for 
obtaining a representative cartel at macro level. Meanwhile, internal influence, mainly, 
from the rank and file on union strategies and policies was limited. Most of the union 
function was shaped and controlled by national leadership and focused on a narrow 
range of employment issues, especially wages, rather than the social and political 
interests of the working class. For instance, many other issues such as employee 
involvement at the workplace, health and safety, job security and the implementation of 
new technologies were ignored by the union leaders in order to compromise on 
economic items in negotiations with employers. Although the conceptual and analytical 
perspectives for trade unions in the European literature are not quite adequate to explain 
the whole nature of the Turkish trade union movements, they might help to understand 
the Turkish unions in the context of "intermediary unionism". 
However, the 1980s saw a remarkable change in the government and employers' policies 
towards trade unions. It is hardly a paradox to argue that the new economic strategies 
have concentrated on the world market through export based economic development 
policies rather than domestic ones, mostly due to the crises of the previous accumulation 
model. This trend, then, has further required a fundamental change in the relationship 
between employer, labour and state policies and between these and the changing policies 
in the world economy . 
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The military intervened the country in the 1980 and suppressed most organised social 
opposition including trade unions. Anti-labour legislation was further shaped to curb 
trade union power. The masses were also depoliticised. Therefore, the 1980 military 
intervention prepared necessary economic, political, legal and social conditions in which 
the new project of the ruling class was easily implemented. In this context, export based 
economic development policies pursued by the Ozal government brought about the 
political exclusion of labour. In other words, the government policies were designed to 
deregulate the economic activities for a more flexible labour market. In this respect, 
several attempts were made to reduce the institutional regulation of conflict so as to 
expose labour relations more directly to market forces particularly in the public sector. 
This development caused a decline in union economic and political power at macro 
level. Thus, the mediating role of TURK-IS and of its member unions was weakened in 
the 1980s. 
The study demonstrates that patterns in Turkey obtain some correspondence with 
general trends, albeit somewhat in a different form from those in Europe that have been 
discussed with reference to the deregulation, anti-union legislation, decline in the 
mediating role of the labour confederations, privatisation and the like. The national 
development project, etatism and populism were diminished in the 1980s in favour of 
economic liberalism. In the economy the strategy of import-substitution was replaced by 
that of export-orientation and in politics a gradual weakening of the official ideology 
"Etatism ll , which in the past had been used by the governments to achieve social and 
political integration. 
However, important consequences of the state tradition have been also witnessed in the 
1980s. While the state has shown indications of deregulation in its relations with 
organised labour in many countries in the 1980s, the conservative party m Turkev 
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(despite all efforts to roll back the role of the state in economic arena through 
liberalisation, deregulation, public sector reform and privatisation) has not totally 
decomposed its relations with the unions, mainly because of the extraordinarily strong 
state tradition and a significant need for the restructuring of its unstable democracy in 
the new decade. It is clear that the development and role of trade unions in Turkey 
cannot be fully understood without a careful consideration of the long tradition of a 
strong and dominant state. Trade unions still expect the state to intervene directly and 
solve a wide variety of problems. 
The military intervention of 1980 and, after that, economic development and the process 
of political democratisation demonstrate the similar trends between Turkey and the 
Southern European countries and some Latin American countries. In comparison to 
Latin American countries it can be argued that the implementation of the economic 
stabilisation programmes could be merely achieved under the political and social 
conditions of a military regime or "restricted democracy". In this respect, like Latin 
American experiences, particularly during the military interventions, "bureaucratic-
authoritarian" regimes are evident in Turkey. This is a similarity which has continued 
into the subsequent period of cautious and halting democratisation processes. 
In also suggesting that some European countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece are 
also dominated by one given trend, this view is of course not disregarding the numerous 
national variations. But, when a cross national check is made from country to country in 
both the countries above and in Turkey, certain developments can be observed. All 
countries first faced the problems of productivity, private investment, unemployment, 
the payment of deficits and political instability and then these countries began to 
implement successful liberalisation programmes and the process of integration in the 
international economy. For instance, in the Turkish case the transition to democracy has 
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brought the governments, the employers and the workers' organisations to seek a closer 
relationship with Europe, and in particular with the European community. For 
employers the integration into Europe means more economic benefits whereas for trade 
unions the democratic institutions of Europe are expected to help the current 
democratisation process in Turkey. In this sense Turkey's democratisation process 
shows a certain similarity to the Southern European countries emerging out of 
dictatorships. 
The current analysis of the practice of Turkish unions needs to emphasise that the 
determinants of union strategy and tactics have had as much to do with the process of 
democratisation and ideological and political developments of the country. The political 
and economic changes have brought Turkey closer to the political mainstream in 
Europe. The changes in both international and domestic economic and political 
situations have forced Turkish governments to look for new policy alternatives abroad. 
Turkey's application for full EC membership may be seen in the context of her long 
journey towards modernisation. 
The conceptual framework employed in this study tries to understand trade unions and 
their role as institutions and processes of mediation. This study also attempts to show 
that although the mediating role of unions may take different directions (from "macro" 
to "micro" or from "economic" to "political" mediation) under the increased external 
pressures, the margin for union mediation can always reappear. This is mostly based on 
their capacity for both planning and co-ordinating new strategies and policies and 
mobilising their members against the government and employers' strategies. Thus, the 
Turkish case shows that unions might be forced to rebuild their structures, strategies and 
perspectives in relation to changing economic, political and institutional environments. It 
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also shows that by pursuing reactive responses to the external pressures, uruons can 
affect the nature of external and internal elements. 
Broadly speaking, the Ozal government's "labour exclusive" policies led to a general 
conflict against the previous labour relations. These were a partial integration of labour 
in the process of restructuring the institutions regulating the process of economic and 
political development of Turkey and Turkish capitalism. In short, until the late 1980s , 
unions were forced to move into a more uncertain situation involving new labour 
practices from the previous, relatively stable framework of relations. 
During this period, the responses of unions against the government's anti-union policies 
were defensive. However, as has been argued before, unions' policies and strategies may 
take different paths depending on the economic, political and institutional changes that 
confront the workers. Therefore, the external and, particularly, the internal pressures 
from rank-and-file, have forced the Turkish unions to make some crucial changes in their 
policies as well as their democratic and political rationalities. As a result, union leaders 
have adopted more reactive responses against the external pressures through mass 
industrial action and renewal of confrontation. The emergence of working class 
militancy was effective in discouraging the government's "labour exclusive" policies. 
Despite a restrictive legal framework for strikes, new forms of industrial action and the 
struggle adopted by Turkish unions have achieved crucial success. 
In the 1960s and 70s Turkish industrial relations was gradually developed by the state-
led arrangements in the name of establishing the balance between class forces. However, 
the 1980s challenges seem to have been a crucial element of a shift unfavourable to 
labour. An important shift in the traditional cultural and political attitudes of the ruling 
class towards labour has also brought about some considerable changes in the union 
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leaders and workers' attitudes. They have had the chance of exercising their capacity to 
influence the government's decisions through mobilising workers resistance rather than 
expecting the changes from above. 
It should be mentioned that the responses of the unions to the hostile attitude of the 
ruling class have not taken place merely through generalised class conflict. The struggle 
over anti-labour legislations, lay-offs and privatisation was an indication of conflict 
which has caused polarisation between capital and the working class. However, several 
agreements achieved in "social concertation" or "neo-corporatist" form of macro level 
wage-price bargaining, although involving only the public sector workers, lead to partial 
integration of labour in the process of restructuring of institutions regulating Turkish 
industrial relations. Privatisation has already provoked a struggle at the level of the 
public sector enterprises, since it tends to undermine the resources of most unions. At 
macro-level the government has sought some integration of unions in implementation of 
new austerity economic measures and restructuring of the political and social structure. 
In general, although the role of Turkish unions in industrial relations has been 
substantially reduced, the political mediating role has been maintained, as well as their 
capacity for mobilising workers' resistance against the governmenfs unilateral 
downward adjustment policies. 
Therefore, as in the case of Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, the governments and 
employers in Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s have come to give strong support to 
establishing a centralised "social and economic council" in the hope that this quasi-
concertative mechanism could be devised to generate sustained peace and considerable 
solutions within the systems. This was mainly due to increased industrial conflict and 
labour costs. 
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In addition, the Turkish government has become vulnerable to a new social environment 
since its own freedom of action has been increasingly subject to international 
developments. Thus, it was not so easy for the government to exercise complete "labour 
exclusive" policies without taking "political contingency" into account. On the other 
hand, Turkish unions displayed a great deal of strength and the capacity to utilise the 
external opportunities and pursued significant solidaristic policies in shaping a broader 
social and political agenda. In this respect, compared with the past, rank and file 
pressure, and other organisational developments (e.g. union democracy) have played a 
crucial role in reshaping the unions' policies and strategies. In other words, for the first 
time in Turkish trade union history Turkish unions have begun to influence the nature of 
their external environment. They have displayed substantial strength and unity in 
reacting against the government and employers' anti-union practices. 
The Europeanisation trend also presents considerable opportunities for umons to 
improve their situation. The key requirement seems to be reactive rather than defensive. 
In fact, Turkish unions are one of the few union movements in Europe to possess a 
solidarity between various unions, adopting policies and tactics which are uniform and 
centralised in many respects. The centralisation is secured by the existence of unified 
unions arranged through industrial base-unionism and the accumulation of power at the 
top level. There are no serious indications of union cohesion being eroded by 
fragmentation into unions with political or religious links, company-based unions or 
occupational unions. 
It can be argued that some more recent developments demonstrate that in the Turkish 
case, the margin for union mediation is still possible. In other words, due to worsening 
economic and political conditions and the important issue of national competitiveness, a 
national consensus is probably urged by the government and employers In this context, 
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a need for "dual bargaining" to provide multi-dimensional relations among social 
partners can emerge. While different form of decentralisation in collective bargaining at 
company level is still likely to be witnessed, particularly on the issues such as employee 
involvement programmes and financial motivation (performance-related pay), tripartite 
negotiations can be taken place at national level over the issues like wages and industrial 
peace. 
In this respect, the unions' confederation, TURK-IS, may be required to playa "political 
mediation" role at the national level. TURK-IS is more likely to be expected to play this 
role mainly to exercise sufficient authority to protect the institutional integrity and its 
political influence in labour-management relations. The question here is how 
fundamentally can these changes alter the traditional patterns of Turkish unions? Can 
they continue to develop counter-strategies? What are the serious options available for 
Turkish unions? These questions lead us to understand the changing role of Turkish 
unions in the light of more recent theoretical debates on the new roles and identities of 
the European unions. 
(ii) A discussion concerning alternative model of trade union actions m the 
1990s for Turkish unions. 
It can be argued that unions are trying to survive in a period of transition with profound 
changes in economic, social, political and cultural conditions. Therefore, they tend to 
adjust to external pressure by changing or redefining union identities, objectives and 
roles. The objectives and policies of the unions differ from each other, depending largely 
on the economic, political and social challenges threatening them. The key question here 
concerns what models or patterns will prevail in the 1990s in Europe and the extent to 
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which they also offer alternative models for Turkish unions. Although the elements of 
the present challenge are similar in most countries, unions can pursue divergent 
strategies. Therefore, it might be argued that unions can yield different models of 
struggle and of responses in terms of the countries' specific economic, social and 
political dynamics. 
With regards to question of trade union responses and identities, there has been more 
recent debate amongst academics, (e.g., Bassett 1986, Regini 1992, Valenzuela 1992 
and Hyman 1994) about the question of new union patterns or changing union identities. 
Hyman (1994b) has recently suggested five alternative trade union identities, namely: 
guild, friendly society, company union, social partner and social movement. He argues 
that when unions face serious crises, they may be driven to choices as an alternative to 
traditional institutions and arrangements. This depends on redefinition of interests, new 
patterns of internal democracy, broadening or narrowing of agenda and altered power 
tactics. He argues that "Trade union identity relates dialectically to the intersecting 
dynamics oj interests, democracy, agenda and power" (Hyman 1994b: 11). 
The aim here is to try to understand Turkish unions in the light of alternative trade union 
models in the European context. In this sense, the question of what is distinctive or 
exceptional about the experience of Turkish unions will be examined taking Hyman's 
ideal models as a starting-point. Careful analysis of the present position of trade unions' 
role and influence and alternative trade union models in Turkey may bring about a more 
cautious examination. Crouch (1993) argues that the dominant identities resulted from 
particular national trade union movements that reflect the specific context in which 
national organisations historically emerged. In this context, the character, role, 
objectives and identity of Turkish unions have reflected the circumstances of their 
formation. 
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Throughout this study, it has been argued that Turkish unions in the 1960s and 70s 
emerged between two models, business unionism and political economism. Union 
character was shaped by state actions or regulations as part of its industrialisation 
attempts. Hyman also talks about the other two models, anti-capitalist opposition 
(pursing class interests) and social integration (pursuing social interests). However, in 
the Turkish context these two models can be ignored, because, the former has never 
become a significant union identity in Turkey. Unlike the case in many other European 
countries, Turkish unions have not been influenced by a great deal of left-wing 
movements such as radical social-democracy, syndicalism and communism. Turkish 
governments, historically, did not put much emphasis on enduring political associative 
action. Since unions have not been allowed to set up any direct and organic relations 
with politics and political parties, union action has concentrated significantly on wages 
and employment conditions. In short, the Turkish working class has not had 
parliamentary representation, which would have added a dimension of parliamentary 
politics. In addition, unlike the situation in other Southern European countries, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, the Turkish labour movement did not develop any underground 
action combined with the socialist or communist organisations against the state 
repression, particularly during the dictatorships. Thus, anti-capitalist or state opposition 
labour movements did not emerge in Turkey. 
The model of social integration has also failed to develop clearly in Turkey. Several 
reasons can be given for this. Firstly, unionism with an Islamic identity has not been 
historically important (if we ignore the emergence of the new confederation, HAK-IS in 
the 1980s, because the objectives and structure of this confederation looks like more the 
business type and its role and influence are marginal in the Turkish labour movement). 
Second, there were attempts towards social-democratic unionism within the TURK-IS 
in the late-1970s in order to benefit from the ideology of the social welfare state. It did 
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not however become the dominant trend. Although this reformist approach within 
TURK-IS unions has never disappeared, it may be better understood in the context of 
the Turkish style of business unionism. This is, perhaps, because unions in Turkey have 
not totally become organisations for the representation of either social or occupational 
interests. Rather, we may safely talk about sectional interest representation reflecting the 
German style of industrial unionism. 
As has been pointed out elsewhere in this study, the economic and political strategies of 
Turkish governments in the 1960s and 70s required the recognition of unions as 
intermediary organisations in the consideration of social stability and economic 
development policies through "integration" or "collaboration" and sometimes "social 
contract". The characteristic of Turkish unions in the same period seemed to be as 
following: (1) they were less committed to the pursuit of political unionism or a political 
agenda, (2) there was an absence of formally established links with a single political 
party, (3) there was more concentration on "Bread and Butter" functions of unionism at 
the cost of the broad-social and political interests of the working class. This sort of 
unionism can be defined as "pure and simple unionism" (Hyman 1994a). However, when 
we look at the development of Turkish unions, especially in the late 1970s, in terms of 
ideological developments and the attempts for centralisation of union structure and 
"social contract", it might be an oversimplification to define Turkish unions as being of 
the Business type. Turkish unions in these periods were neither purely business nor 
"social contract" types but they may be identified between them. 
However, the established patterns of trade unionism have also been also challenged in 
Turkey in the last 15 years because of the profound changes in its external environment. 
Therefore a search for new identities has become a significant issue for Turkish unions , 
It has been claimed that the problems currently facing European unions derive from a 
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cnsls of political econOIIDsm. Hyman (1994b) suggests that trade uruons should 
reconstruct the interests and agenda of trade unionism by focusing on two significant 
areas which are the issue of work and employment and broader social concerns. In 
addition, a redefinition of trade union representation will allow unions to concentrate on 
different strategic orientations considering the members as producers, citizens, human 
capital and consumers. This, finally, leads to alternative trade union identities or ideal 
types grouped by Hyman as guild, friendly society, company union, social partner and 
social movement. 
Among Hyman's five ideal models, the models, company union, social partner and social 
movement will be discussed in the Turkish case. Firstly, the implementation of the 
company union in Turkey is difficult for political, economic, cultural and legal reasons. 
In fact, Turkey, as some other southern countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece, for 
example, has a different model of anti-labour, sometime authoritarian (mostly through 
military governments), pragmatic and procapitalist motivation of labour-management 
relations. In this sense, trade unions operate in the industrial relation systems confined 
by a detailed, complex and extensive employment regulation. 
The mam obstacle to company uruorusm m Turkey stems from the trade uruon 
legislation of 1983. According to this Act, unions can only organise on an industrial 
basis. Company unionism is not permitted by law. In addition, unlike the situation in 
most countries, the company level mechanisms of employee participation, team briefing, 
quality circles or consultative committees have not developed at a sufficient level in 
Turkey. It is a fact that apart from some large and multinational companies such as Koc 
Holding, Brisa and Siemens, the applications of the new organisational techniques 
including nT, TQM are not even being considered by the majority of firms in Turkey. 
The limited introduction of new managerial organisational practices also displays one of 
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the key barriers to the implementation of Japanese style company unionism. Particularly, 
in the manufacturing industry, changes in product market, production systems and 
management methods have been relatively stable. This means that F ordism "a pattern of 
capital accumulation" is still a significant model for the Turkish economic expansion. It 
can be argued that Turkey can also be regarded within a category of nation states which 
are considered to share a heritage of incomplete Keynesianism and regulation (Martinez 
Lucio and Blyton 1994). However, it is still likely that some developments towards 
"micro concertation" or "company level productivity coalitions" will be seen in return for 
job protection in the foreseeable future. If it happens, this kind of "micro concertation" 
is likely to be established in large, multinational and non-union firms in the private 
sector. Then we will be able to talk about "company unionism" or "company level 
employee relations" in Turkey. 
Therefore, it is safer to discuss political econorrusm, social partnership and social 
movement. Turkey's responses to the international economic developments of the last 
and new decades have represented a continuation of its efforts to increase industrial 
development and to broaden her exports base. In this context, the nature of and the 
scope of trade union action have given rise to serious problems for Turkish 
governments. The rise of the trade union question confronts Turkey as she seeks 
industrial export-led development under increasing international competition. Under 
these circumstances, Turkish unions have faced great challenges, not only because of 
changes in internal developments in economic and political structures but also the world 
economic recession and the growth of competition in world markets. Therefore, Turkish 
unions have become intolerable for the state and employers in the 1980s. On the other 
hand, unions have also been regarded as a sign of democratic elements to display to 
European partners in consideration of the application to join the EC. Thus, legal and 
institutional rules have discouraged government from complete erosion of the union 
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movement In Turkey. This is also, probably, because the purpose of Turkish 
governments has not only been to stabilise its problematic democracy, which is under 
heavy international pressure, but also to control inflation and the budget deficits through 
wide public sector agreements with unions. 
The Turkish trade union movement has been through a difficult period of economic and 
political unrest combined with high levels of unemployment existing side-by-side with 
high levels of inflation and balance of payments difficulties. Under these conditions, the 
hostility of the governments and employers has encouraged unions to take militant and 
oppositional stands against the ruling class. So there have been real and substantial shifts 
in actions and directions of Turkish unions, particularly in the late 1980s and at the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, radicalisation of TURK-IS' members seems to have 
been an outcome of tactical policy concerning both external and internal pressures, not a 
strategy. Intensified competition, technological change, transnationalisation of capital 
and fiscal crises of the state have not yet eroded the material basis of political 
economism in Turkey. 
The important wave of strikes, particularly in the public sector, in the late 1980s has 
forced the Turkish government to adopt a more positive attitude to collective 
bargaining. Therefore, the margin for concession bargaining, at least in public sector, has 
not disappeared in the same period. As with the Spanish, Irish and, to a lesser extent, 
Portuguese and Greek governments, the new government in Turkey at the beginning of 
the 1990s has tried to encourage a national system of concertation through a "new 
tripartite economic council" almost as much in order to stabilise political uncertainty'. 
mainly, the issue of democracy and industrial conflict as to implement the Th1F austerity 
economic programs for controlling inflation and the country's growing foreign debt 
problem. However, this attempt has failed, mostly because of rejection by trade unions 
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What was encouraged was the possibility that the government, trade uruons and 
employers' organisations could share responsibility for ensuring not only overall 
economic development, but also social and political stability. In this context, TURK-IS 
and its member unions were still considered as valued interlocutors by the government. 
The basis of national union authority undermined in the 1980s may have reversed at the 
beginning of the new decade. 
At this stage, we should raise the key questions again: How can trade unions in Turkey 
affect the extent and nature of current difficulties? Can trade unions produce effective 
responses to new external pressures? Do they have such capacities? What sort of 
opportunities and policies are available to unions and can Turkish unions possess an area 
of strategic choice in responding to the challenges and changes of the 1990s? It can be 
argued that unions do have such capacities and they can affect or influence the changing 
features of their environment. This can also lead us to Hyman's question: can models be 
combined in a form which is both effective and progressive? 
Turkish unions can posses an area of strategic choice in responding to the changes and 
challenges of external pressure. There are external and internal opportunities for the new 
policies which Turkish unions can pursue. Since the mid-1980s, the more Turkey has 
become open to the world and dependent on world trade and other international links, 
the harder it has become for the Turkish government to use direct political repression or 
explicit prohibitions. There has been increasing international pressure around the issues 
of linking EC membership access to respect for democracy and labour rights. In this 
sense, the future developments of trade unions might be related to the development of 
Turkish democracy and the increasing interdependence of Turkey with European 
countries. In fact, Turkish unions have been campaigning for bringing trade union rights 
to the level of international standards. Although future developments in the Turkish 
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trade union movement will depend widely on internal political and econoffil'C h a C an,::,e. 
they can be influenced and supported by external factors. In this case, European-linked 
labour movements and even transnational trade union links might become part of the 
significant agenda of Turkish unions. 
This also leads us to Hyman's final model, social movement. If trade unions in Turkey 
claim to be part of a process of building a wider and deeper civil democratic society 
within a European context, the issue of democracy is likely to be pushed to the centre of 
political discussion by the action of unions and of workers themselves. Therefore, new 
democratic trade unionism can be established by demanding the objectives of both 
improving the material conditions of workers and their broad political and social 
interests under a slogan of democratisation. By gaining mass support trade unions as 
populist campaigning organisations can centre on a "Democracy movement". 
It may be suggested that bringing broader political questions and raising demands about 
the issue of democracy, Turkish unions can be successful in defending more effectively 
and progressively the workers' broad interests in the economic and political fields. 
Waterman (1993:247) argues that "the major international movement of the present day 
is not so much a labour or socialist one as a broad, varied and complex democratic 
movement (of which labour is one part)", For him, in this new process, trade unions are 
to playa significant role in relation to new forms of subordination and oppression. Thus, 
the important emphasis should be given to new forms of struggle and democracy. 
It is a fact that unlike most other European countries, the old socialist-egalitarian 
ideologies have not had a significant influence on the Turkish working class. Therefore, 
it would be much easier to develop new identities resulting from collectivist or 
solidaristic labour movements. The new unifying ideology, mainly centred on 
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"democracy" may bring about "co-operation" or "solidarity" among individuals in formal 
and informal sectors, unemployed, different working groups etc. For example, in the 
Turkish case, the emergence of the recent civil servants' movements is a crucial 
opportunity for central confederations. The most important issue for TURK-IS becomes 
the unionisation of civil servants as well as the unionisation of expanding sectors, in 
particular, service sector workers or white-collar trade unions. A separate confederation 
for these working groups would damage the solidaristic trade union movement. 
Therefore, the task for TURK-IS is to create new objectives and policies in which the 
possible diversification in the demand of new working groups and the old ones can be 
reduced. This seems an important issue. Because, in contrast with many other countries, 
in some traditional industries such as steel, docks and coal-mining trade unions have still 
maintained their members (although they have recently been losing significant numbers 
of members due more recent developments in privatisation, closure of plants and 
massive lay-offs). Nevertheless, their role and influence within TURK-IS is still 
significant. This is also, indeed, important to sustain some solidaristic policies within the 
confederation. TURK-IS's recent attempts to strengthen its relations with other 
confederations, HAK-IS, DISK and to defend the civil servants' movement against the 
government can be regarded as a sign of a new direction and orientation and role for the 
Turkish labour movement (TURK-IS 1994). 
In short, TURK-IS and its members might redefine their policies and objectives to 
pursue the material interest of their members as well as a broader and more generalising 
social and political agenda. This also requires new forms of struggle, of demands in 
collective bargaining and internal democracy within unions themselves. All these 
developments might lead the government to have different degrees of toleration for 
workers' organisation. The government and employers' organisations may require trade 
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union mediation once more, again through social partnership since the government's 
economic and political stability has been insecure due to external and internal pressure 
and problems. Therefore, there is a possibility of some developments towards political 
exchange or concession bargaining at macro level by a "centralised political negotiation" 
in the coming years. 
It can be argued that in parallel with the developments in Turkish democracy, Turkish 
unions have been marked by periods of instability. Their strategies, policies and choices 
seem to have been as products of specific economic, social, political, cultural conditions 
and the contradiction of Turkish capitalism. In fact, different trade unions in different 
industries have displayed similar responses to changes in the economic and political 
environment. These unifying responses have been recently combined with the 
"democracy movement" and "solidaristic policies" within the labour movement. 
It is a serious challenge for Turkish unions to pursue effective and progressive forms of 
trade unionism which not only defend the economic and broad political and social 
interests of workers, but also help to contribute to a country which claims that it is 
moving democratically, socially and culturally in the direction of European countries as a 
whole. However, the question of which alternative model of trade unionism can take 
shape in Turkey will be determined by the actions of trade unions and workers 
themselves in the future. It seems that the rise of new identities for Turkish unions opens 
a crucial new era in the history of trade unionism in Turkey. 
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